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The Review of Metaphysics

A PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

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CHANGE AND ITS SOURCES

GEORGE A. BLAIR, S.J.

1. *The First Dilemma*

1.1. *Basic assumptions*

Philosophical inquiry frequently depends more upon the initial attitude of the inquirer than it does on the nature of the problem itself. And so, before starting an investigation of change, it would be well to make explicit where we are starting from. We shall assume two things as self-evident: (1) that the mind's representation of the reality which it knows is fundamentally accurate; and (2) that nothing happens without a sufficient reason. From these principles it follows that to demand from reality an accounting for the way in which it presents itself to us is not illegitimate, and that an assertion based only upon indirect evidence can at times be valid. As we proceed, the implications of this basic attitude will emerge more clearly.

1.2. *The dilemma*

Change is one of experience's most evident data. The man who has finished reading is different from the same man before he started; the book he has read was once a tree. But if the fact is clear, it hides a very profound problem. Examining change, we see from experience that things do not come to be out of nothing; other things turn into them. The principle of sufficient reason confirms this, since a pure negation can never be a sufficient reason for anything. But if this is true, then neither can the negation of an attribute (or of a totally different way of being) provide a sufficient reason for its emergence in an already existing thing; this would be tantamount to saying that the attribute came from nothing. Nor, if the thing really changes, can we say simply that an external agent "pours in" some of its perfection, since then it

would not change, but only receive a metaphysical coat of paint. And so, we seem to have forced ourselves into a dilemma: things must be what they are, and yet they must themselves be in some sense what they are not. If we deny the first part there is nothing to change; if the second, change is unintelligible, and hence impossible.

A priori we know that there is a way out of this dilemma, because change cannot be radically unintelligible. But in solving a generic problem such as this, it seems that we have nothing to go on except the fact that there is a solution.

Experience and experiment will not help us, because at the time when any observation of a change is possible the difficulty we are here considering has already come and gone. However, we are not at a complete loss; the mere fact of knowing the possibility of a solution enables us to grasp a good deal of what its nature is. The method by which this can be done is quite simple. (1) The principle of sufficient reason tells us that our problem has a solution. (2) A study of the problem tells us that it is inexplicable unless its solution has such-and-such a property. (3) We then conclude that there is something with this property. At first glance, this looks like a neat way of avoiding work; but it is really only a general statement of what happens in any theoretical investigation. Newton used it to "discover" force; Yukawa used it to predict the meson. These entities were posits, forced upon the theorists by necessities inherent in the theory itself; if the theory was correct, their existence was assured.¹

1.3. *The posits*

Applying this method to the dilemma of change, then, we shall require two entities, since a single being cannot have contradictory properties. The first posit, which we shall call the

¹ A scientific theory will, if it is true, have a number of conclusions which can be experimentally tested. It is clearly a strong argument for the validity of a theory if entities predicted are actually discovered. Metaphysical theories, on the other hand, since they deal with more generic questions, are seldom so neatly verifiable; the major test of the truth of a metaphysical system seems to be that its conclusions do not contradict the spontaneous common-sense judgments of the intelligent man.

actuality of the thing, will be that in the being which accounts for the fact it is what it is; the other, to be called the thing's *potentiality*, will be that which accounts for the thing's being what it is not. These names are given because by the first posit a thing is actually something, and by the second it has a power to be changed.² They are called *posits* in the sense that they are affirmed without direct experimental evidence in order to give a sufficient reason for a given set of facts, not in the sense that they are hypothetical entities which may or may not actually exist. In this particular case their existence happens to be necessary, because no matter what explanation is given of change, its double aspect must be accounted for. But though they may certainly exist, they cannot be "things" in the ordinary sense of the word; a thing is single, even though when it changes we know it to be composed of these two entities. It will avoid confusion if these posits are called *sources* of certain aspects of a thing, so that they will not tend to be reified.³

For clarity's sake, let us place here exact definitions of our posits. *Actuality* means only and precisely *that* (whatever its nature) *which accounts for the fact that a thing is what it is*. *Potentiality* means *that which accounts for the fact that a thing is what it is not*. Ordinary connotations of the words are to be excluded; refinement of their meaning cannot come from within, but only by examination of the dilemma which they explain.

1.4. *First solution of the problem*

These, then, are the tools we are working with; progress now depends on how well we can know what they are to work on. Possibly the first thing to be noticed about change is that it is divisible into two distinct types: (1) that in which the substance remains the same, while the being is altered in some respect, as

² I use these particular words rather than *act* and *potency*, because the former in English connotes action or activity, and the latter an active sort of capacity, neither of which senses seems happy in the context.

³ This seems to me to be the most reasonable translation of *principium* (i.e., that from which a thing proceeds); the English cognate "principle" refers mainly to propositions of this nature.

when a man reads;⁴ (2) that in which the substance becomes something completely different, as when an animal dies. The former is *accidental* change, the latter *substantial* change.

1.4.1. *Accidental change.* Of accidental change this much we know already: (1) that an existing thing becomes other in some non-essential respect, and (2) that the sources Actuality and Potentiality will account for the process.⁵ In this case the Actuality is not the thing itself, but the respect from which and toward which the thing changes. For example, a leaf Actually is green, but is Potentially red.

We seem so far to have no information on the Potentiality; a mere division into types of change cannot tell us anything about how a change is possible. But we can draw some conclusions regarding the Actuality: (1) that the respect in which the being changes, the accident, is an accidental Way of Existing,⁶ and (2) that it is the Actuality in an accidental change. By Way of Existing I intend the usual signification of the phrase: that whereby a thing is red, or heavy, or extended, etc. Now it is evident from observation that a thing can at one time exist in more than one such way: it can be green and small, green and large, etc.⁷ From reflection we can learn that the Way of Existing is distinct from the thing which exists in this way, for two reasons: (1) because one is Actuality and in the other resides Potentiality, different because they account for different facts; and (2) because the Way of Existing can disappear without essentially affecting the thing. When we speak of distinctions, however, we must keep

⁴ By *substance* here, I mean *the sufficient reason for the intelligible* (as opposed to merely observable) *unity of a being*. It also means *the being in its intelligible unity*. Thus, for example, a man is a substance, since his activities manifest an intelligible unity in him; but a chair is not a substance, since it has no property that cannot be understood as following from a mere summation of its parts.

⁵ Henceforward when words are being used in a technical sense they will be given a capital initial.

⁶ This phrase is what I shall use in place of St. Thomas' *forma*, since, as will later appear, I think it will express more accurately, though not so compactly, the meaning of his term.

⁷ Though it cannot be green and red, since these are two species of the same type of accident. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 85, a. 4, ad 2.

in mind that two Sources of a thing may be really distinct without destroying the unity of the thing which they constitute.*

1.4.2. *Substantial change.* Deeper knowledge of change comes in considering its other form, substantial change. The profound alteration which takes place, for example, when an animal dies—when it changes from an intelligible unit to an aggregate of chemicals with a mere observable unity—will give us light on both of the Sources of change.

1.4.2.1. *The potentiality.* In attacking this problem, we shall first consider the Potentiality in some of its more obvious aspects, leaving aside one extremely important property which can logically be discovered only as a resolution of a new dilemma arising from a consideration of the Actuality.

The Potentiality is what accounts for the possibility of a change; it is the Source of a thing's being something else. In section 1.2. we saw that in change one thing cannot be said to be annihilated and another created; from which it follows that there must be some being or Source which may be said to undergo the change and be common to both terms of the change.⁸ In the case of substantial change, this can be nothing but the Potentiality.¹⁰ This leads us to consider as legitimate the statement that the Potentiality is Potentiality for what the thing happens to be as well as Potentiality for what it actually is not, in the sense that it "underlies," so to speak, each Actuality, and also that if the thing possessing this Potentiality is once any definite being, there is no

* There is a Scholastic dispute on what "really distinct" means. The meaning here intended (which is that held in the Thomistic school) is that *a* is really distinct from *b* when there is an *a* and there is a *b*, and *a* is not *b*. Others say that *a* and *b* are really distinct only when they are separable; still others when they are two separate *things*.

⁸ By a *term (terminus)* of a change, I mean either that thing which existed before the process, or that which exists after it.

¹⁰ This is true because by definition of this type of change, the *thing* cannot be common to both terms, nor can the Actuality, the Source by which a given thing is this thing and not another. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* ix. 9. 1051a 5-17. From this point onward, since the terminology and approach will tend to be increasingly my own, I shall make it a point to provide confirmatory references from Aristotle or St. Thomas to show that the content of what I have to say is for the most part traditional.

reason *a priori* why it cannot at a later time actually be that definite being again. This would seem to imply that every change is theoretically reversible, which gives rise to the difficulty that in actual fact reversibility is, if anything, the exception rather than the rule. No one expects to hear his dead dog bark. We cannot deal with this objection just yet, though it will receive some answer before our investigation is at an end.

Considering the variety of changes in the universe, and especially in view of modern nuclear research, it would seem probable that material things have a fundamental Potentiality to be any other material thing, even including certain types of energy. This is not to say that a thing can be anything you please at once, but given enough intermediate changes, any given product could very likely result from any given starting-point. If this is true, it leads to the question, "Why are many steps necessary?" The Potentiality is the same in all of them. Why is it that things change in definite and predictable ways into definite and predictable products?

The obverse of this question arises when one notices the fact that Potentiality is restricted in its nature only by the totality of possible changes, which may, as we said, include the totality of possible material beings. Of itself, then, it is completely indeterminate. True, it is constituted—put into existence—by being a Source of an actual being, but this has no effect upon its nature as Potentiality.¹¹ The difficulty with this assertion is that this indeterminate Potentiality is that which accounts for the possibility of change, which is always determinate. But something indeterminate can never be a sufficient reason for what is determinate. Hence it seems that we have destroyed the whole function of Potentiality and with it the Potentiality itself, since its existence was posited

¹¹ Cf. Aristotle, *Physics*, i. 9. 192a 25-34, and St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 66, a. 2, c. It will have been observed by Scholastic philosophers that I am avoiding the word *matter* in this context; the reason is that I am convinced that *matter* in the sense of Potentiality for substantial change is not only not the matter which we spontaneously think of, but also not "material" in the normal sense of the word (i.e., not palpable, etc.). From a later consideration of what I believe to be the proper nature of this Potentiality we shall be able to give it a distinctive name.

solely for this function. The contradiction, however, is only apparent, as again we shall see in the proper place.

One final and rather mysterious property of the Potentiality, and we shall be able to go on to a consideration of the Actuality. The Potentiality does not account for the being as it exists, since this is the function of Actuality.¹² From this it follows that Potentiality by itself has no meaning; that is, there is never any state of affairs such that it could be called simply Potentiality.¹³

1.4.2.2. *The Actuality.* In substantial change, as in accidental change, the Actuality can be called the Way of Existing of the thing, since it is what accounts for the thing's being what it is. However, the two differ in that the Actuality of substantial change accounts for the thing as a thing—for the fact that it is *this* thing and not another—while the Actuality of accidental change accounts only for some nonessential respect.¹⁴ The substantial change itself consists in the disappearance of one substantial Way of Existing and its replacement by another. One is spontaneously inclined to ask, "What happened to the first Way of Existing, and where did the second come from?" In one sense, this is like asking where the light goes when it goes out,¹⁵ but in another sense it is quite justified, and deserves consideration.

With regard to the second part of the question, then, where the second Way of Existing came from, we know that the principle of sufficient reason demands an explanation not only of the existence but of the determinateness of the new Way of Existing. The Potentiality, as Source of the possibility of change, can explain the *fact* of a new Way of Existing (since this fact is included in the notion of change), but as itself indeterminate it cannot explain the new Actuality's determinateness. Nor can the former Way of Existing explain the new one's determinateness, since it has nothing to do with the new Way of Existing. Hence we are forced to look outside the being to the agent. Now this agent must be

¹² Of course, it accounts for the fact that the being is mutable, but this is playing with words.

¹³ Cf. Arist. *Metaph.*, ix. 8. 1049b 4-1050a 23.

¹⁴ Cf. St. Thomas, *S.T.* I, q. 77, a. 6, c.

¹⁵ The Scholastic "answer" *eductio e potentia materiae*, in reality only shows the absurdity of the question.

itself determinate, or we have the same difficulty as we had above with the Potentiality; and this determination can occur in one of two ways. (1) The agent may be determined by its own substantial Way of Existing in such a manner that it produces something like itself, as when an animal begets offspring; or (2) an accidental Way of Existing in the agent may determine a similar substantial Way of Existing in the effect, as when a knowing agent produces something from a pre-conceived plan. This provides a partial answer to the difficulty raised above concerning the indeterminateness of the Potentiality, but only a partial answer, since the agent cannot produce any effect it pleases from any being it pleases. As a matter of fact, the Way of Existing of the effect is more often than not determined somehow by the being which is acted on rather than that which acts upon it; the part the agent seems to play in many or most changes is to set the process of change in motion—to determine the *when* of the change rather than the *what*.¹⁶ So, except in a few cases, the problem of how the Potentiality can determine a change remains.

We might notice, however, that it is the Way of Existing which determines the agent's activity; and it is true in all cases that the substantial Way of Existing is the source of activity, since a being acts according to what it is.¹⁷ This is so true that men spontaneously think they have a sufficient grasp of what a thing is

¹⁶ That the being acted upon determines the *what* of the change is not true in all cases, however. Offspring, for example, are formed ultimately from the food the parent animal eats; but it makes no difference whether a canary is fed on birdseed or on caterpillars—it still produces canary chicks. The question here is this: to what extent is the Way of Existing of the effect dependent upon the efficient cause? Tomes have been written on the subject, so it can hardly be expected that half a paragraph and footnote will make anything clear. This much is certain: the new Way of Existing cannot explain itself; therefore something other than it (call it the adequate cause, if you will) must provide a complete explanation, and hence must precontain it in some way. Cf. St. Thomas, *S.T. I*, q. 4, a. 2, c.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 179, a. 1, ad 1. This fact gives rise to that rather odd-sounding principle that the agent as agent is not changed when it acts. It acts because of its Actuality, which is the Source of stability rather than change; if it changes in acting (as most things do), this is purely accidental to the fact of its agency, and only happens because it also possesses Potentiality and is affected by the re-agency of what it acts upon. But granted a thing that was nothing but Actuality, it would produce changes without being affected at all. Cf. *ibid.*, I, q. 2, a. 3, c., "*Prima Via*."

if they know what it does. Hence, the Way of Existing is a sort of power; but one must not confuse this active power with Potentiality, the Source of the possibility of *being* changed.

Now in answer to the first part of the question raised at the beginning of this section, of what happened to the old Way of Existing, it may be simply said that its disappearance is accounted for by the occurrence of the new Way of Existing.¹⁸ This rests upon two reasons: (1) that the Way of Existing explains completely how the being is what it is, and (2) that every being that is really only one being is a substantial unit. Hence it cannot have two Ways of Existing at one time, or there is no sufficient reason for its unity.¹⁹ As we have stated the argument, it sounds almost absurdly obvious; yet this particular little point has been the subject of many a Scholastic argument for centuries, the more so because it has rather far-reaching implications. My own opinion of how the confusion arose is that those who originated the theory, though they themselves knew what they meant by Actuality, never defined it precisely.²⁰ People took it to mean some sort of perfection, or the Source of activity, definitions which in the first place are vague enough to admit any number of consequences, and which in the second place have no direct connection with an explanation of change, the whole reason for which the Source was originally posited. With such a notion as a starting point, it is no wonder that the theory has branched off in sundry directions, since it is only a shrewd intuition rather than solid reasoning that could keep one on the right track.

A consideration of the notion itself of the Way of Existing will give us the few additional properties necessary for a radical advance in our investigation. First, the Way of Existing, *looked at in itself*,

¹⁸ Cf. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 28, a. 1, c.

¹⁹ That is, it cannot have two *substantial* Ways of Existing, though it may have many accidents. On this point, cf. St. Thomas, *S.T.*, I, q. 77, a. 2, ad 3; and I, q. 77, a. 6, c.

²⁰ Aristotle, for example, when he is trying to define Actuality, says that it is what is not Potentiality, and then says that everybody knows what he is talking about and that you can't expect to have a definition of everything. See *Metaph.*, ix. 6. 1048a 25-b 6. He would have been a bit more careful if he could have seen what people were going to do with this "perfectly obvious" posit.

must be unique,²¹ because there cannot be another Way of Existing unless it is an *other* Way of Existing; that is, there can be only one of this Way of Existing, since in order for there to be two, the second must be somehow distinguishable from the first, which automatically makes it a different Way of Existing.²² Secondly, looked at in itself, the Way of Existing is unlimited. This is not to say that it cannot be limited, but that limitation is not intrinsic to the Way of Existing itself, which is essentially such-and-such a Way of Existing, with no further qualification.²³

1.4.3. Recapitulation. Before proceeding to the next step of the theory, let us sum up what has been learned up to this point, to enable us to refer more conveniently to what we have said. We know, then, about the Potentiality:

- (1) that it is common to both terms of a change,
- (2) that it probably is Potentiality for everything material,
- (3) that it is Potentiality for what the being possessing it actually is,
- (4) that of its nature it is indeterminate, and
- (5) that of itself it possesses no reality.

About the Actuality, we know:

- (6) that it is the Way of Existing of the thing,
- (7) that it is really distinct from the Potentiality,
- (8) that it is the Source of activity,
- (9) that there is but one in a single being,
- (10) that of its nature it is unique, and
- (11) that of its nature it is unlimited.

Our theory also must eventually answer:

- (12) why all changes do not seem to be reversible,
- (13) how indeterminate Potentiality can determine a definite change, and
- (14) how the Potentiality can be intelligible at all if proposition (5) is true.

²¹ Cf. St. Thomas, *S.T.*, I, q. 50, a. 4, c.

²² This seems to be what Ludwig Wittgenstein is getting at in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (New York, 1951), p. 37, where he says, "For if a thing is not distinguished by anything, I cannot distinguish it—for otherwise it would be distinguished."

²³ Cf. St. Thomas, *S.T.*, I, q. 50, a. 2, ad 4.

There is also a rather serious difficulty against the Actuality, which we shall see presently.

2. The Second Dilemma

2.1. The Dilemma

If we want to proceed in this investigation by setting up dilemmas, we now have no lack of material. Yet we will reach our goal most quickly if we take a dilemma arising from a difficulty not yet proposed: that resulting from proposition (10) of section 1.4.3. If every Way of Existing is unique and hence not multipliable, how can we account for the fact that there are many beings possessing identical Ways of Existing? We know things by expressing the unity of one thing with another, by saying that this is a man and that is a man, that this is red and that is red; the "man" or the "red" has exactly the same significance in both "this" and "that," and as far as humanity or redness goes the two are one. We cannot avoid the issue by saying that this is a trick brought on by the way our knowing apparatus works, because we presupposed in the very beginning (Assumption (1) of section 1.1.) that our way of knowing reality refers accurately to the reality known. And so, different beings have the same Way of Existing, and yet this is impossible, because there can be only one of each Way of Existing.

We now require a Source to explain how Ways of Existing can be multiplied. But in doing this, we discover we also need a Source to explain their limitation, since if anything is possessed by two beings, neither one of them possesses all of it, and hence in each being it is found in a limited way. It should be noted that as multiplication necessarily presupposes limitation, so that fact of limitation gives rise to the possibility of multiplication. Hence, what we really need is a Source to explain the limitation of Actuality.

Now then, this Source cannot be intrinsic to the Actuality, because then the Actuality would be both intrinsically unlimited and intrinsically limited, which is absurd. But we already have a Source extrinsic to the Actuality and at the same time correlative to

it: the Potentiality, whose function in the constitution of the actual being has not yet been defined.²⁴ As a preliminary confirmation that we may without violence allow the Potentiality to assume the duty of limiting the Way of Existing, let us observe that a being "seeks to change" because it "desires" to be less limited—that change is naturally perfective, not destructive; and so limitation of the Way of Existing is involved in the *why*, at least, of change—a fact which links it to the Potentiality, the source of the possibility of change.

2.2. *First reevaluation of the theory*

In the being as it actually exists, the Potentiality takes its reality from the Way of Existing, the Source by which the being is what it is; hence if it is true that the Potentiality explains the limitation of the Way of Existing, this property is probably its chief and essential one, with the others, even that of being Source of change, flowing necessarily from it. We shall see that this is the case. It will not do to object that the Potentiality was posited solely as Source of the possibility of change, and that therefore this must always be its primary property, because the purpose of investigation is to discover *what is meant* by "Source of the possibility of change," which involves how the Potentiality can be such a source. It is on this deeper level that we are now working.

Since we have been giving things names from their properties, let us now re-name the Potentiality and call it the *Limitation* of the Way of Existing. I intend this Limitation to be taken in the sense that it is somehow extrinsic to the essence of the Actuality itself: that it is *not* the Actuality, that the definition of Actuality does not include Limitation; but it is to be understood that the whole proper function of the Limitation is precisely *to be* the limitation of Actuality. Together, the Way of Existing and the Limitation constitute the single, unified, limited thing or being, because the Way of Existing, limited, is *one*. The Limitation now has proper intelligibility in the being as it exists, and so the difficulty of proposition (14) in section 1.4.3. has been answered.

²⁴ This is the meaning of proposition (5) of section 1.4.3, which was stated rather starkly. It will be observed that we are on the road to a solution of the difficulty proposed in proposition (14) of the same section.

It might make the idea expressed in the last paragraph clearer if a rather crude analogy were given to illustrate it. Consider a wooden ball. If the Way of Existing of a limited being were taken as parallel to what the ball is made of—the wood, then the Limitation would be parallel to the spherical surface. In one sense, the ball is totally wood; the surface is in this view only where the wood leaves off. The surface is not the wood, though it is the “stopping”—the limit—of the wood. However, one cannot say that any old chunk of wood is a ball, since a ball must have a spherical surface; and so the surface, in spite of the fact that it is not intrinsic to the nature of the *wood*, is included in the essence of *ball*. And though at first sight it would be considered nothing at all, with reference to the ball itself it has a very real function.²⁵

Before we attempt to see what explanation can now be given of change, it would be well to examine the various ways in which the Limitation can be considered. First of all, it can be taken in the abstract, as the Limitation (in general) of the Way of Existing. In this sense it is completely indeterminate, belonging to every being which has a limited Way of Existing; the concept, as universal, is in its own way “unlimited,” since it is a consideration of the essential nature of Limitation, prescinding from the way in which it appears in the concrete. Secondly, it may be considered in the concrete, where it becomes *this* Limitation of *this* particular Way of Existing, and where it becomes distinguished from every other Limitation by constituting the unique being which I designate by “this”.²⁶ This distinction solves the diffi-

²⁵ This analogy must not be pushed too far, since an actual (as opposed to an analogical) analysis of a ball is rather the other way round: what makes a ball a ball is mainly the surface or shape, and what makes it *this* individual ball is the Potentiality or Limitation. In addition, in the case of a ball we are in the accidental order, shape being an accidental Way of Existing of whatever the ball is made of. The analogy is in my opinion a good one, however, as long as one remembers that it is only an analogy.

²⁶ And so the Limitation becomes the Source of individuation of things with the same Way of Existing, as one would expect. Aristotelian scholars will have noticed that since we arrived at this second dilemma, we have broken completely with Aristotle's ideas on Act and Potency, and have in fact turned them upside down. Thomists will possibly object from here on that I am pushing Thomistic principles too far. I can only answer that I am not trying to write a commentary upon Aristotle or St. Thomas, but am

culty proposed in proposition (13) of section 1.4.3. that an indeterminate Potentiality cannot determine a definite change. The answer is that in the concrete case of a definite change the Limitation—the Potentiality—is not indeterminate at all, but is a particular Limitation of a particular Way of Existing.

A consideration of Limitation also involves a consideration of what follows from a being because of its Limitation. The first of these consequences is that of quantity, which as the foundation for all measurement necessarily includes limitation in its essence. It is in fact the manifestative property of the Limitation: as the latter is the limitation of the thing in its intelligible unity, so quantity is the limitation of the thing in its relations with other things. It is this quantitative limitation, in the second place, which provides the foundation for all those other accidental Ways of Existing which seem to require limitation in order to exist, such as color, odor, hardness, etc., as opposed to goodness, intelligence, etc. A thorough examination of these two consequences of being as limited would disclose that all those properties which we associate with a material thing as material either follow directly from its Limitation or from Actualities which can be quantified and hence limited. This is where the Scholastic idea of Limitation as "matter" came from.²⁷

2.2.1. *Change.* Let us now see what light our findings shed on the process of change. Though I am not unaware of difficulties in the explanation to be given, I feel that it answers more questions than it raises.

Before the change there is an agent determined by its Way of Existing, and the changeable being whose Way of Existing possesses a definite Limitation. The agent acts on the subject through the Limitation²⁸ in such a way that the Way of Existing is

attempting to get at the truth in their theories. It will be seen that pushing the Thomistic notion of Potentiality to its logical conclusions will do no damage to his system.

²⁷ I am afraid the reader must take this on faith; the "thorough examination" suggested above would amount to a small book. On the division here made of Limitation or "matter," see St. Thomas, *S.T. I*, q. 85, a. 1, ad 2.

²⁸ It acts on the whole subject, of course, but it only acts on it because the subject is limited.

first modified accidentally, and finally can no longer support the altered Limitation even by accidental modifications and must give way to the Actuality or Actualities which are capable of supporting this new Limitation. For example, mercuric oxide is heated in a test tube. What first happens is that it becomes hot; that is, that the hotter, more energetic molecules of glass "strike" the less energetic oxide molecules, producing in them a Limitation which disposes them for faster motion. When this has reached a certain intensity, one molecule in "striking" another produces a Limitation so great that the molecule is no longer disposed to move, but simply cannot exist. Then whatever can exist with this Limitation, in this case the two beings mercury and oxygen, are the result of the change.

2.2.2. Conclusions. One will note that in the change just described the result is always some definite and predictable quantity of the same two products: mercury and oxygen. This is because the Limitation of mercuric oxide is the Limitation of a definite Way of Existing, and is affected in a definite way by a definite agent. Hence, given the same type of agent and the same conditions, the Limitation of the first term of a change becomes the Limitation of only one or (if two products result every time) two particular beings; and since quantity follows directly from the Limitation, the products will manifest the quantity of the original being. This solves the remaining difficulty against the Potentiality proposed as number (12) of section 1.4.3, that all changes are not necessarily reversible. For it is quite conceivable that the Limitation of the products, especially those resulting from the breakdown of some delicately balanced organism like an animal, has been so altered that it cannot be brought back by natural agencies into that precise state which can support the original Way of Existing. This explanation of change also allows one to account for the unity of a being, and at the same time to show how other beings are said to be virtually present in it. The Ways of Existing of hydrogen and oxygen are not actually present in water, because there is but one Way of Existing in a single being; and besides if they were they would have to manifest all their essential properties, which is clearly not the case. But the molecule of water has a Limitation which is in many respects like

the Limitation of hydrogen and oxygen (even to the extent, probably, of being more like hydrogen in some parts and more like oxygen in other), and which disposes itself more readily toward the Ways of Existing of hydrogen and oxygen when acted on."²⁹

3. *The Third Dilemma*

3.1. *The dilemma*

We have up to now been avoiding one problem, the final one of this investigation, a problem whose solution will again necessitate an alteration in our theory. This is the problem of existence. We have the notion of "thing," by the predication of which we can unify all reality; and the foundation of this notion of "thing" or "being" is the affirmation of the existence of each object which we call a thing.³⁰ It must be noted that the affirmation of existence comes in the judgment, not in a concept, and hence reaches out to reality in its own unique way. When we form the pseudo-concept "existence" we have done so in the following way: we have realized that the judgment affirming existence reaches reality, and that therefore there is a foundation in reality for the judgment; then we take this foundation, which is not

²⁹ I really ought to append here a consideration of accidents in the light of the modified theory. But besides the fact that the subject is obscure and exceedingly complex, and would require page upon page to develop, I am not at all satisfied with any explanation I am at present able to give. Not that I see contradictions between what I would propose and man's experience (an argument that would destroy this theory), but I suspect that to attain a true notion of an accident one would have to probe rather deeply into a reexamination of Scholastic psychology, a thing which I have not yet been able to do.

³⁰ That the affirmation of existence has any scientific value is something denied by many modern philosophers. I have no intention here of entering double-listed into the wrangle, but a word should be said to show that Scholastics are not being deceived by their emotions. What I am asserting when I say that "x exists" is the extra-mental foundation for my knowing that I am not deceived in talking about x. By "extra-mental foundation" I do not mean the *evidence* (e.g., sense experience, etc.), but that which accounts for there *being* evidence. Existence, from this viewpoint, is the ground of actual, as opposed to hypothetical, knowledge; but it is more than this. It is the ground, as said above, of the unification of all objects known. This is not to say that existence is knowing, but that it is a sufficient reason accounting for two evident psychological facts.

directly conceptualizable, and make a concept of it as the foundation of a correct judgment. In other words, the abstract word "existence" means "that in reality by which an affirmative judgment is correct."

Now since the affirmation of existence is the foundation also of the notion of "thing," by which we unify all reality, it follows that existence must be some sort of Actuality. This is so because (1) it is clearly not itself a thing, and hence must be a Source; but (2) it is such a Source as to be in its own nature unique—since by it things become unified—and in its own nature limitless, being limited in the concrete only because it appears in more than one being. But, as we saw in section 2.1, a Source which has these two properties is an Actuality, not a Potentiality. And so existence is an Actuality, but what kind of Actuality?³¹ Any reality, whether thing or Source, presupposes existence, and so existence must be the Actuality of the highest order. Its Potentiality—its Limitation—is basically what we have called the Way of Existing, that Source by which existence is limited to being *this type* of existence, and no other. The existence is limited to being *this individual* of *this type* of existence by the Limitation of the Way of Existing.

3.2. *Final reevaluation of the theory*

But if the Way of Existing is in reality a limitation of existence, then it follows that the true Actuality, the whole reality, of any being is existence,³² something which sounds reasonable enough. Each being, then, is an existence, with the fact that is *an* existence and not simply existence accounted for by the Way of Existing and its Limitation.

The Way of Existing, as the name here given it implies, cannot even be thought of without existence, because of its nature it has a reference to existence. But as a limitation of existence, it is *not* existence—existence is of itself unlimited and the Way of

³¹ Here again we have been avoiding Scholastic disputes. The old quarrel of whether essence is really distinct from existence or not hinges upon whether existence is an Actuality or not; how existence is attained and what its meaning is are questions answered in vastly different ways by different Scholastic (and non-Scholastic) thinkers.

³² Cf. St. Thomas, *S.T.*, I, q. 5, a. 1, c.

Existing is its limitation. Nor is it another reality added to existence from without; this is absurd. It is rather a contraction of existence into one species. So the limited existence is a single thing, not a coalescence of two things; without the limitation however, the existence would be infinite, and without the existence, the limitation would be an unthinkable nonentity. It follows from this that the Way of Existing is Actuality only in a secondary sense, referring to its own Limitation, and always presupposing existence. This is why it is said that the Way of Existing "gives existence" to the being.³³

The Limitation of the Way of Existing now becomes the Limitation of a limitation of existing; in itself (to speak as though this meant something) it is a nonentity two steps removed from reality. Something of what is meant can be gained from considering a wooden ball and a cube. This time let the wood parallel existence and the surface the Way of Existing. Now a sphere is a kind of infinite surface, because it has no "beginning" or "end" to it; it just goes round and round. But a cube has a limited surface; that is, the surface *itself* has "beginnings" and "ends" or edges. So, if the surface limits the wood, the "cubeness" limits the surface. And, in the analogue, if the Way of Existing limits the existence, the Limitation limits the Way of Existing. But the *thing* is still a unit, for all its composition; it is still, in all its reality, an existence.

3.3. *Final recapitulation*

The light which change has cast on reality, then, shows us, in brief:

- (1) that the reality—the Actuality— of a being is existence,
 - (a) that this is of itself infinite and unique;
- (2) that it has as a limitation the Way of Existing,
 - (a) which takes all its reality from existence,
 - (b) which is really distinct from existence,
 - (c) which in its own order is of itself infinite and unique,
 - (d) which is the Source of stability of the being,

³³ Cf. *ibid.*, I, q. 77, a. 6, c.

- (e) which is single in a single being,
 - (f) which fixes the type or species of the being,
 - (g) which is modified by certain accidental Ways of Existing;
- (3) that this Way of Existing can have a Limitation,
- (a) which takes all its reality from the Way of Existing, and ultimately from existence,
 - (b) which is really distinct from the Way of Existing,
 - (c) which is the Source of the possibility of change,
 - (d) which remains in both terms of a change as their Limitation,
 - (e) which is indefinite in the abstract and definite in the concrete,
 - (f) which has quantity as a sort of property,
 - (g) which grounds all of those properties which we call material;
- (4) and in spite of the composition the being is a unit: a limited existence.

A considerable advance, considering the meagre amount of information which formed our starting-point. It is true, of course, when all is said and done, that we do not understand what the Sources of being "really are." But ask a physicist what an electron is, whether it is "really" a wave or "really" a particle; and if he is an intelligent man, he will not answer you. We have used basically the same method as the physicist—whether one's reasoning is developed mathematically or discursively makes little essential difference—and arrived at conclusions rather like his: somewhat intelligible, somewhat hidden. This is the term of any inquiry when pushed far enough; it merely means that we are not omniscient.

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ON TALKING ABOUT NON-EXISTENTS

CLIVE INGRAM-PEARSON

AT first sight it may well seem that the question of talking about non-existents just does not arise. Since by definition non-existents do not exist, there is nothing that one *can* say about *them*. Nevertheless even to say this implies that at least one can make negative statements about non-existents—one can say in fact that non-existents do not exist. Nor, when extended to specific instances, does this sort of talk seem to reduce itself to meaningless tautology. The statement that “fairies do not exist”, for instance, seems to carry a meaning which it is impossible to signify in any other way. And moreover it is generally accepted that in such specific instances we are not limited simply to these negative statements about non-existents. In addition to saying that fairies do not exist, one may also apparently say that “fairies are imagined beings” or “fairies are beings of the mind” or “fairies exist only in fairy tales,” etc. In what follows I want to enquire into the valid possibility for talking about non-existents and point to a major interpretative significance which seems to follow if any such possibility is allowed.

Of course it is necessary to distinguish clearly between statements which actually purport to be about non-existents and seemingly similar statements in which the question of non-existents is not in fact broached at all. These latter statements are to be distinguished from statements about non-existents, not in *not* being about non-existents and *therefore* being about existents, but in being distinct from the questions both of existence *and* non-existence. They deal with another question altogether, namely that of the various predicative uses of the substantive verb. The statement “fairies have wings,” for instance, is a statement falling within this latter category: it is not concerned with the existential status of the objects of reference designated by the subject term nor indeed with any designation whatever; merely with the signification and analysis of the concept “fairy”; whether having wings is a subsidiary and implicit description within the signification “fairy.”

With this distinction in mind, then, we may enquire first into the status of those statements which do seem to pass beyond the predicative use of the substantive verb and actually designate non-existents. There are statements like "fairies do not exist." In order to achieve its obvious status as a *denial* this statement must have some object of reference for its subject term; for denials which are denials of nothing are not denials in any sense at all. Yet at the same time the person propounding the statement "fairies do not exist" clearly does not believe that his subject term designates anything whatever; indeed it is precisely the intention to deny that there is any designate or any existent to talk about in this case. The problem is, then, "Through what sort of designation can the statement 'fairies do not exist' achieve its status as a denial?" What is the precise nature of that object of reference, the reference to which denies its very existence?

The answer to this problem seems to be that the peculiar object of reference which we refer to as "non-existent" is not describable in this way until *after* the existential denial has been uttered. And prior to the denial that fairies (say) exist, and as the necessary condition for that denial, someone must either have believed, or been thought to have believed, that fairies do exist. Thus if a person B says "fairies do not exist" and is understood to refer in this way to non-existents, he must already have assumed an original usage of the term "fairies" by a person A in which the term does designate existents. B accepts a term which has existential import for A, which refers for A to an actual existent of a specific sort. It is precisely the *actual existent intended by A* of which B is able to say that it just isn't there. It is on the ground that there are no designates of the term (say, "fairies") *as used by A* that B can meaningfully say that fairies do not exist. The actual designation of the term by which, through denial, we seem to make reference to non-existents is thus made explicit. Such a designation is definable only in a double or complex manner—namely as an existent which at least one person believes to be present in the world and which another person at the same time and in the same context believes is not there.

This double description which is the ground of the denial by which "non-existent" becomes a meaningful reference, sets the

limits to our talk about non-existents. That is to say it becomes evident, once this indirect reference is made explicit, that it is not possible to talk about non-existents positively or directly at all. For the statements which seem to do this, and are usually understood as doing this, in every case alter the very designation of the term referring to non-existents which constitutes the term as intelligible in that sense. Consider the positive statement "fairies are only imagined beings" in relation to "fairies do not exist." If "fairies do not exist" is to be a meaningful reference to non-existents in the sense outlined, then the import of this statement is that "fairies" cannot be said to be "imagined" beings or any other sort of beings. What has happened in the case of saying "fairies are imagined beings" is that the term fairies has changed its designation, and though it seems to be, is in fact no longer a term by means of which we can refer to non-existents. That is, instead of standing for the beings that one person believes to be in the world, and another believes not to be in the world, it now designates something radically different, namely, a "being of the mind." And the only statement about a "being of the mind" that may accurately be formulated in conformity with the original (complex or indirect) designation of "fairy" (in the denial that fairies exist) is, "ideas of fairies are beings of the mind." For the statement "fairies are imagined beings" to make any sense in the same context as "fairies do not exist," "fairy" has to be a shorthand term for "idea of fairy"; it designates neither an existent *nor* non-existent fairy in the original sense, but an existent idea of a fairy. But in this usage it is quite clear that the term fairy has nothing to do with talking about what we want to call non-existents. For it could not *now* be said, as was said originally, that fairies (by which we *now* designate "ideas of fairies") do not exist. Ideas of fairies certainly do exist. The problem of talking about non-existents is already suffering from a confusion due to an elliptical use of language at the stage at which the statements "fairies do not exist" and "fairies are imagined beings" are both thought of as usable within the context of that problem.

The problem, then, of what, if anything, we might mean in talking about non-existents confines itself to the analysis of the import of the indirect references which we establish in the negative

statement "non-existents do not exist." Does this type of indirect reference succeed in making intelligible anything at all not already intelligibly expressed in the ordinary positive-type reference to existents? The answer to this question is that our negative talk about non-existents does in fact establish an existential reference of a highly unusual, yet at the same time, highly significant nature. It makes it possible for us to refer to the existential state of *real absence*. The positive reference which we actually attain through our negative statements about non-existents is to the real absence in the world of specifically designated entities.

Now it ought to be noted that this idea of "real absence" attains a unique status in its radical distinction from the idea of "imaginary absence." One may very well imagine the absence of any entity with which one is already acquainted through its existence, but this very existence would of course deny the actual existence of any state corresponding to this absence. Entities simply imagined to be absent are in fact present. But at the same time unless entities imagined to be absent are in fact being compared with the possibility of their own real absence, it is difficult to understand just what absence is. The very possibility of imagining entities to be absent depends in fact upon a prior grasp of the significance of the idea of "real absence" which is just not attainable in the reference to entities as existent. In other words, the idea of real absence attains a noetically unique status precisely through its power to refer to entities which do not exist. It is our talk about these non-existents that in turn makes possible an interpretation of the world which is not obtainable through other statements, even those which describe the imaginary absence of entities. In our reference to non-existents, in the reference to entities which do not in fact help to constitute the world, the world itself comes to be understood under a unique aspect, namely as a mysterious totality from which certain possibilities for realisation are *really absent*. So that through this idea, what things *are not* becomes just as intelligible a part of the noetic enterprise as what things are. Non-existence, the real absence amongst entities of a myriad of positive existential attainments, is seen to be as much a part of the truth about those entities as the few hum-drum perfections which are in fact realized in existence. To be unmindful of non-existents and therefore of

the import of the idea of real absence, is to fall short of the formal truth about being.

Talk about non-existents, then, far from being an undertaking with which the noetic enterprise might easily dispense, does take place under clearly defined, though unusual, conditions and with positive noetic results. However in arriving at this conclusion we have so far neglected to make explicit one important assumption upon which the whole argument is based, the understanding of which is in fact the most important consequence of being able to talk about non-existents. This assumption concerns the very status of existence itself.

It will be recognised that our talk about what we call "non-existents," the very possibility of which grows out of denial through indirect designation, refers in every case simply to the unusual existential state which we have described is that of "real absence." That is to say, our reference to non-existents fails, in every case in which this reference is meaningful, to designate just sheer "nothing" and in fact opens up an otherwise indiscernable aspect of the world. Nevertheless this description, "non-existent," does signify the exact opposite of what we mean when we impute the description "existent." The question therefore arises as to what meaning of "existence" we must have in mind at any time at which we feel justified in talking about the non-existent. Certainly it cannot be that meaning which tries to allow "nothingness" to designate the state signified by the denial of existence.

The question of what it means to assert that a thing exists has given rise to theories about the meaning of existence ranging from the assertion that this elusive meaning is the complex "repositum" of all knowledge to the opposite assertion that "existence" fails to signify anything at all not already signified by other words. But in all cases the precise meaning of existence is evaded, either on the grounds that it transcends our powers of clear definition through sheer complexity, or else on the ground that the idea of "existing" is so naive and simple as to be entirely absorbed in other references. And in all cases also the definition which it is found so difficult to express is that of existence understood as the constitutive ingredient of entities—some property, quality, or activity constituting in myriad ways the factual status of whatever is

attributed with that status. Now what is of interest to our present purpose is that it is just this idea of existence which we are all the time contradicting in our talk about non-existents. For it is precisely when undertood as the state existentially opposed to that of factuality that non-existence defies being spoken about. So that what we are suggesting in the present context in this: that the past difficulties of arriving at the meaning of existence are due to nothing other than the failure to realise that existence is itself nothing but a meaning or interpretation of entities. It is only as the existential opposite of an "existence" which is itself already understood to be an *interpretation* of entities, that the reference to the "non-existent" can issue in the positive noetic results which we have tried to describe. Through our meaningful reference to non-existents, we place existence itself within the realm of meaning and thereby deny to existence any status as constituting simply the factuality of entities.

That the objects of experience present themselves to us as already the subjects of various interpretations is both commonly recognized and easily demonstrable. It is quite clear for instance that one and the same object is understood under various aspects according to whether one is talking about it in a scientific context, or a theological context, or just a context demarked by certain practical objectives. These contexts decide in advance the way in which a particular object will be regarded; and this way of regarding the object is made possible precisely by the employment of the categories and questions peculiar to the context concerned. Scientific answers about objects are received only to scientific questions about objects, which questions themselves constitute the possibility of such answers. However although these sources of the interpretative aspects of entities are for the most part clearly discernable, it has not been commonly recognized that the *existence* of entities is itself such an aspect. And the principal difficulty in the way of this discernment is precisely that of failing to recognize the status of the category and the question which are in fact the source and ground of the interpretation of entities which we call their existence. The suggestion to which our analysis of talk about non-existents leads then, is just this: that the existence of entities is that aspect of them at which we arrive when, and only

when, we subject them to the category and the question of non-existence; that is when we consider them in relation to the possibility of their own real absence.

This assertion that the difficulty about the meaning of existence (at least as far as it is affected by our references to non-existents) is to be resolved in the understanding that existence is already a meaning or interpretation, appears at first sight to represent a completely radical ontological outlook. Nevertheless this understanding of the status of existence appears to be also implicit in the question about the meaning of existence even as ordinarily interpreted. For if "existence" as understood in the quest for its meaning *were* some constituting ingredient of entities, the whole meaning of existence would be perceived at the same time as those entities were perceived. That is to say one would have the knowledge of what it is for a thing to exist immediately upon the perception that a certain thing was "really there"; for this "really being there" is what existence would mean; it would mean something of such a sort that one could have concerning it the "permanent possibility of sensation"—something distinct in this way from mere imaginings. But obviously this is not the answer which the question about the meaning of existence expects. Rather the meaning of existence intends the implications which follow upon this perception of "really being there." It intends to enquire after the conditions under which the thing merits this designation and through which it is then understood that even those things, comparison with which makes this designation intelligible, themselves deserve in their own way the same designation. In other words, the meaning of existence ideally intends to lay bare the conditions under which all things are able to be comprehended under one and the same aspect, but which aspect itself becomes a noetic possibility only because the things of which existence is this general aspect, have already been interpreted through comparison one with the other in the way described. The meaning of existence, therefore, is directed at the elucidation of the precise nature of the comparison which is able to translate a way of looking at some entities in their distinction from others into a way of looking at *all* entities: this comparison, we are suggesting, is precisely that which is made possible through the concept

of non-existence; it is the comparison of each entity with the state of affairs which would be marked out by that entity's real absence. The difference between that aspect or interpretation of entities which we signify in the statement that they exist, and those other aspects or interpretations which are founded in the interests of special purposes is just that the former aspect bestows upon all entities that independence of our purposes which for the first time makes it possible to talk about things-by-themselves. But the point is that this decision to let things-be-by-themselves is a general interpretation subsequent to particular interpretations—it is simply that interpretation founded on the decision not to interpret things in the usual way.

That existence is a developed interpretation of entities through the idea of non-existence or real absence, is born out in a further way. There are languages and cultures in which the idea of existence is not found and in which the question of the meaning of existence is not therefore intelligible. In such cultures things-in-the-world are nevertheless interpreted in many ways such as "being able to be eaten" "being worthy of fear or adoration," etc., so that these interpretations precede the understanding that things exist in these cases at least. Moreover the facts of etymology go to establish that the original use of the substantive verb amongst primitive peoples is such as to imply the presence of the object in every case. So that the failure to attach any meaning to existence is attended by a parallel failure to take any interest in the non-existent. Existence remains dissociated from the dealing with things until *one day* the frustration of practical intentions makes it clear that however much one wished otherwise some conceivable entities just are not present in the world. On this basis it comes to be understood that the entities which are present are all of them significant in a very special sense—that is they are not just present, but *present rather than not*. This establishes for the first time what it means to say that all the present entities exist. And since there previously is no sense at all in which existence is attributed to entities, existence reveals itself precisely as that meaning or aspect or interpretation of entities which is attributed subsequently to other interpretations in this special way. To pose later still the question as to what things *are*, to open up what have come to be

called the merely cognitive pursuits, is to start from this "existential" aspect under which things have already come to be understood. And if there is anything more basic than this to be known about things it is difficult to understand *what* it could be; for this much seems to be clear, that to understand the *existence* of entities as anything other than an interpretation growing out of and founded in the reference to non-existence or real absence, is to try to go beyond the scope of interpretation and meaning altogether into some unimaginable noetically opaque chaos. Objects of all kinds, which are able to be spoken about as such only through a human genius for interpretation or creative penetration, reveal in their existence that neither in fact nor intention can the human mind transcend the interpretation-functions by which it makes meaning and truth possible at all. The limits to this interpretation-function are set by the fundamental concepts of "existence" and "non-existence" which in fact open out the whole vast array of cognitive possibilities which is the truth about being. And what our talk about non-existents makes clear concerning this truth about being, is that such truth is possible only because "being" is already an interpretation within the realm of truth when the question about its meaning is asked.

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ARISTOTLE'S ARGUMENT FROM TIME

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In the first paragraph of chapter 6 of Book Lambda, Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* suggests an argument for the existence of a prime mover which has been rather unaccountably neglected by philosophers and scholars alike. As Book Lambda is surely the climax of the whole *Metaphysics*, and chapter 6 is quite evidently pivotal to Book Lambda, one might have supposed that the argument would have received some close attention. The argument—styled by me the argument from time—will be seen to be logically independent of the familiar argument from motion that dominates the later books of the *Physics*. In exhibiting the structure of the argument from time, I propose to show that if the argument be disentangled from its Aristotelian scaffolding and reduced to its barest essentials, all of the premises of the argument may be found—oddly enough—to command the assent of a sceptic so far afield as David Hume. The argument is thus seen to transcend any special system and to merit the most trenchant study on its own account.

Thomas Aquinas, in his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, offers a faithful (if pedestrian) rendering of the argument in the course of his almost literal paraphrase; but in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, when he undertakes to give "the arguments by which Aristotle sets out to prove the existence of God," the argument from time is strangely omitted. Thomas is not peculiar in this omission. Maimonides before him evinces no recognition of the argument from time, and I am aware of no modern discussion of it. The one directly relevant passage in Book Lambda is certainly exiguous enough, and it might perhaps be suggested (mistakenly, I think) that Aristotle himself failed to grasp the argument as independent of the argument from motion. The argument from time is indeed absent from the *Physics* in anything like its full force, though an abbreviated version of it is peripherally anticipated in chapter 1 of Bk. 8. There being such a meagreness of supporting documentation in the Aristotelian corpus itself, it is not

altogether surprising that the key passage—*Met.* 1071b3-10—should be passed over as merely a highly condensed synopsis of the argument from motion. I am confident, however, that, elliptical as the passage is, it actually uncovers an argument for the prime mover quite distinct from the main argument of the *Physics*.

In the Oxford translation, the text is as follows:

Since there were three kinds of substance, two of them physical and one unmovable, regarding the latter we must assert that it is necessary that there should be an eternal unmovable substance. For substances are the first of existing things, and if they are all destructible, all things are destructible. But it is impossible that movement should either have come into being or cease to be (for it must always have existed), or that time should. For there could not be a before and an after if time did not exist. Movement also is continuous, then, in the sense in which time is; for time is either the same thing as movement or an attribute of movement.¹

Attending directly to the available sense of the passage, what does the argument come to? This: there must be an eternal substance. Why? Because, otherwise, all substances might perish; but that is impossible. Why? Because there must always be substances in motion, and there must also always be time. Why? Because time cannot perish. Why? Because perishing entails an afterwards—a time when the perished entity no longer exists—and if time were to perish, then there would be an afterwards—a time—when time no longer exists; which is absurd. But not only must there always be time, but also there must always be substances in motion. Why? Because the passage of time is unintelligible apart from moving (or changing) substances. Hence not all substances are perishable: there must be an eternal substance.

The crux of the argument lies quite evidently in the joint assertion of 1) the perishing of an entity entails an afterwards—a time—when the entity no longer exists; and 2) time is inseparable from moving or changing entities existing in time. These constitute the two salient premises which supply the entire axis on

¹ Ἐπεὶ δ' ἦσαν τρεῖς οὐσίαι, δύο μὲν αἱ φυσικαὶ μία δ' ἡ ἀκίνητος, περὶ ταύτης λεκτέον ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναι αἰδιὸν τινα οὐσίαν ἀκίνητον. αἱ τε γὰρ οὐσίαι πρῶται τῶν ὄντων, καὶ εἰ πάντα φθαρεαί, πάντα φθορά· ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον κίνησιν ἢ γενέσθαι ἢ φθορῆναι (εἰ γὰρ ἦν), οὐδὲ χρόνον. οὐ γὰρ εἶόν τε τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον εἶναι μὴ ὄντος χρόνου· καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἀρα οὕτω συνεχὴς ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ χρόνος. ἡ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ κινήσεως τι πάθος.

(Ed. Jaeger.)

which the argument turns. Certainly, if it be true that time is both imperishable and coeval with changing substances existing in time, then it follows that changing substances must always exist. Furthermore, if changing substances must always exist, then existence as such cannot be radically contingent. For if existence were radically contingent, then indeed it would be possible that everything should perish and nothing whatever exist. The argument is thus calculated to issue in two conclusions, first, that changing substances must always exist, and, second, that there must be an eternal necessary substance that assures everlasting change.

In the *Physics*, 251b10-28, the argument from time is tangentially enlisted to demonstrate the first conclusion while the second is altogether omitted. Significantly enough, the editor of the Oxford translation brackets the entire passage to indicate that it lies outside the main course of the chapter. The chapter as a whole is expressly devoted to demonstrating that change is eternal, and the principal evidence adduced in support of that thesis proves to be part and parcel of the argument from motion. Collateral or accessory to the main line of demonstration is the following excursion:

How can there be any before or after without the existence of time?
And how can there be any time without the existence of motion? If,
then, time is the number of motion or itself a kind of motion, it
follows that, if there is always time, motion must also be eternal.

Here, as elsewhere, the term "motion" is employed by Aristotle to denote changing or moving substances. To the best of my knowledge, *Met.* 1071b3-10 and *Phys.* 251b10-28 comprise the only passages in Aristotle where textual warrant for the argument from time may be produced. But where the argument in the *Physics* is rather out-of-the-way and parenthetical, in the *Metaphysics* the argument is accorded a position of commanding, central importance.

In its abridged form (omitting the prime mover) the argument from time is actually stated twice in *Phys.* 251b10-28. The two versions are not identical. In the first version, already quoted the imperishability of time is demonstrated through the premise that perishing as such entails an afterwards. This is, of course, the

procedure of the Lambda passage. *Phys.* 251b19-28 proceeds along quite different lines:

Now since time cannot exist and is unthinkable apart from the moment, and the moment is a kind of middle-point uniting as it does in itself both a beginning and an end, a beginning of future time and an end of past time, it follows that there must always be time: for the extremity of the last period of time that we take must be found in some moment, since time contains no point of contact for us except the moment. Therefore, since the moment is both a beginning and an end, there must always be time on both sides of it. But if this is true of time, it is evident that it must also be true of motion, time being a kind of affection of motion.

Here the present instant is viewed as being necessarily not merely a terminus *ad quem* but also a terminus *a quo*.

The argument from time in its full scope will perhaps gain in clarity if it is couched in a manner more closely adapted to contemporary discourse. I would suggest the following formulation. If all matters of fact are contingent, then all existing things might perish, and might perish simultaneously, *totum simul*, and it would thus be altogether possible that nothing whatever should exist. Certainly, if all things were to perish at once, $\xi\zeta\alpha\iota\tau\epsilon\upsilon\gamma\epsilon\varsigma$, new things might well replace them; but, on the basis of radical contingency, it would be equally possible that this would not occur. But perishing as such entails an afterwards. Therefore, at the very least, time would exist after the perishing of all things. But time is inseparable from changing or moving things existing in time. Therefore, if all things were to perish, new things *must* replace them. It is consequently impossible that all matters of fact should be contingent. Something must exist by necessity.

Of all the premises to the argument, the most problematical is certainly the one that requires of time that it be incapable of existing apart from changing or moving substances. Aristotle engages in a thematic investigation of time in chapters 10 - 14 of Bk. 4 of the *Physics*. The burden of chapter 11, in 218b21 - 219b9, is precisely that time as such entails motion. The argument is as follows:

Time does not exist without change; for when the state of our own minds does not change at all, or we have not noticed its changing, we do not realize that time has elapsed.... If, then, the non-

realization of the existence of time happens to us when we do not distinguish any change, but the soul seems to stay in one indivisible state, and when we perceive and distinguish we say time has elapsed, evidently time is not independent of motion and change. . . . But we apprehend time only when we have marked motion, marking it by "before" and "after". . . . When we think of the extremes as different from the middle and the mind pronounces that the "nows" are two, one before and the other after, it is then that we say that there is time, and this that we say is time.

The argument here is exposed to several difficulties. It is to be noted, first, that Aristotle identifies time with the passage or lapse of time: he attempts to prove merely that the *passage* of time is impossible apart from changing substances. Far from denying the possibility of a *nunc stans*, he actually appears to insist upon it, at least in the text at hand. This text is certainly insufficient. It must be supplemented by Aristotle's argument that time cannot be conceived as a succession of discrete atomic moments but is rather to be understood as a continuum (like motion itself). However, granting time to be continuous, must it then entail objects moving or changing? Even if it be true that the lapse of time cannot be *noticed* by us apart from changing things, does it follow that time cannot in fact elapse without such change? And is it really true that we cannot notice the lapse of time except in connection with change? These questions are by no means laid to rest by Aristotle's discussion. That motion entails time, is certainly true; but that time in its turn—even the passage of time—entails motion, is far less evident. Despite my misgivings here, empiricists are likely to agree with Aristotle.

We have observed that the two cardinal premises of the argument from time are, first, that perishing as such entails an afterwards and, second, that time is inseparable from changing or moving substances. These may be styled as the first and second premises respectively. Although the second premise remains perhaps to be established, I submit that the first is incontestably true. What indeed is perishing? If a thing is to perish, it must at one time exist and *then* it must cease to exist. There is thus a before and an after. *Now* the thing exists, and *now* it does not exist. There must then be two *nows* in every case of perishing—a now *when* the thing exists and a now *when* the thing no longer exists. There is thus a *when* after the thing has perished—when

the thing no longer exists. Hence it is true that there must be time not only *while* the thing exists but also *after* it has perished, namely, a time when it does not exist. According to Aristotle, "it is just this that enables Democritus to show that all things cannot have had a becoming: for time, he says, is uncreated." We may surmise that Democritus must also have insisted that not all things can perish since time as a whole is imperishable, the perishing of one time always entailing the coming to be of another. The first premise of the argument from time may then be credited to Democritus.

It should now be apparent that full justice cannot be done to the argument from time apart from an exhaustive analytic of time itself. Aristotle's argument must certainly be grounded in such an analytic, whether it is to be certified finally as demonstrative or as fallacious; and it can hardly be said that we have at our disposal today anything like an adequate understanding of time. We have seen that there is reason to believe that Aristotle's own analytic of time may be insufficient as a foundation for the argument. Closer inspection, however, discloses that what we have called the problematical second premise is far less urgent for the argument than it has appeared. It is not required by the argument that time be incapable of existing apart from *changing* entities. Assuming that all substances have perished and that (on the strength of the first premise) time is found to supersede that total perishing, the really imperative question that now arises is this: is an empty or vacuous time possible? Is time intelligible as something substantial that can exist by itself alone, void of anything existing in time, or is it rather the case that time must always be occupied by some concrete entity (be that concrete entity in motion or at rest)? If the problematical second premise is replaced by the "weaker" premise that time is incapable of existing apart from concrete entities, then Aristotle's argument will be retrenched and redacted as follows. Something must exist by an eternal necessity: for if all existing things were contingent, then they might all perish simultaneously and it would be possible that nothing whatever would exist; but perishing entails a future time, and time is inseparable from concrete entities; therefore not all existing things can be contingent.

Stripped down to bare essentials, the argument from time is found to be accommodable in all its premises to the empiricist philosophy of David Hume and, I would suggest, to empiricism as such. This surprising conclusion may be readily supported by documentation drawn from the *Treatise*. At the very outset, Hume's analytic of time may be seen expressly to affirm the second premise, at least in its retrenched form.

The idea of time is not derived from a particular impression mixed up with others, and plainly distinguishable from them; but arises altogether from the manner in which impressions appear to the mind, without making one of the number. Five notes played on a flute give us the impression and idea of time, though time be not a sixth impression which presents itself to the hearing or any other of the senses. . . . (The mind) only takes notice of the *manner* in which the different sounds make their appearance. . . . Since (time) appears not as any primary distinct impression, (it) can plainly be nothing but different ideas, or impressions, or objects disposed in a certain manner, that is, succeeding each other.

Hume, like Aristotle, clearly means by the word *time* the passage or lapse of time, in terms of which he can say that "tis impossible to conceive a time (meaning a lapse of time) when there (is) no succession or change in any real existence." Time itself cannot be understood as a "real existence." It is rather for Hume "an abstract idea," and though a *nunc stans* or *praesentia perdurabilis* is presumably allowed by him as possible, he insists that the "parts into which the ideas of space and time resolve themselves (i.e. points and moments) . . . being nothing in themselves, are inconceivable when not filled with something real and existent." An empty time is thus seen to be impossible.

Hume's affirmation of the second premise is direct and forthright. In addition, it may be said that on the basis of his philosophy it is quite inevitable. If we turn now from the second to the first premise, one will look in vain for any direct confirmation of it in Hume's dossier on time. The premise is neither affirmed nor denied: it is simply ignored; though one is tempted to construe a denial of it from Hume's general analytic of time. However, indirect evidence in *support* of the premise may be adduced elsewhere—from Hume's thematic inquiry into the principle of causation. This indirect evidence is, I believe, altogether convincing. Hume undertakes to examine at close quarters

the proposition "Whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence" with the object of showing that the antecedent of the proposition in no way entails the consequent. This task requires of Hume that he explore precisely all of the implications that are in fact entailed by the antecedent if he is to prove that the consequent is really extraneous. The nerve of the discussion is as follows.

Now that the . . . proposition (whatever has a beginning has also a cause of existence) is utterly incapable of demonstrative proof, we may satisfy ourselves by considering that as all distinct ideas are separable from each other, and as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, it will be easy for us to conceive any *object to be non-existent this moment and existent the next* without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or productive principle. (my italics)

For an entity to begin to exist, involves for Hume only one requirement, namely, that it be "non-existent this moment and existent the next." Although it needs no antecedent cause, it does presuppose an antecedent time prior to its existence. (In this minimum sense, at least, it may be said that *ex nihilo nihil fit*.) So, too, it will not be doubted that for Hume the perishing or ceasing to be of an entity involves an object existent this moment and non-existent the next. Time thus overleaps and supersedes all entities.

It might perhaps be suggested that the two cardinal premises of the argument from time are actually contradictory one with the other. One might argue as follows. If time is merely an attribute of concrete entities, then if all existing things were to perish, time also would perish with them. On the other hand, if the perishing of an entity entails a subsequent time, then an empty time is surely envisaged as possible. This argument is very revealing. What it shows, however, is not that the two premises are mutually contradictory but rather that they are logically independent of one another. According to the first premise, concrete entities are viewed as existing in a supersessive time. According to the second premise, time itself is viewed as existing in concrete entities. Both might well be true, each in its own way. A very real contradiction does, however, arise if one wishes to assert conjointly the two premises *along with* the principle that existence

as such is radically contingent. These three principles, taken together, are indeed incompatible. It thus follows that if the two premises may be severally known to be true (each through an independent insight terminal in itself), radical contingency must be denied.

Hume's celebrated insistence on radical contingency may be here recalled:

Whatever *is* may *not be*. No negation of a fact can involve a contradiction. The non-existence of any being, without exception, is as clear and distinct an idea as its existence. The proposition which affirms it not to be, however false, is no less conceivable and intelligible than that which affirms it to be.

Part at least of Hume's purport in this passage is that it is entirely possible that everything should perish and nothing whatever exist. This position cannot be maintained if the two cardinal premises can be attested to as true. We have already seen that Hume acquiesces, in one form or another, in both of those premises. Mutually they entail that something must always exist. That all sensible entities are contingent, is really all that Hume's philosophy entitles him to assert. He is thus led—curiously—to the recognition of some non-sensible transcendent entity that exists eternally by its own right.

Once again it must be reiterated that the argument from time can only be sustained if it is grounded in a radical analytic of time itself. Such an analytic alone can provide the deep underpinning that the argument requires. Time is perhaps the great theme of metaphysical investigation, for only when being is examined *sub specie temporis* can it be understood at all.

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THE THEATRICAL ASPECT OF THE COGITO

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DESCARTES doubts that there is this or that; he does not doubt that something is. If he claimed to apply doubt not only to what is, but also to being (in Heideggerian terms), then the word "doubt" which he uses would become meaningless.

There is something else that Descartes does not question: the meaningfulness of language as a whole and of a particular tongue in so far as he uses it as he does. The doubt bears on the way the mind, or language, divides and composes what is: this and that thing, this and that relation. The quest of Descartes may, I think, be interpreted in this way: Is there a word, or group of words, which can safely be assumed to isolate a definite object of thinking which, *as determined*, would be more than an object of thinking, or creature of language? (This "more" may be specified in various ways, including a Cartesian way. I shall remain non-committal about it for the moment.)

The phenomenological reduction of this and that does not leave a bare "there is," but a "there is thinking (this or that)." Descartes does not doubt the meaningfulness of the word "thinking" any more than the meaningfulness of the verb "to be"; and he does not doubt the meaningfulness of such words as "doubting," "feeling," "willing," *in so far as* doubting, feeling, willing, etc., involve unreflective thinking.

A conclusion is thus reached which may be phrased as follows: "Thinking" is a minimum definition of "being." Whatever else may be said to be, there is thinking. This is an echo of Parmenides. And a translation into Heideggerian terms might run like this: Thinking is not on the ontic, but on the ontological level. Thinking as doubting reveals the nihilating power of being.



But this is not the goal of the Cartesian quest; or at least its goal is not just that. The preoccupation is centered on definite

objects of thinking. The kind of object which is wanted has not been found through unreflective thinking, since this thinking has taken the form of doubting. But this kind of object is believed to be found through the intervention of reflective thinking. In one of the versions of the Cogito, the reflective leap is indicated by "therefore" (*donec, ergo*). The value of this conjunction is less logical than psychological. It means something like "thus, I realize it." It is equivalent to the pseudosyllogistic Greek conjunction *ara*.

The effect of the reflective leap is not simply to permit the affirmation: "There is thinking." In order to obtain a properly isolated object of thinking, distinct from thinking (about thinking), the formula objectifies unreflective thinking (doubting). The realization indicated by the word "therefore" is an objectification. And thus, as it is made an object of thinking, thinking becomes an-ego-who-thinks, a particular thinking thing.

This extrapolation effects a radical alteration which, along with other critics such as Sartre, I cannot accept. I reject it not because of any formal rule of logic (the Cogito lies outside the scope of formal logic), but because the way in which I interpret the text and the way in which I interpret my experience do not tally.

As far as I am concerned, words like "to think," "to feel," may be used to refer to experiences, or activities, lived as such (lived infinitively), and not as an ego who thinks and feels: they are not lived substantively, or personally. The ego appears only when I translate these experiences, or activities, within the frame of some I-thou pattern, as, for instance, when I write a philosophical essay.

What can be said about these experiences or activities is that a certain quality inhabits them, or haunts them, a quality which may be called "selfness" rather than "self." I say "selfness" as I might say "blueness," or "dryness." "Selfness" is a substantive, like "self," but it stands as a pro-adjective. This quality of selfness is a matter of experience and comprehension. It can not be detached from the experiencing so as to be made an isolated object of thinking, of knowledge and belief.

On the other hand, what can be an object of thinking, knowledge and belief is the personal, or social, self. This self is posited

as an object among other objects, as a person among other persons. It is this self which can properly be designated with the help of personal pronouns. Selfness is a quality inherent in feeling, the self is an object of thinking, in particular of imaginative thinking (thinking according to thing-concepts). It is a tool of socio-pragmatic thinking, a creature of imagination.

Now, as I interpret it, the methodical doubt is precisely designed to reject this kind of object. A methodical doubt, or phenomenological reduction, shows the inauthenticity of the category of the person. It encloses the I-thou pattern within the conventions of the human comedy, or tragedy. It reduces the social, or personal self to a theatrical persona.

But it appears to me that what the Cartesian formula affirms is not the quality of selfness which is felt in one way or another (for instance as an ideal), but the personal self, this theatrical persona which should have been dissolved by the methodical doubt. To be more precise, the Cartesian "ego" stands for a particular person and also for the category of the person, for a quasi-Platonic idea of the self.



The first ground for this interpretation has already been presented. No doubt the ego which Descartes extrapolates is pretty empty. It is not a personality. But it can be considered as the almost empty conceptual frame for a personality. It is an *être de raison* which can serve as a frame for a being of imagination. If Descartes had only wanted to translate into language what I call selfness, then this elaborate show was not needed. It could only, as it does, confuse the issue by assuming the appearance of a reasoning sequence.

A search for a definite object of knowledge and belief can only encounter the self, not selfness. What appears once the reflective leap has been taken is the self. As a matter of fact, reflection can be said to create the self.

My interpretation also relies on what follows the Cogito: the verbal establishment of the existence of God. What Descartes calls "God" is not equivalent to "divine": this god is a personal god. He is a "being," a "creator." He is supposed not to be

deceitful, unlike the *malin génie*. No doubt this god is said to be "infinite," but this does not prevent him from being an object of thinking and belief.

If, in the formula "I think, I am," "I" were meant only to refer to what I call selfness, it would be possible to proceed to an examination of the experience of the divine, of the ideal, but not to the examination of the idea of a god. The "I" has to be conceived as personal in order to call forth the idea of a personal god. There has to be a *dramatis persona* on the philosophical stage in order that a *deus* may appear *ex machina*. (I am not concerned here with the quality of the mechanism.)

In the demonstration, much use is made of the idea of finitude. The idea of the finite calls forth the idea of the infinite: these two ideas are correlative. What I call selfness can be described as neither finite nor infinite. The word "infinite" might be used instead. If the phrase "I think" were equivalent to "there is thinking," Descartes could not abstract from it the idea of finitude. The *res* has to be posited apart from *cogitans* in order that the idea of finitude may appear. The demonstration of the existence of God relies on a rift between the substantive and the participle. If we restore the participle to its full infinitive value (altered by the association with a substantive), the rift is between a substantive and an infinitive.

This rift and the privilege granted to the substantive are also made evident in a passage of the answer to Hobbes's objections: "It is certain that thought can not be without a thing which thinks, and in general no accident or act can be without a substance of which it is the act."



Let us now return to the part of the *Meditations* which precedes the Cogito, i.e., to the doubting sequence. There is no denying its seductiveness. But this seductiveness is dramatic rather than philosophical. It is fitting that the establishment of a belief in a persona should be effected with the help of theatrical technique.

The first person is used constantly: a verb-ending in the Latin text, a pronoun in the French text. A narrator is put on the stage.

Advantage is taken of the structure of a language in which the category of the person, of the personified thing, plays a fundamental role. Actually, it is in the very nature of language (prosaic, socio-pragmatic language) to betray uniqueness. On being translated into language, uniqueness necessarily becomes singularity or universality, or both (as in the case of the Cartesian ego). Yet uniqueness is no more singular or universal than blue is round or square. There are ways of tricking language, of betraying with words the betraying words. Thus in certain anti-theatrical plays, the characters seem to say: "We are characters in a play, we are your dream; we are creatures of language and so are you." There is also the poetic conversion of language. But in the *Méditations*, an *honnête homme* addresses *honnêtes gens*.

So there is an expository monologue. "I" designates a singular person who is busy removing all props from the stage. But as we enter into the spirit of the game, this persona becomes invisible: we assume that it is not on the stage. For this persona has a universal as well as a singular value. The reader identifies himself with the persona in order to live the experiment. In this way, the personal selves of both the narrator and the reader are discounted. This is good in a way: this persona must not obtrude too much, for we might say: "Since the *tabula* must be *rasa*, why is not this narrating ghost, this theatrical convention, taken out of the way too?" On the other hand, this character must reappear on stage, in "clear and distinct" light. It is this very mask "I," universal and singular, which must be affirmed.

In the *Méditations*, this is done with the help of a conjuring trick. Once the stage has been emptied of props and characters, the character "I" is called back on stage by another character. The difficulty consists in having this other character appear on stage and play his part without stirring suspicion. The trick is similar to one which has been used by mystery novelists in a closed-room situation: the character does not enter the stage as a "real" character, but, say, as a prop-man.

We are told: "Now in case we had been remiss and left something on stage which escaped our notice, I call a prop-man to check." We admire the thoroughness of the conjurer. Lost in

admiration, we do not notice that what seems to make the trick impossible makes it in fact more easy.

For the hypothetical *malin génie* who is thus brought into play is deceitful. We might have balked at seeing an ego pulled out of the hat of thinking. But undoubtedly, if there is something deceived, this something has to be a person. The verb "to be deceived" requires a personal subject such as may be legitimately detached from the verb. The verb has meaning only within the scope of an I-thou pattern.

The monologue has become a dialogue. This is theatrically effective: It is more compelling to "believe" in a character engaged in a dialogue than in a character engaged in a monologue. The narrator was somewhat ghostly; but the deceived persona is a "real" character.



"At the moment of entering the stage of this world, where I have stood so far as a spectator, I walk masked." *Larvatus prodeat*: this phrase of Descartes appears identical to the Cogito in the perspective of my critical interpretation. There is walking, advancing, for instance thinking, under the mask of the ego.

But Descartes means the mask to be affirmed as something more than a socio-pragmatic convention. Or rather there are two masks. The first mask (the materially involved ego) is exposed and the second mask appears all the more authentic.

Thus characters in a play appear more "real" if they are made to watch a play within the play. The reflective leap is meant to have this effect in Descartes. Likewise, I may realize that I am dreaming, but stop there and fail to notice that the realization itself takes place within a second dream. Thus, perhaps Descartes, in one of the *Songes*, according to his biographer: "Doubting whether what he had just seen was dream or vision, not only did he decide, while sleeping, that it was a dream, but he also interpreted it before sleep left him."

However, the spectacle of the play within the play or the experience of the dream within the dream may provide an incentive for further doubt instead of confining the doubt to a chosen domain. If theatrical characters can watch a play, what are we

who watch these characters watch a play? If a dream can be recognized as such while sleeping, what is waking? The doubting sequence in Descartes is induced in part by such a preoccupation. But on what should the attention fasten to break the spell of the waking dream, or play? On "errors" of the senses? I should rather think on language, language as it is molded by socio-pragmatic categories such as that of the person.



To sum up. My critical interpretation has not consisted in saying that the self was not a reliable object of knowledge and belief. Any object of knowledge, any tool used in a cognitive language, can be considered as certain or uncertain according to the perspective, the mood or the situation. Thus, belief in the self and selves is normal in a dramatic situation, and the seductiveness of the Cogito in the *Méditations* seems to me due to dramatic technique. But if the situation appears as theatrical rather than dramatic, the self is reduced to a persona, to a theatrical mask. Beliefs are as fitful as barometers. There is something approaching: this is a person, there is belief in a person. Words are heard and interpreted: there is belief in my self. Now there is thinking about this event: there may be no more belief in the two selves. "Good reasons to believe" do not alter the picture radically. Beliefs come before reasoning. Reasoning, as long as it lasts, may dispel a belief; it cannot produce a belief. And to try to bolster a belief with reasons is quite superfluous, or inefficacious.

My critical interpretation has rather consisted in saying that the Cartesian experience, as I live it, can not furnish any object of knowledge and belief, certain or uncertain, because it dissolves objects of knowledge: the experience of radical doubt annihilates the perspective of knowledge, a perspective which it is necessary to enter in order that objects of knowledge and belief may appear. Descartes needs a reflective leap, or a *malin génie*, in order to reenter a perspective of knowledge.

This is why I have been concerned with showing that the self posited by Descartes *was* a person, or persona, that is to say an object of knowledge and belief, rather than just a name for a quality of the experience.

An experience does not ask for belief. Names for qualities of experience do not ask for belief: they are to be comprehended. They may appear ill-chosen: "selfness" is probably a poor choice. "Coherence" would be a better word, if it were not too narrowly intellectual. What about "logos"?

The result of my critical interpretation is not the assertion that persons, or selves, "just do not exist." "To exist" has meaning only if the mode of existence is specified. Persons exist as objects, or tools, of knowledge in socio-pragmatic language and thinking. They exist as objects of belief in socio-pragmatic acting. My person, or self, exists as persona in social role-taking. The assumption of the persona may range beyond its domain of usefulness and tend toward hypnotic identification.

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BERKELEY'S DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION

JOHN W. DAVIS

BERKELEY's doctrine of the notion is a crucial aspect of his philosophy still requiring exposition and criticism. It is the purpose of this paper to analyze and criticize the doctrine, to weigh the remarks made by commentators concerning it, and to relate the doctrine to the Berkeleian philosophy as a whole.

Analysis of the doctrine of the notion may begin by differentiating the notion in Berkeley from the idea. For Berkeley "human knowledge may naturally be reduced to two heads, that of ideas, and that of spirits."¹ These two objects of knowledge are so radically different from one another that they have nothing in common but the name "being."² Concerning the first kind of knowledge, knowledge by ideas, Berkeley recognizes two kinds: "ideas actually imprinted on the senses" and "ideas formed by the help of memory and imagination."³ Ideas of imagination and ideas of sense "equally exist in the mind,"⁴ i.e., they are both mind-dependent and distinct from the mind.⁵ Ideas of imagination are copies of ideas of sense:

The ideas imprinted on the sense by the Author of nature are called *real things*: and those excited in the imagination . . . are more

¹ Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge*, Sec. 86. All quotations are from *The Works of George Berkeley*, ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, 9 vols. (London, 1948-1957). Usually reference to Berkeley's own section numbering will be sufficient, but, as in the case of the *Three Dialogues*, where there is no such section numbering, reference will be to the pages of the Luce and Jessop edition of the *Works*. Reference will also be made to other editions occasionally, but such references will be indicated.

² *Principles*, Sec. 89.

³ *Ibid.*, Sec. 1. In this opening sentence of the *Principles* Berkeley recognizes only two classes of ideas. The objects of knowledge "perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind" are notions. Cf. G. A. Johnston, *Development of Berkeley's Philosophy* (London, 1923), p. 143 f.

⁴ *Principles*, Sec. 34.

⁵ Cf. Luce's careful treatment of this problem. A. A. Luce, "Berkeley's Existence in the Mind," *Mind*, I (1941), 258-267.

properly termed *ideas* or *images of things*, which they copy and represent.*

Although ideas of imagination are evidence of the activity of the mind in the sense that the mind is capable of "compounding, dividing or barely representing" those ideas originally received from sense, "the very being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it."⁸

The second kind of knowledge, activity of mind, or spirit, is to be contrasted sharply with this passivity of ideas. "Such is the nature of spirit, or that which acts, that it cannot be it self perceived, but only by the effects which it produceth."⁹ To hold, however, that spirit cannot be known would lead to that scepticism which it is Berkeley's central purpose to overcome. Spirit must be known and yet it cannot be known by way of ideas since "an idea can be like nothing but an idea."¹⁰ If ideas are passive and spirits are active, then spirits must be known in another fashion than by way of ideas. Spirit is known by means of notions.

What, then, are notions? Are they but an *ad hoc* device to help Berkeley out of his confusion? Or has Berkeley remained true to his philosophy of sense and spirit and pointed to something experienced and experienceable in this doctrine?

The doctrine of the notion is most fully developed in the *Principles*, although other sources will also be found useful. It will be desirable first to set out with minimum comment the sections of the first (1710) and second (1734) edition of the *Principles* which deal with the doctrine. These two editions will have to be distinguished carefully; nothing less than the question

* *Principles*, Sec. 33. Cf. also George Berkeley, *Philosophical Commentaries*, ed. A. A. Luce (London, 1944), entry § 823 and Luce's note to this entry. Cf. also Luce's note to entry § 528 where Berkeley's references to the imaginative faculty in the *Philosophical Commentaries* are collected.

⁷ *Principles*, Sec. 1.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Sec. 25. Cf. *Principles*, Sec. 135. Cf. also *Philosophical Commentaries* 176a, 523, 633 for the passivity of ideas.

⁹ *Principles*, Sec. 27.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Sec. 8. This doctrine was axiomatic with Berkeley; he never proves it nor does he even offer evidence for it.

of Berkeley's possible development is bound up with this text.¹¹

In 1710 Berkeley wrote:

So far as I can see, the words will, soul, spirit, do not stand for different ideas, or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something which is very different from ideas, and which, being an agent, cannot be like unto, or represented by, any idea whatsoever.¹²

In 1734 he appended the sentence:

Though it must be owned at the same time, that we have some notion of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind such as willing, loving, hating, in as much as we know or understand the meaning of these words.¹³

Thus far notional knowledge is concerned only with knowledge of our own minds.

In Section 89 of the first edition Berkeley writes:

Thing or *being* is the most general name of all, it comprehends under it two kinds entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the name, to wit, *spirits* and *ideas*. The former are active, indivisible substances: the latter are *inert*, *fleeting*, *dependent beings*, which subsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or exist in minds or spiritual substances.¹⁴

There is added to this in the second edition the following passage, Berkeley's fullest account of the doctrine of the notion:

¹¹ Berkeley had intended to write a second part to the *Principles* which would have dealt with spirit and thus presumably would have contained a fuller account of the doctrine of the notion. (A "3d Book" is mentioned in entry § 583 of the *Philosophical Commentaries*, a book which presumably would have dealt with natural philosophy). There are references to the second part of the *Principles* in entries § 508, 807, 878 of the *Philosophical Commentaries*. He also included "Part I" on the title page of the first edition of the *Principles*. Berkeley refers to the second part in a letter to Samuel Johnson in 1729. He writes:

"As to the Second Part of my Treatise . . . the fact is that I had made considerable progress in it; but the MS. was lost about fourteen years ago, during my travels in Italy, and I never had the leisure since to do so disagreeable a thing as writing twice on the same subject" (*Works*, II, 282).

¹² *Principles*, Sec. 27.

¹³ *Loc. cit.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Sec. 89.

We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflexion, and that of other spirits by reason. We may be said to have some knowledge or notion of our own minds, of spirits and active beings, whereof in a strict sense we have not ideas. In like manner we know and have a notion of relations between things or ideas, which relations are distinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be perceived by us without our perceiving the former. To me it seems that ideas, spirits and relations are all in their respective kinds, the objects of human knowledge and subject of discourse: and that the term *idea* would be improperly extended to signify every thing we know or have any notion of.¹⁵

In Section 140 of the second edition there occurs the following passage:

In a large sense indeed, we may be said to have an idea, or rather a notion of *spirit*, that is, we understand the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny any thing of it.

The phrase "or rather a notion" is in the first edition manuscript but is crossed out and the whole facing page is reserved for correction and addition.¹⁶ Finally, in this group of additions, there is in the second edition in Section 142 the following:

We may not I think strictly be said to have an idea of an active being, or of an action, although we may be said to have a notion of them. I have some knowledge or notion of my mind, and its acts about ideas, inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant by those words. What I know, that I have some notion of. I will not say, that the terms *idea* and *notion* may not be used convertibly, if the world will have it so. But yet it conduceth to clearness and propriety, that we distinguish things very different by different names. It is also to be remarked, that all relations including an act of the mind, we cannot so properly be said to have an idea, but rather a notion of the relations or habitudes between things. But if in the modern way the word *idea* is extended to spirits, and relations and acts; this is after all an affair of verbal concern.¹⁷

According to Berkeley in the foregoing passages, therefore, we have notional knowledge of our own minds, of other minds,

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ *Works*, II, 105, editor's note to line 13. Cf. also Jessop in Berkeley, *Principles*, ed. T. E. Jessop (London, 1937), v-vi.

¹⁷ *Principles*, Sec. 142.

of God, and of relations. We may consider each of these objects of knowledge somewhat more fully in order to discover in what way they may be thought of as coordinate classes of cases. If it cannot be shown that in some meaningful way they are coordinate, then Berkeley's notion would be a residual category in which is put everything not accountable for otherwise on his epistemology.

In Section 89 (second edition), quoted above, knowledge of our own minds is by "inward feeling or reflexion." In the third of the *Three Dialogues* Berkeley describes self-knowledge in the following terms:

I do nevertheless know, that I who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as certainly, as I know my ideas exist. Farther, I know what I mean by the terms *I* and *myself*; and I know this immediately, or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as I perceive a triangle, a colour, or a sound. . . . My own mind and my own ideas I have an immediate knowledge of. . . .¹⁸

The important points to note concerning self-knowledge are that it is non-ideational and that it is to be distinguished from knowledge of other finite spirits and from God by its immediacy.

As for our knowledge of other finite minds, Berkeley asserts:

We cannot know the existence of other spirits, otherwise than by their operations, or the ideas by them excited in us. I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform me there are certain particular agents like my self, which accompany them, and concur in their production. Hence the knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of my ideas; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or concomitant signs.¹⁹

The argument here, of course, is a form of the argument from analogy. The account is certainly sketchy, but apart from some similar suggestions in the *Three Dialogues* and *Alciphron*, it is all that Berkeley wrote on the matter. One point, however, is clear. For Berkeley, knowledge of other finite spirits does not have the

¹⁸ *Works*, II, 231-232.

¹⁹ *Principles*, Sec. 145. Cf. *Alciphron* IV, Section 5. "In a strict sense, I do not see Alciphron, i.e. that individual thinking thing, but only such visible signs and tokens as suggest and infer the being of the invisible thinking principle or soul."

same immediacy that characterizes self-knowledge. Knowledge of other minds is in fact an inference made by way of ideas.

The same conditions apply to knowledge of God. God is also known through his effects, but "the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the existence of men."²⁰ He is "known as certainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever, distinct from our selves."²¹ In the *Three Dialogues* knowledge of God is related to the notion in the following manner:

Taking the word *idea* in a large sense, my soul may be said to furnish me with an idea, that is, an image, or likeness of God, though extremely inadequate, for all the notion I have of God, is obtained by reflecting on my own soul heightening its powers, and removing its imperfections. I have therefore, though not an inactive idea, yet in my self some sort of an active thinking image of the Deity. And though I perceive Him not by sense, yet I have a notion of Him, or know Him by reflexion and reasoning.²²

In the same passage we learn that "I do by an act of reason, necessarily infer the existence of a God, and of all created things in the mind of God."²³ In sum, then, notional knowledge of either finite or infinite minds cannot be characterized by its immediacy. It is rather its objects that seem to differentiate notional knowledge from knowledge by way of ideas.

At first blush, relational knowledge seems qualitatively different from our knowledge of spirits. Why, then, is it included by Berkeley under notional knowledge? It may be pointed out at the outset that Berkeley has remarkably little to say about relations in his writings. In the *Philosophical Commentaries* he writes: "The obscure ambiguous term Relation which is said to be the largest field of knowledge [by Locke] confounds and deceives us."²⁴ His most important comment concerning relations, already quoted, is in Section 89. Relations there are said to be distinct from relata because we can have an idea of the latter and not the former. Relations are not given in sensory experience; our knowledge of them is notional.

²⁰ *Principles*, Sec. 147.

²¹ *Loc. cit.*

²² *Works*, II, 231-232.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 232.

²⁴ *Philosophical Commentaries*, § 540.

What, then, have self-knowledge, knowledge of other finite minds, knowledge of God and relational knowledge in common? Obviously they have in common the fact that they cannot be known by way of idea. Such a negative characteristic will give the clue to an understanding of the Berkeleian doctrine of notions.

No one of these classes of cases is capable of being given in the form of either sensory ideas, or in the form of idea images, the only two classes of ideas Berkeley recognizes. Neither the self, nor God, nor other minds, nor relations as objects of knowledge can be percepts or images. The result is the notion, best described as a concept having as its objects certain mental operations, relations, other minds, and God.²³ These objects share one characteristic which categorizes them as known notionally, viz. they are known by mental operations or acts. That notions are the result of mental acts or operations can be seen from examination of what Berkeley says in the previously quoted additions to Sections 89 and 142 of the *Principles*, e.g. "I have some knowledge or notion of my mind, and its acts about ideas." This is brought out even more clearly in *Siris* 308 where we are told:

Some, perhaps, may think the truth to be this—that there are properly no ideas, or passive objects, in the mind but were derived from sense: but that there are also besides these her own acts or operations; such are notions.²⁴

²³ The doctrine of the notion is sometimes called simply "Berkeley's conceptualism." Cf. Sidney Rome, "Berkeley's Conceptualism," *Philosophical Review*, LV, (1946), *passim*, and Frans Bender, *George Berkeley's Philosophy Re-examined* (Amsterdam, 1945), p. 89. Without further specification this terminology can be confusing, since Berkeley is neither a realist, nominalist, nor conceptualist in the traditional meanings of these terms. Cf. John Wild, *George Berkeley* (Cambridge, 1936), p. 135. The term "concept" in connection with Berkeley should be thought of as an abstract representation having as its objects certain specified classes of cases. Another term that would suffice is Fraser's term "idealess meaning." Cf. *The Works of George Berkeley*, ed. A. C. Fraser, 4 vols. (Oxford, 1901). I, 273, footnote 3. Johnston, who has written the fullest and most careful account of the doctrine in Berkeley, says that the notion refers to the "universal element in knowledge." Johnston, *Berkeley's Development*, p. 161 f. He also says later: "The notion is a concept or universal, present to the mind, and having as its objects (a) spirits, (b) mental operations, and (c) relations." Johnston, *Berkeley's Development*, p. 168.

²⁴ *Siris*, Sec. 308.

The notion as described by Berkeley should be thought of as capable of being interpreted within the framework of Berkeley's immaterialism. This central and characteristic Berkeleian tenet holds that there is nothing in the universe but minds and ideas. *Esse is percipi* or *percipere*. Minds perceive and ideas are perceived. Unless the notion is to be construed as a *tertium quid*, something other than mind and ideas, the doctrine of *percipere* must include the acts of mind which comprise notional knowledge. That this is the case for Berkeley can be seen from the *Philosophical Commentaries*. He writes: "Existence is *percipi* or *percipere* or *velle* i.e. *agere*."²⁷ Within the comprehension, then, of *percipere* are included both volitions and other active operations of the mind.

The most serious and incisive criticism of the doctrine of the notion has been made by Calkins.²⁸ In summary form her criticism can be put as follows. Both ideas and notions are copies. Ideas copy other ideas and notions which refer to acts of mind must have some likeness to the spirits and relations known through them. Activity of mind for Berkeley, however, consists in its capacity for being conscious. It is this which differentiates mind from ideas, which are passive. Notions, however, are passive in this sense; they, too, are objects of knowledge for minds. The only alternative to this possibility would be to describe notions as minds. This is not the case, since notions are transient and one mind can have several notions whereas mind or spirit is "one simple, undivided, active being."²⁹ Thus, as Calkins puts it, "A 'notion of spirit' is as inherently impossible as an idea of spirit."³⁰

The usage that has been so far discussed of the term "notion" may be called Berkeley's technical usage. Side by side with this, however, there are broader usages of the term in which the term is sometimes a synonym for idea. When Berkeley revised his first edition of the *Principles* in 1734 he not only added the notion passages already commented upon, but also dropped the term "notion" as synonymous with idea in several passages. For

²⁷ *Philosophical Commentaries*, entry § 429 and its addition, § 429a.

²⁸ Mary Whiton Calkins, *The Persistent Problems of Philosophy*, 5th ed. (New York, 1933), p. 115 and pp. 144 ff.

²⁹ *Principles*, Sec. 127.

³⁰ Calkins, *Persistent Problems*, p. 145.

example, in Section 25 of the *Principles* the following sentence appeared in the first edition: "All our ideas, sensations, notions, or the things which we perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished are visibly inactive, there is nothing of power or agency included in them."²¹ In the second edition of the *Principles* this phrase was dropped to conform to Berkeley's technical usage of the term "notion."²² Even in the revised *Principles*, however, there remain vestiges of the earlier usage. Furthermore, in all editions of the *Three Dialogues* the looser usage of "notion" remains side by side with the technical usage. As has been pointed out,²³ this looser usage does not always even correspond to the term "idea"; sometimes the term "notion" seems simply to refer to any phenomenon of consciousness. It seems impossible to fix upon any closer specification of the term than this.

The foregoing remarks may next be related to the central problem of contemporary Berkeleian scholarship, Berkeley's alleged development. Most commentators on Berkeley beginning with Fraser, the first modern editor, and including Johnston, Hicks, Metz, Wild, and Bender²⁴ have stressed the development of Berkeley's philosophy. Put shortly, this alleged development is seen as a growth from sensationalism to spiritualism, a road from Locke to Plato. The most recent editors of Berkeley, Luce and Jessop,²⁵ however, in their edition of the *Works*, their doctrinal articles, footnotes, and commentaries on individual works of Berkeley, have stressed the unity of the Berkeleian philosophy.

²¹ *Principles*, Sec. 25. Notice also the subtraction in *Principles*, Sec. 138.

²² Berkeley does not seem to have revised the "Introduction" to the *Principles* with his technical doctrine of notion in mind, since a number of passages can be noted with the looser usage. Cf. *Principles*, Sec. 6 of the "Intro."

²³ By Johnston, *Berkeley's Development*, p. 161.

²⁴ Berkeley, *Works*, ed. Fraser; Johnston, *Berkeley's Development*; G. Dawes Hicks, *Berkeley* (London, 1923); Rudolph Metz, *George Berkeley, Leben und Lehre* (Stuttgart, 1925); John Wild, *George Berkeley*; Bender, *Berkeley Re-examined*.

²⁵ The phrase 'Luce-Jessop' interpretation of Berkeley is to be avoided for Luce has taken pains to point out that their collaboration has extended no further than to attempt to present an accurate text of Berkeley. Cf. A. A. Luce, "Berkeleian Action and Passion," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, VII (1953), p. 4.

Luce puts this latter thesis in its most uncompromising form. Berkeley's philosophical development, as opposed to his development as a man, consisted "only in seeing wider applications of that early philosophy which he never abandoned, never outgrew, and never changed."²⁶ On this view, Berkeley's philosophy reached completion by the first edition of the *Principles* in 1710. Those, on the other hand, who have asserted that Berkeley's philosophy underwent development in his published writings have cited the changes in the second edition of the *Principles* in 1734 as evidence for their developmental thesis.²⁷ The doctrine of the notion, therefore, brings to focus the central problem of Berkeleian scholarship, Berkeley's alleged development.

The lines of controversy are thus drawn; let us attempt to assess them. The unitary view of Luce and Jessop, it should be noted, stresses that there were changes of significance made by

²⁶ A. A. Luce, "The Unity of the Berkeleian Philosophy," *Mind*, XLVI (1937), p. 44.

²⁷ It is not being suggested that commentators prior to Luce and Jessop are in complete agreement on the course of Berkeley's alleged development; naturally there are differences in emphasis and interpretation. Johnston writes: "Thus, instead of merely saying that spirits have meaning, he now says that we have a notion of spirits. Though the two statements really amount to the same thing the introduction of the new and distinctive term marks a notable step in the direction of a systematic theory of universal knowledge of spirits." Johnston, *Berkeley's Development*, p. 161. Metz writes: "Erst in der sehr viel späteren 2 Aufl. der *Prinzipien* vom Jahre 1734 führt Berkeley neben der sinnlichen Erkenntnis mit dem Begriff der Notion einen wahrhaft rationalen Faktor in seine Lehre ein." Metz, *Berkeley*, s. 73. Hicks refers to the differences between the first and second editions of the *Principles* as marking a "turning point" in Berkeley's philosophy and calls the doctrine of notions in the second edition a "radical modification." Hicks, *Berkeley*, p. 206. Wild comments: "We must also regard the emphatic introduction of the term 'notion' with the caused 'acts' or 'operations' of the finite self, which occurred at this time as a definite though incomplete Platonic step." Wild, *Berkeley*, p. 70. Bender writes: "In the second edition of the *Principles* . . . some important additions were made which deal mainly with spirits and with the 'notion' as the means whereby knowledge may be obtained concerning them." Bender, *Berkeley*, p. 64. Rome writes: "The two historically important consequences arising out of Berkeley's introducing 'notions' into the 1734 edition of the *Principles* are . . . first spiritual realism, and second common sense realism." Sidney Rome, "Berkeley's Conceptualism," *Philosophical Review*, LV (1946), 686.

Berkeley in the course of writing the *Philosophical Commentaries*; the unitary view refers only to Berkeley's published writings, and considers that the *Principles* and the *Three Dialogues* in their first editions contain his mature philosophy. On this unitary view the additions made in the second edition in regard to notions were only in the way of giving the mental as object a name.³⁸

There are two lines of evidence for this contention. The first is textual. In connection with Section 140 of the *Principles* there is in the manuscript version the phrase "or rather a notion." This passage has been noted earlier in this paper. It was Jessop who first pointed this out, and he comments upon his collation of the two versions as follows:

. . . when Berkeley introduced the term "notion" in a restricted sense in his second edition he did but restore what he had originally intended to include in the first. . . . the term only, not the doctrine it indicated was omitted from the first edition.³⁹

Luce claims that "there is not a shadow of difference between the two editions on the substantial issue."⁴⁰ This line of evidence, however, would not seem to be as strong as Luce, Jessop, and Wisdom believe. If it can be shown that actually the second-edition changes in the *Principles* do in fact add new doctrine, then the Luce and Jessop reference to a technical usage of the term "notion" prior to 1734 will only show that Berkeley was perhaps concerned about his doctrine of spirits. But we already know his concern both from his letter to Johnson and from the references to the second part of the *Principles* in the *Philosophical Commentaries*. The question is not whether he thought about the problem, but rather whether the doctrine appears full-blown before 1734.

The second line of evidence for the unitary view of Luce and Jessop is that the substance of Berkeley's teaching on notions can

³⁸ George Berkeley, *Philosophical Writings*, ed. T. E. Jessop (London, 1952), note to Secs. 27 and 63; and A. A. Luce, *Berkeley and Malebranche* (London, 1934) pp. 104-105.

³⁹ *Principles of Human Knowledge*, ed. T. E. Jessop (London, 1937), v-vi. Also Jessop in *Works*, II, note to Sec. 27, p. 53. Wisdom accepts this argument and claims that the developmental view of Hicks is thereby "knocked . . . firmly on the head" (John Wisdom, *The Unconscious Origin of Berkeley's Philosophy* [London, 1953], p. 45).

⁴⁰ A. A. Luce, *Berkeley's Immaterialism* (London, 1945), p. 99.

be found in the *Philosophical Commentaries*. There is little doubt that a number of entries in this document seem pertinent to the issue. But how fully is the doctrine developed in this work? For Jessop "the doctrine is present even in the *Commonplace Book*."⁴¹ Study of the entries Jessop cites in support of this contention⁴² and other entries which are similar⁴³ reveals that Berkeley in the *Philosophical Commentaries* does only two things—denies, in the first place, that we have ideational knowledge of the operations of the mind and asserts, secondly, that such knowledge is possible.⁴⁴ Certainly by 1734 he does more than give these two contentions a name.

The entries in the *Philosophical Commentaries* would not seem to bear out Jessop's contention. In that work, Berkeley did not include relations under notional knowledge, did not recognize that notional knowledge is an epistemological act, nor did he classify the objects of notional knowledge. As far as the first edition of the *Principles* is concerned, Berkeley did not have to delete in order to publish the second in 1734. He did, however, have to add, and these additions represent what it seems most simple to call new doctrine. To assert, as do both Luce and Jessop, that the doctrine is present in everything but name in the first edition of the *Principles* in 1710 seems merely perverse.

What has been shown here does not purport to establish two Berkeleys, an early and a late; this must be argued on other grounds. There is development, however, in Berkeley's doctrine of the notion, a development which occurred, on the only evidence available, between 1710 and 1734.

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⁴¹ Jessop in *Principles*, vi (editor's preface).

⁴² Entries 176a, 523, 576, 712 in Luce's numeration.

⁴³ Cf. entries 490, 663, 230, 847.

⁴⁴ Berkeley writes: "Qu: whether it were not better to call the operations of the mind ideas, confining this term to things sensible?" (Berkeley, *Philosophical Commentaries*, entry § 490). Berkeley answers this question in the affirmative to the extent that he later adopts the term "notion" for describing the operation of the mind, although never strictly speaking does he confine the term "idea" to things sensible; he insists upon the possibility of ideas of the imagination, which, although rooted in sense-perception, show the activity of the mind.

CRITICAL STUDIES

THE LIBERALISM OF CLASSICAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

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CLASSICAL political philosophy—the political philosophy originated by Socrates and elaborated by Plato and by Aristotle—is today generally rejected as obsolete. The difference between, not to say the mutual incompatibility of, the two grounds on which it is rejected corresponds to the difference between the two schools of thought which predominate in our age, namely, positivism and existentialism. Positivism rejects classical political philosophy with a view to its mode as unscientific and with a view to its substance as undemocratic. There is a tension between these grounds, for, according to positivism, science is incapable of validating any value judgment and therefore science can never reject a doctrine because it is undemocratic. But “the heart has its reasons which reason does not know,” and not indeed positivism but many positivists possess a heart. Moreover there is an affinity between present day positivism and sympathy for a certain kind of democracy; that affinity is due to the broad, not merely methodological, context out of which positivism emerged or to the hidden premises of positivism which positivism is unable to articulate because it is constitutionally unable to conceive of itself as a problem. Positivism may be said to be more dogmatic than any other position of which we have records. Positivism can achieve this triumph because it is able to present itself as very sceptical; it is that manifestation of dogmatism based on scepticism in which the scepticism completely conceals the dogmatism from its adherents. It is the latest form and it may very well be the last form in which modern rationalism appears; it is that form in which the crisis of modern rationalism becomes almost obvious to everyone. Once it becomes obvious to a man, he has already abandoned positivism and, if he adheres to the modern premises, he has no choice but to turn to existentialism. Existentialism faces

the situation with which positivism is confronted but which it does not grasp: the fact that reason has become radically problematic. According to positivism, the first premises are not evident and necessary but are either purely factual or else conventional. According to existentialism, they are in a sense necessary but they are certainly not evident: all thinking rests on unevident but non-arbitrary premises. Man is in the grip of powers which he cannot master or comprehend, and these powers reveal themselves differently in different historical epochs. Hence classical political philosophy is to be rejected as unhistorical or rationalistic. It was rationalistic because it denied the fundamental dependence of reason on language, which is always this or that language, the language of a historical community, of a community which has not been made but has grown. Classical political philosophy could not give to itself an account of its own essential Greekness. Furthermore, by denying the dependence of man's thought on powers which he cannot comprehend, classical political philosophy was irreligious. It denied indeed the possibility of an areligious civil society, but it subordinated the religious to the political. For instance, in the *Republic*, Plato reduces the sacred to the useful; when Aristotle says that the city is natural, he implies that it is not sacred, like the sacred Troy in Homer; he reveals the precarious status of religion in his scheme by enumerating the concern with the divine in the "fifth and first" place: only the citizens who are too old for political activity ought to become priests.

Professor Eric A. Havelock in his book *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics*¹ approaches classical political philosophy from the positivistic point of view. The doctrine to which he adheres is however a somewhat obsolete version of positivism. Positivist study of society, as he understands it, is "descriptive" and opposed to "judgmental evaluation" (120, 368) but this does not prevent his siding with those who understand "History as Progress." The social scientist cannot speak of progress unless value judgments can be objective. The up-to-date or consistent positivist will therefore refrain from speaking of progress and instead speak of change. Similarly Havelock appears to accept the distinction between

¹ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957). 443 pp., \$6.00.

primitive men or savages and civilized men (186-188), whereas the consistent positivist will speak not of savages but of pre-literate men and assert that preliterate men have "civilizations" or "cultures" neither superior nor inferior to those of literate men. It would be wrong to believe that the up-to-date positivist is entirely consistent or that his careful avoidance of "evaluative" terms is entirely due to his methodological puritanism; his heart tells him that once one admits the inequality of "cultures," one may not be able to condemn colonialism on moral grounds. Havelock is therefore perhaps only more intelligent or more frank than the consistent positivists when he describes his position as liberal rather than as positivist. Yet this does not entirely dispose of the difficulty. "For the liberals man is to be taken as you find him and therefore his present political institutions are to be taken as given also." This means that here and now the liberals will take American democracy as given and will then "concentrate empirically and descriptively on this kind of political mechanism." This is a fair description of positivistic political science at its best. Yet Havelock praises the same liberals for writing "in defence of democracy" (cf. 123 and 155). What then is a liberal? Was a German social scientist who in 1939 took "the present political institutions as given" and subjected them to "empirical analysis" for this reason by itself a liberal? If so then a liberal is not a man of strong moral or political convictions, and this does not seem to agree with the common meaning of the word. Yet from Havelock's Preface it appears that the liberal regards all political and moral convictions as "negotiable" because he is extremely tolerant. Havelock applies the implicit maxim of conduct to the relations between the United States and Soviet Russia today. For all one can know from his book, he would have given the same advice during the conflict between the Western democracies and the Fascist regimes at the time of the Munich conference. At any rate he does not seem to have given thought to the question of whether Tolerance can remain tolerant when confronted with unqualified Intolerance or whether one must not fall back in the end on "moral convictions" which are not "negotiable." In almost all these points Havelock is liberal in the sense in which the word is commonly used here and now.

Originally, a liberal was a man who behaves in a manner becoming a free man as distinguished from a slave. According to the classic analysis, liberality is a virtue concerned with the use of wealth and therefore especially with giving: the liberal man gives gladly of his own in the right circumstances because it is noble to do so, and not from calculation; hence it is not easy for him to become or to remain rich; liberality is less opposed to prodigality than to meanness (greed as well as niggardliness). It is easy to see how this narrow meaning of liberality emerged out of the broad meaning. In everyday life, which is life in peace, the most common opportunities for showing whether one has the character of a free man or of a slave are afforded by one's dealings with one's possessions; most men honor wealth and show therewith that they are slaves of wealth; the man who behaves in a manner becoming a free man comes to sight primarily as a liberal man in the sense articulated by Aristotle. He knows that certain activities and hence in particular certain sciences and arts—the liberal sciences and arts—are choiceworthy for their own sake, regardless of their utility for the satisfaction of the lower kind of needs. He prefers the goods of the soul to the goods of the body. Liberality is then only one aspect of, not to say one name for, human excellence or being honorable or decent. The liberal man on the highest level esteems most highly the mind and its excellence and is aware of the fact that man at his best is autonomous or not subject to any authority, while in every other respect he is subject to authority which, in order to deserve respect, or to be truly authority, must be a reflection through a dimming medium of what is simply the highest. The liberal man cannot be a subject to a tyrant or to a master and for almost all practical purposes he will be a republican. Classical political philosophy was liberal in the original sense.

It is not necessary for our present purpose to dwell on the successive changes which the word "liberal" has undergone since the early 19th century. Those changes follow the substitution of modern political philosophy—the ground as well as the consequence of modern natural science—for classical political philosophy. Before the substitution was completed, "liberality" sometimes meant lack of restraint, not to say profanity. By virtue of

the more recent changes, "liberal" has come to mean almost the opposite of what it meant originally; the original meaning has almost vanished from "common sense". To quote Havelock, "It is of course assumed that by any common sense definition of the word liberal as it is applied in politics Plato is not a liberal thinker" (19). Havelock's understanding of liberalism hardly differs in either substance or mode from what is now the common-sense understanding. Liberalism, as he understands it, puts a greater stress on liberty than on authority; it regards authority as derivative solely from society, and society as spontaneous or automatic rather than as established by man; it denies the existence of any fixed norms: norms are responses to needs and change with the needs; the change of the needs and of the responses to them has a pattern: there is a historical process which is progressive without however tending toward an end or a peak, or which is "piece meal" (123); liberalism conceives of the historical process as a continuation of the evolutionary process; it is historical because it regards the human characteristics as acquired and not as given; it is optimistic and radical; it is "a genuine humanism which is not guilt-ridden"; it is democratic and egalitarian; accordingly it traces the historical changes and hence morality less to outstanding men than to groups and their pressures which "take concrete form in the educational activity of the members of the group"; it is in full sympathy with technological society and an international commercial system; it is empirical and pragmatic; last but not least it is naturalist or scientific, i.e., non-theological and non-metaphysical.

Havelock's understanding of liberalism differs from the vulgar understanding in two points. In the first place he regards it as necessary to look for the historical roots of liberalism in Greek antiquity. According to the common view, the sources of liberalism are found in writings like Locke's *Second Treatise of Government* and the Declaration of Independence. Havelock however feels that these writings convey a teaching which is not strictly speaking liberal since it is based on the assumption of natural right, i.e., of an absolute; that teaching is therefore still too Platonic to be liberal (15-18). Pure liberalism exists either after the complete expulsion of Platonism or else before its emergence.

As we would put it, there is a kinship between modern historicism and ancient conventionalism (i.e., the view that all right is conventional or no right is natural). Havelock contends that a pure liberalism existed in pre-Platonic or pre-Socratic thought; while implying "a brooding sense of natural justice among men" (377), it rejected natural justice. His historical opinion may be said to find its complete expression in the contention that whereas Plato and Aristotle as well as the Old Testament are responsible for the authoritarian strand in Western thought, the New Testament as well as certain Greek sophists, materialists, agnostics or atheists are responsible for the liberal strand in it (259, 376). One might find it strange that a view according to which moral convictions are negotiable is suggested to be somehow in harmony with the New Testament. But perhaps Havelock thought chiefly of the New Testament prohibition or counsel against resisting evil and the failure of a pupil of Gorgias, as distinguished from a pupil of Socrates, to resort to the punishment of evildoers. Be this as it may, one is tempted to describe Havelock's liberalism as a classical scholar's Christian liberalism of a certain kind. But one must resist this temptation since Havelock deplores the "basic split between the moral or ideal and the expedient or selfish" which developed under "Christian other-worldly influences" (365, 14), unless one assumes that according to him "primitive Christianity" (18) was not other-worldly. The issue would seem to be settled by his remark that "religion, however humane, is always intolerant of purely secular thinking" (161).

There was a time when we were exposed to the opinion that Plato and Aristotle were related to the sophists as the German idealists were to the theorists of the French Revolution. This opinion could be shared by both friends and enemies of the principles of 1789. Havelock's contention is an up-to-date and therefore simplified version of that opinion. By speaking constantly of "the Greek liberals," he suggests that in Greek antiquity the battle lines were drawn in the same way as in modern times: liberals were up in arms against the orthodox and the authoritarians (18, 73). He explicitly contends that there existed in ancient Greece a "liberal-historical view"—a view which had become "a completed structure" by the time of Aristotle—and that

the thinkers who set it forth combined in a non-accidental manner a non-theological and non-metaphysical anthropology or philosophy of history with faith in the common man or at any rate in democracy (11, 18, 32, 155). Everyone, we believe, grants or has granted that there were men prior to Plato who were "materialists" and at the same time asserted that the universe has come into being *opera sine divom* in any sense of the word "god". These men asserted therefore that man and all other living beings have come into being out of inanimate beings and through inanimate beings, and that man's beginnings were poor and brutish; that, compared with its beginnings, human life as it is now presupposes a progress achieved through human exertions and human inventions; and that morality—the right and the noble—is of merely human origin. This doctrine or set of doctrines is however only the necessary but by no means the sufficient condition of liberalism. It is indeed common to present day liberalism and its ancient equivalent. Yet once when speaking of a "'Darwinian' and 'behaviorist'" ancient doctrine, Havelock says that in employing these adjectives he uses "a very loose analogy" (34). The mere mention of Darwinism might have sufficed to reveal the precarious character of the connection between evolutionism and liberalism. Above all, we are entitled to expect of a man who does not tire of speaking of science that he make abundantly clear the reason why the analogy is loose, or in other words that he make clear the fundamental difference between modern liberalism and its ancient equivalent. Havelock disappoints this expectation. He regards it as a thesis characteristic of liberals that "man is an animal" or "man is merely an animal" or "man is merely a special sort of an animal" (107-110), but, as Aristotle's definition of man sufficiently shows, this thesis cannot be characteristic of liberalism. Liberalism and non-liberalism begin to differ when the non-liberals raise the question regarding the significance of man's being "a special sort of animal." Let man be a mixture of the elements like any other animal, yet the elements are mixed in him from the beginning as they are in no other animal: man alone can acquire "the factors which distinguish him presently" from the other animals (cf. 75-76); he is the only animal which can look at the universe or look up to it; this necessary consequence of his

"speciality" can easily lead to the non-liberal conclusion that the distinctly human life is the life devoted to contemplation as distinguished from the life of action or of production. Furthermore, if the universe has come into being, it will perish again, and this coming into being and perishing has taken place and will take place infinitely often; there were and will be infinitely many universes succeeding one another. Here the question arises as to whether there can be a universe without man: is man's being accidental to the universe, to any universe? In other words, is the state of things prior to the emergence of man and the other animals one state of the universe equal in rank to the state after their emergence, or are the two states fundamentally different from one another as *chaos* and *cosmos*? The liberals assert that man's being is accidental to the universe and that *chaos* and *cosmos* are only two different states of the universe. But did their ancient predecessors—"the Greek anthropologists"—agree with them? Besides, just as the coming into being of the universe is succeeded by its perishing, the coming into being of civilization is succeeded by its decay: "the historical process" is not simply progressive but cyclical. As everyone knows, this does not affect the "flamboyant optimism" (69) of the liberals but it may have affected their Greek predecessors; it may have led them to attach less importance to activity contributing to that progress of social institutions which is necessarily succeeded by their decay than to the understanding of the permanent grounds or character of the process or to the understanding of the whole within which the process takes place and which limits the progress (cf. 253); this limit is not set by man, and it surpasses everything man can bring about by his exertions and inventions; it is superhuman or divine. Moreover, one may grant that progress is due entirely to man's exertions and inventions and yet trace progress primarily to rare and discontinuous acts of a few outstanding men; "progressivism" is not necessarily identical with that "gradualism" which is apparently essential to liberalism. Finally, liberalism is empirical or pragmatic; it is therefore unable to assert that the principle of causality ("nothing can come into being out of nothing and through nothing") is evidently and necessarily true. On the other hand, it would seem that the Greek anthropologists or rather

"physiologists" did regard that principle as evidently true because they understood the relation of sense perception and *logos* differently than do the liberals. It is no exaggeration to say that Havelock never meets the issue of the possible fundamental difference between the liberals and their Greek predecessors. For one cannot say that he meets that issue by asserting that the Greeks who believed in progress "may have retained this within the framework of a cosmic cycle" and that "the issue as it affects a basic philosophy of human history and morals is whether we *at present* are living in a regress or a progress" (405). It is obvious that this does not affect at all the considerations which have been indicated. Besides, in order to prove that a given Greek thinker was a liberal, Havelock is now compelled to prove that the thinker in question thought himself to live "in a progress." Contrary to his inclination, he cannot show this by showing that the thinker in question regarded his time as superior to the barbaric beginnings, for any time prior to the final devastation is superior to the first age. Nor can he show it by showing that the thinker in question believed himself to live at the peak of the process, for this belief implies that there will be no further progress to speak of. All this means that he cannot prove the existence of a single Greek liberal thinker.

Of one great obstacle to his undertaking Havelock is aware. To put it conservatively, very little is known of the Greek liberals; at most only fragments of their writings and reports about their teachings as well as about their deeds and sufferings survive. To overcome this difficulty, Havelock must devise an appropriate procedure. He divides the bulk of his argument into two parts, the first dealing with anthropology or philosophy of history and the second with political doctrine. He subdivides the first part completely and the second part to some extent in accordance with the requirements of the subject matter. Liberalism being preceded by orthodoxy (73), he presents first the orthodox or theological view, then the liberal or scientific view and finally the compromise between the orthodox and the liberal views which is in fact the metaphysical view (of Plato and Aristotle). He thus tacitly replaces the Comtean scheme of the three stages by what would seem to be a dialectical scheme which bodes as ill for the future of liberalism as did Comte's. Given the great difficulty of interpreting

fragments, especially when "the surviving scraps are ... tenuous" (123), he wisely begins with complete books in which the liberal doctrine is believed to be embodied and only afterward turns to the fragments. But he does not take the complete works as wholes; he uses them as quarries from which he removes without any ado the liberal gems which, it seems, are immediately recognizable as such; if he is not confronted with fragments, he creates fragments. Furthermore, four of the ten complete books used in the first and basic part of his argument are poetic works, and poets are "not reporters"; one is a history which stems from the first pre-Christian century and which therefore is not obviously a good source of pre-Platonic thought (64, 73); the others are dialogues of Plato, who also is "not a reporter," and Aristotle's *Politics*. It would be petty to pay much attention to the fact that, on occasion, Havelock does not hesitate to assert without evidence that, in a given passage in which Plato does not claim to report, "Plato is reporting" (181). For on the whole, Havelock is very distrustful of Plato's and Aristotle's remarks about their predecessors. Hence it would seem that he cannot reasonably follow any other procedure in reconstructing pre-Platonic social science except to start from the complete prose works which are indubitably pre-Platonic, i.e. from Herodotus and Thucydides. Havelock rejects this beginning apparently on the ground that Herodotus and Thucydides are historians and not scientists or that their works contain only "concrete observations" and not "generic schematizations" (405-406). But may "concrete observations" not be based on general premises? If a present day historian of classical thought can know Bradley, Bentham, Bosanquet, Darwin, Dewey, Freud, Green, Grotius, Hegel, Hobbes, Hume, James, Kant, Leibniz, Locke, Machiavelli, Marx, Mill, Newton, Rousseau, Spencer (see the Index of Havelock's book), it is possible that Herodotus and Thucydides had heard of one or the other Greek anthropologist and that a careful reading of their histories will bring to light the "generic schematizations" which guided their "concrete observations." Havelock himself has occasional glimpses of this possibility (e.g. 414). What seems to protect him against the pitfalls of his procedure is his awareness that, at any rate as regards "the Elder Sophists," the sources are "imperfect and

imprecise and the task of piecing them together to make a coherent picture requires philological discipline, a good deal of finesse, and also an exercise of over-all judgment which must be content to leave some things unsettled" (157, 230). We shall have to consider whether his deed corresponds to his speech, or whether he exhibits the virtues which he cannot help claiming to be indispensable to his enterprise.

Liberalism implies a philosophy of history. "History" does not mean in this context a kind of inquiry or the outcome of an inquiry, but rather the object of an inquiry or a "dimension of reality." Since the Greek word from which "History" is derived does not have the latter meaning, philological discipline would prevent one from ascribing to any Greek thinker a philosophy of history, at least before one has laid the proper foundation for such an ascription. Havelock thinks or acts differently. Since his authors do not speak of history in the derivative sense of the term, he makes them speak of it and thus transforms them into modern thinkers, if not directly into liberals. For instance, he translates "becoming" or "all human things" by "History" and he inserts "history," with brackets or without them, into the ancient sayings (62, 94, 108, 115).

The characteristic assertion of liberalism seems to be that man and hence also morality is not "a fixed quantity"; that man's nature and therewith morality is essentially changing; that this change constitutes History; and that through History man has developed from most imperfect beginnings into a civilized or humane being. The opponents of liberalism seem to assert that man's nature does not change, that morality is timeless or *a priori* and that man's beginnings were perfect (27-29, 35, 40, 44-45). But it is not clear, and it has not been made clear by Havelock, that there is a necessary connection between the assertion that man's nature does not change and the assertion that man's beginnings were perfect, i.e., superior to the present. The recollection, we do not say of Plato and Aristotle, but merely of 18th century progressivism would have dispelled the confusion. Be this as it may, as is indicated by the titles of the pertinent chapters in Havelock's book, he is mainly concerned with the question regarding the status of man in the beginning.

The pre-liberal or orthodox position must be understood by Havelock as the belief that man's beginnings were simply perfect, that man's original state was the garden of Eden or the golden age, a state in which men were well provided for by God or gods and not in need of work and skills, and in which nothing was required of them except childlike obedience: imperfection or misery, and hence the need for work and the arts, arose through man's fault or guilt; but these merely human remedies are utterly insufficient. The orthodox regard History as Regress. "The classic Greek statement of the Eden dream" occurs in Hesiod's account of the golden age in the *Works and Days*. According to Havelock, the comparison of the golden age with the garden of Eden is not a loose analogy: "Hesiod's narrative conveys the inevitable suggestion that Eden was lost through eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge" (36). Hesiod's "famous account of the five ages" contains "the story of three successive failures of three generations of men" (37), of failures which culminate in the present, the worst of all five ages. Havelock hears in Hesiod's account "the tone of genuine social and moral critique." Yet he cannot take him seriously: Hesiod's account of the fifth or present age "reads like the perennial and peevish complaint of an ageing conservative whose hardening habits and faculties cannot come to terms with youth or with changing conditions": Accordingly, he apologizes for having "lingered over Hesiod" after having devoted to him less than five pages, a considerable part of which is filled with a mere enumeration of items mentioned by Hesiod (40). Havelock suggests then that according to Hesiod man lost Eden through his sin. Yet only three out of five successive races of men were "failures." The first and golden race was not a failure. There is no indication whatever that it came to an end through man's sin. The golden race lived under Kronos, the next race, the silver race, was hidden away by Zeus and the three last races are explicitly said to have been "made" by Zeus. It would seem then, as Havelock notes in a different context, that when Zeus "succeeded to the throne of Kronos . . . human degeneration began" (53): the destruction of the golden race was due to Zeus' dethroning of Kronos. Zeus apparently did not wish or was not able to make a golden race of his own. It is, to say the least, not perfectly

clear whether according to Hesiod the failure of the silver, bronze and iron races was not due in the last analysis to Zeus' whim or his defective workmanship rather than to man's fault. "Hebrew analogies . . . can often mislead" (137). However, one of the races made by Zeus, the fourth race, the race of the heroes or demigods, was by far superior to the three other races made or ruled by Zeus; some of the men of the fourth race are so excellent that they are again ruled by Kronos, if only after their death. Havelock does not explain why Hesiod assigned to the demigods the place between the inferior bronze race and the still more inferior iron race. When Plato adopted Hesiod's scheme in the *Republic*, he gave a reason why or intimated in what respect the fourth race or rather the fourth regime is almost equal to the first regime: the first regime is the rule of the philosophers and the fourth regime is democracy, i.e., the only regime apart from the first in which philosophers can live or live freely (546 e-547 a1, 557d 4, 558a8). For reasons which need not be stated, one cannot use the Platonic variation for the understanding of the original. It is pertinent to say that according to Hesiod the fifth or iron race is not necessarily the last race: the age succeeding the iron age is likely to be superior to it or to the present age, which itself is not at all deprived of every goodness (*Works and Days* 174-175, 179). Could Hesiod have thought that a more or less better race is always succeeded by a more or less worse race which in its turn is always succeeded by a more or less better race and so on until the age of Zeus (i.e., human life as we know it) comes to its end? On the basis of the evidence, this suggestion is more "inevitable" than the accepted interpretation. Under no circumstances is one entitled to say that Hesiod regarded "History as Regress."

How Hesiod's account of the five races must be understood depends on the context in which it occurs. As for its immediate context, it is the second of three stories; the first story is the account of Prometheus and Pandora, and the third story is the tale of the hawk and the nightingale. Havelock refers in a few words to the first story, in which work may be said to be presented as a curse but he does not say anything about the third story although it is very pertinent to the history of Greek liberalism. The hawk said to the nightingale while he carried her high up in

the clouds, having gripped her fast with his talons: "He is a fool who tries to withstand the stronger, for he will never vanquish him and he suffers pain besides the disgrace." The king believes that he disposes entirely of the fate of the singer but the singer or the poet has a power of his own, a power surpassing that of the king (*Theogony* 94-103). As for the broad context of this story as well as of the story of the five races, it is the *Works and Days* as a whole. The poem as a whole tells when and how the various "works," especially of farming, must be done and which "days" are propitious and which not for various purposes; the account of the works and the days is preceded by exhortations to work as the only proper thing for just men and as a blessing, by answers to the question as to why the gods compel men to work, and by the praise of Zeus the king, the guardian of justice who blesses the just and crushes the proud if he wills (*W.D.* 267-273). There are, it seems, two ways of life, that of the unjust idlers and that of the just who work, especially as farmers. Closer inspection shows that there are at least three ways of life corresponding to the three kinds of men: those who understand by themselves, those who listen to the former and obey them, and those who understand neither by themselves nor by listening to others. The man who understands by himself and therefore can speak well and with understanding and is best of all is, in the highest case, the singer. The singer as singer neither works nor is he idle. His deeds belong to the night rather than to the "days." Song transcends the primary antithesis which must be transcended because of the ambiguity of work: work is both a curse and a blessing. Toil is the brother of Forgetting (*Theogony* 226-227) while the Muses are the daughters of Memory. Song transcends the primary antithesis because its highest theme—Zeus—transcends it.

Havelock is not concerned with the context of Hesiod's stories of the perfect beginning because he is too certain of his answers to all questions. "An early agricultural economy" combined with "disillusionment with sex" finds "wish fulfillment by projecting backwards"; and the "backward vision" combines "with an *a priori* epistemology" (36, 40). A psychology and a sociology derived from the observation of present day Western man, or rather a certain type of present day Western men, take the place of the

authentic context and are used as the key to the character of men and societies of the past in such a way that phenomena, which are not allowed to exist by the "*a priori* epistemology" of these present day pursuits, can never be noticed. The circle, being a circle, is necessarily closed. But the mind is closed too. The attempt is made to catch a profound and subtle thought in the meshes of a thought of unsurpassed shallowness and crudity.

As our quotations have abundantly proved, Havelock takes it for granted that the modern social scientist, but not Hesiod, understood what happened in Hesiod or to Hesiod. As for the assertion that Hesiod had an epistemology, it is not as preposterous as it sounds. Hesiod reflected on the sources of his knowledge. His *Works and Days* derive from three different sources: his experience, what people say, and what the Muses taught him. For instance, what he teaches regarding farming is derived from his experience, but since he had little experience of sailing, his teaching regarding sailing depends very much on instruction by the Muses (*W.D.* 646-662, 803). Instruction by the Muses seems to be indispensable for knowledge of the things that shall be and of the things that were in the olden times as well as of the gods who are always; i.e., for knowledge hidden from man, who has experience only of what is now. The Muses however go abroad by night, veiled in thick mist. Or, as they said to Hesiod, they know how to say many lies which resemble the truth but they also know, when they will, how to sing true things (*Theogony* 9-10, 26-27). As far as we can tell, the Muses did not always tell Hesiod which of their tales were true and which were not. Certainly Hesiod does not tell us which of his tales are true and which are not. The farmer, not the singer, must strip when doing his work (*W.D.* 391-392). Hesiod's teaching is ambiguous according to his knowledge, not to say according to his intention. One form in which the ambiguity appears is self-contradiction. Seeing that the Muses are the daughters of Zeus, we wonder whether they instructed the men of the age of Kronos as they instruct a few men of the iron age, and whether the possible difference in this respect between the two ages did not affect Hesiod's private judgment about the golden age.

We conclude that it is not wise to open the discussion of the "regressivist" position with the interpretation of Hesiod. It is wiser to begin with the non-musical and unambiguous discussion of the problem of progress which we find in the second book of Aristotle's *Politics*. Assuming as a fact that the change from the old manner in the arts and the sciences to the new manner has been beneficial, Aristotle wonders whether a corresponding change in the laws would be equally beneficial. He thus raises the question as to whether, as some people ("the Greek liberals") believe, there is a necessary harmony between intellectual progress and social progress. His answer is not unqualifiedly in the affirmative. By understanding his reasoning one will be enabled to begin to understand those Greek thinkers who both after and before the emergence of science were distrustful of social change, and "looked backward".

Havelock tries to supplement Hesiod's "regressivist" statement by two Platonic statements of the same description. In the myth of the *Statesman*, Plato contrasts the present state of things, the state of things under Zeus, with the preceding state of things under Kronos. He modifies the old story by presenting the process as cyclical: the present age of Zeus will be succeeded by another age of Kronos, and so on. In spite of this, "the net effect upon the reader's imagination is less cyclical than regressive"; Plato "works on our values" in such a way that he "unmistakeably and ingeniously . . . denatures the activities of a technological culture and demotes it to the rank of a second-best" (42-43). While one must not neglect how Plato's "allegory" (47) affects the readers' imagination, one must also consider how it affects the readers' thought. Plato makes it clear that we have knowledge by perception only of the present age; of the age of Kronos we know only from hearsay (272b 1-3, 269a 7-8). Myths are told to children, and in the *Statesman*, a philosopher tells the myth of the ages of Kronos and of Zeus to a child or a youth who has barely outgrown childhood (268e 4-6; *Republic* 377a 1-6, 378d 1). As regards the only state of things of which we possess first-hand knowledge, the philosopher says that there is in it no divine providence, no care of God or gods for men (271d 3-6, 273a 1, 274d 3-6). The philosopher who indicates this thought, which is

at variance with what other Platonic characters say elsewhere, is of course not Socrates, who merely listens in silence and refrains even at the end of the conversation from expressing his disagreement or agreement with what the strange philosopher had said. The stranger expresses a less disconcerting thought by saying that even if there were divine providence, human happiness would not be assured: the question of whether men led a blessed life under Kronos, when the gods took care of men, is left unanswered on the ground that we do not know whether men then used their freedom from care for philosophizing instead of telling one another myths; 'only a life dedicated to philosophy can be called happy (272b 3-d 4). Hesiod compelled us to raise a similar question regarding the golden age. Here we are compelled to raise the question as to whether philosophy would have been possible at all in the age of Kronos, in which there was no need for the arts and hence the arts did not exist (272a); we recall that Socrates did not tire of talking, not indeed with shoemakers and physicians, but of shoemakers and physicians (*Gorgias* 491a 1-3) in order to make clear to himself and to others what philosophy is; he thus indeed "demoted [the arts] to the rank of a second-best" but this is a high rank. Above all, as Havelock recognizes, Plato admits in the myth of the *Statesman* the imperfect character of man's beginnings; that Plato has "borrowed" this view from "the scientific anthropologists" we shall believe as soon as we have been shown; we do not sufficiently know the limitations of Plato's mind to be able to say that he could not possibly have arrived at this view by his own efforts. Yet "then, illogically, but necessarily" he ascribes to fire, the arts, seeds and plants divine origin (43). That the Eleatic Stranger thus contradicts himself is true, but we are not certain whether he does not contradict his contradiction in the same breath (274d 2-6) thus restoring the original position. And even while he speaks for a moment of divine gifts, Plato's Eleatic Stranger does not go so far as his Protagoras who, on a similar occasion, speaks not only of the gifts of Prometheus but in addition of the political art as a gift from Zeus.

In the *Laws*, Plato's spokesman converses with old men who possess political experience. Again the story is told of how men

lived under Kronos in abundance and were ruled by demons who cared for them. "This account which makes use of truth, tells even today" that not men but a god or the immortal mind within us must rule over men if the city is to be happy (713c 2-714a 2). Here men are indeed said to have led a blessed life under Kronos, but the conclusion from this is not that one must long for the lost age of Kronos but that, in the decisive respect, the bliss of that age—rule of the divine—is equally possible now. When, in the *Laws*, Plato discusses man's first age thematically or, as Havelock says, "more ambitiously," he does not refer to the age of Kronos. Present day life, including the great amounts of vice and of virtue which we find in it, has come into being out of the first men, the sparse survivors of a cataclysm (678a 7-9): the first men were not the golden race of Hesiod. Havelock contends that the paraphrased sentence "is really intended to suggest that the factor of novelty in human history does not exist" (45). He would be right if, in seeking the origin or the cause or the "out of which" of a thing, one implicitly asserts that the effect cannot differ from the cause. Still, this time Havelock has some evidence for ascribing to Plato "a regressive concept of human history": "an Eden of innocence, not perfect in either virtue or vice, is later described as [possessing] three of the four cardinal virtues complete" (49). He would find us pedantic if we tried to stop him with the observation that Plato uses the comparative and not the positive (679e 2-3) and thus denies completeness to the cardinal virtues possessed by early men. Plato altogether denies to early man the first and highest of the cardinal virtues, wisdom or prudence. In some respects, he suggests, early men were superior to most present day men, but in the decisive respect—as regards wisdom or the quest for wisdom—they were certainly inferior to the best of later men. To begin with Plato praises early men highly: he praises them as highly as he praises the members of the city of pigs in the *Republic*. With some exaggeration one may therefore say that up to this point Havelock's interpretation would be tolerable if there were no philosophy. But Plato goes on to illustrate the political order of early man with that of Homer's Cyclopes. The interlocutor Megillus is intelligent enough to see that Plato's spokesman in fact describes early men as

savages (680d 1-4) and even as cannibals (781e 5-782c 2). While, as we have seen, Havelock noticed that Plato's description of early men changes from a very qualified praise to a less qualified praise, he fails to see that it changes again and this time to the abandonment of all praise. Hence he judges that in Plato's account "the whole scientific perspective is . . . skillfully and totally corrupted by . . . wholly unscientific suggestion[s]" (48); given his prejudices, he cannot help reaching this result, except that he should not have spoken of Plato's "skill." From the fact that inventions have been made, Plato infers that men lacked the invented things at an earlier epoch; Havelock makes him "argue quite naively that though new invention has been achieved by man . . . it must come to a stop sometime": the notion of an "infinitely extended history" or of "human history as, so to speak, open at both ends is wholly alien to his imagination" (49). Whatever may be true of the liberal imagination, the liberal's science tells him that invention must come to a stop sometime, since the life of the human race will come to a stop sometime.

Following Havelock, we have completely disregarded the context of the "archeology" of the third book of Plato's *Laws* or the meaning of the work as a whole. As we can here only assert, consideration of the whole work would merely confirm what already appears from the passages used by Havelock, namely, that it is wholly unwarranted to say that according to Plato, man's early life is "a wholly admirable and happy thing" (58). Nevertheless Havelock is right in saying that "the net effect" of the passages in question "upon the reader's imagination" is the opposite. What "necessity" drove Plato, whose "systematic mind was, to say the least, not prone to contradiction" (100), to be "illogical"? Havelock suggests that Plato was compelled grudgingly to make concessions to the Greek anthropologists but that his prejudice always reasserted itself and especially when he was old, i.e., when he wrote the *Laws* in which "the Hesiodic nostalgia is in control" (44, 47). This explanation rests on the untenable assumption that Plato believed in the age of Kronos. Havelock also suggests, it seems, that Plato had to contradict himself because he could not contradict the Greek anthropologists "in open fight," for in doing so he would have been compelled to restate their doctrine and thus

to contribute to the spreading of a dangerous doctrine (87-88). This explanation rests on the assumption, proved untenable by the tenth book of the *Laws* for instance, that Plato was afraid openly to set forth dangerous or subversive doctrines to which he was opposed. Havelock might retort that the extreme view openly set forth and openly attacked by Plato was less dangerous in his eyes than the view of the Greek liberals; but until we know that there were Greek liberals we must regard it as possible that Plato failed to set forth the liberal view because the liberal view did not exist. We on our part suggest this explanation. Plato knew that most men read more with their "imagination" than with open-minded care and are therefore much more benefited by salutary myths than by the naked truth. Precisely the liberals who hold that morality is historical or of merely human origin must go on to say, with the sophist Protagoras as paraphrased by Havelock, that this invaluable acquisition which for later men is a heritage, "must never be lost" or is "too precious to be gambled with" (187): the greatest enemies of civilization in civilized countries are those who squander the heritage because they look down on it or on the past; civilization is much less endangered by narrow but loyal preservers than by the shallow and glib futurists who, being themselves rootless, try to destroy all roots and thus do everything in their power in order to bring back the initial chaos and promiscuity. The first duty of civilized man is then to respect his past. This respect finds its exaggerated but effective expression in the belief that the ancestors—the Founding Fathers—were simply superior to the present generation and especially to the present youth, and mere "logic" leads from this to the belief in perfect beginnings or in the age of Kronos.

Havelock begins his attempt to disinter Greek liberalism by commenting on three passages each of which is taken from a play of one of the three tragedians. He contends that these passages present a progressivist view of history and thus show the presence of "scientific anthropology" (52). Aeschylus' *Prometheus* "offers a drastic correction of the Hesiodic scheme." When Zeus dethroned Kronos, he desired to destroy the human race and to plant a new one but thanks to Prometheus' intervention, which was inspired by love of man or by compassion for man,

this plan was frustrated. In Aeschylus' presentation Zeus's decision appears as "the whim of a cruel and careless despot" (53). Aeschylus "underlines the philanthropy" of Prometheus because in his presentation man "is somehow gaining in stature" (54). He says, as did Hesiod, that Prometheus' crime consisted in the theft of fire for the benefit of man but he adds with emphasis that the stolen fire, or the stolen source of fire, became man's teacher in every art, that Prometheus has given man all arts, all of them great boons to man, and, above all, that Prometheus gave man understanding. According to Havelock then, Aeschylus makes two assertions. In the first place, "so far from being created by the gods or descended from them [the human species] emerged as we know it from a pre-human condition," and it emerged from its pre-human condition through technology, i.e., through "human achievement" (57, 61). Secondly, "somehow, in the unfolding history of civilization, the cause of technology and the cause of compassion are bound up together"; the threat of a "liquidation" of the human race [by Zeus] was "a concomitant . . . of the total absence of technology" (58). Aeschylus is, then, a believer in progressive evolution. But did he believe only in progress achieved or did he have "the vistas of infinite time," i.e., of infinite future progress? Prometheus' condemnation and punishment by Zeus seems to show that Aeschylus "has retained the Hesiodic pessimism"; but since in the end there will be a reconciliation between Prometheus and Zeus, our faith in "the historical process" is restored (61). Havelock calls Prometheus' enumeration of the arts which he gave to man "the catalogue of human achievement," just as he finds in the play the view that man was not made by the gods. He does not even attempt to prove the second assertion (cf. *Prometheus* 235). As for the first assertion he admits that "on the surface of the drama" Prometheus is a god but he contends reasonably that if the fire which Prometheus stole is, as Prometheus himself says, the teacher of man in many or in all arts (*Prometheus* 109-110, 256), the arts are to some extent man's own achievement (63-65). What then is Prometheus' achievement? Who or what is Prometheus? "Prometheus is the embodiment of Intelligence" (64). Yet Prometheus says that he put blind hopes in men as a remedy for having made them stop to

foresee their doom, their death (vv. 250-252). Similarly, he regards as his greatest invention the art of medicine by which men are enabled to ward off all diseases (vv. 478-483): does he claim that medicine can heal all mortal diseases or that he has abolished man's mortality? Is he a boaster? But he knows, or he has learned through his suffering, the limitation of all art: "Art is by far weaker than necessity" (vv. 514-518); Prometheus' love of man cannot overcome the power of necessity. There is then no "infinite progress." The well-meaning bringer of blind hopes is himself the victim of a blind hope: he did not foresee how harshly he would be punished by Zeus. The fore-thinker lacked forethought in his own case. In the struggle between Zeus and Kronos, between Guile and Strength, he sided with Zeus; he made a choice which seemed wise at the time but which he now regrets (vv. 201-225, 268-271; cf. 1071-1079). He does not wish to tell Io her future fate because he knows that ignorance is sometimes better than knowledge or that man needs blind hopes, but he is easily persuaded to act against his better knowledge out of the kindness of his heart (vv. 624 ff.). Is Aeschylus' message so different from Hesiod's, who taught that Zeus is wiler than the wily Prometheus (vv. 61-62; *Theogony* 545-616)? Zeus, not Prometheus, teaches man to learn wisdom by suffering (vv. 585-586; *Agamemnon* 168-178) and not through the power of the arts. Is then the Zeus of the *Prometheus* a cruel tyrant? The play is a part and certainly not the last part of a trilogy; Prometheus' antagonist does not appear in the play; Hermes states Zeus' case as well as he can; but we do not know how Zeus would have stated it. The very greatness of Prometheus, which is so powerfully exhibited in the play, may be meant to give us an inkling of the greatness of Zeus, of Zeus' wisdom. Zeus is so great that he cannot be understood, that he must appear as a cruel tyrant, before he has manifested himself. He found men—Kronos' men—as witless beings; the implication that Kronos' race of men was not golden, that the first men were witless, is part of the praise of Zeus. Zeus wished to destroy Kronos' men and to create new ones. Prometheus claims that he prevented the destruction of man by stealing fire for him. Did Zeus wish to create men worthy of him and free from blind hopes? Was it impossible for Zeus to

undo the effect of Prometheus' deed, or did he decide to use Prometheus' kind-hearted but not foreseeing deed in a foreseeing, in a royal manner? Did he decide, that is, to use Prometheus' increase of man's power as a means for teaching man true wisdom by the suffering coming from the very power of the arts? By dwelling on the "surface" of the play, one becomes aware of the contrast between the arts and true wisdom. Since the play presents the first men as most imperfect and since it seems to suggest that the arts are less divine gifts than human inventions, Havelock is certain that Aeschylus used a "scientific source," and as a consequence engages in speculations about the scientific anthropology which illumined the poet (61-64). With perhaps greater right could not one seek for the "scientific source" of the Biblical account according to which the city and the arts were originated by Cain and his race? The Bible leaves much less doubt regarding the merely human origin of "civilization" than does Aeschylus. Havelock does not prove and cannot prove from Aeschylus the existence of "Greek liberalism". Aeschylus' changes of Hesiod's story are much more easily understood as the outcome of a somewhat different meditation on things divine-human than as due to the influence of science.

Havelock turns next to the choral song of the *Antigone* in which the chorus expresses its trembling admiration for man as the being which is supremely awful and supremely endangered: an awful crime against the law of the city had just been discovered. In describing man's awful or wondrous character, the chorus enumerates man's most outstanding inventions: "The figure of Prometheus has disappeared." This would prove the influence of science if it had been impossible for Greeks, or for men in general, who were not scientists or influenced by science to be somehow aware of the human origin of the human arts (cf. *Laws* 677d4). In two pages Havelock proves, in accordance with his standards of proof, three things. According to Havelock's Sophocles, man taught himself "consciousness"; hence Havelock forces the reader to wonder how an unconscious being can teach itself anything and in particular consciousness. The whole choral song in question expresses "flamboyant optimism." "The conclusion of the chorus carries us beyond

the confines of anthropology to the borders of a liberal theory of morals and politics" (68-70). With equally "quick speech" he shows the influence of science as well as the "theistic" or "pietistic" perversion of science in a passage of Euripides' *Suppliants*. That passage is declared to be "a skillful rewrite" of a "scientific original" the existence of which we have by now learned to assume since we have so frequently been told to do so. The only remark which could possibly be stretched to be meant to be an attempt of a proof is the assertion that Euripides becomes involved "in unconscious paradox," i.e., in a contradiction, since in theistically praising the kindness of heaven he speaks non-theistically of its harshness. In fact, Euripides makes his Theseus say that a god taught man to protect himself against a god, i.e., another god. Havelock however knows that Euripides speaks "in the person of Theseus" (72).

For Havelock's purpose Diodorus Siculus is much more important than the three great tragedians. Diodorus—already an authority for Machiavelli and Hobbes—gives a coherent account of the origin of the universe and of man which is in fundamental agreement with "scientific naturalism," the inspiration of "the progressive . . . view of history" (75-76). In his sympathetic survey, Havelock mentions the fact that according to Diodorus the universe and man have come into being whereas for Diodorus it is equally important that they will perish (I. 6. 3.): "progressivism" is not a precise description of his "view of history." Diodorus takes it for granted that man is by nature well endowed since he has as his helpers "hands and reason" (I. 8. 9); according to Havelock, he thus contradicts his "earlier naturalistic account of the origins of language" (78): as if reason, which is one and the same, and language, of which there are necessarily many, were the same thing; or, in other words, as if man's leading a brutish life at the beginning would prove that man was originally a brute. Hence Havelock is compelled to impute to Diodorus the desire to describe, not what man achieved by using his given hands and his given reason but the genesis of the human hand and the genesis of the human reason (79). Since Diodorus speaks in his "pre-history" (75) only of nations or tribes, and not yet of the city, it follows that "the city-state could not have been for [the Greek

anthropologists] the one essential form toward which all society tends" (80): has anyone ever said that the city is "pre-historical"? Diodorus repeatedly says that man progressed "little by little"; by this emphasis on "gradualism," Havelock contends, Diodorus opposes the myths according to which man's original condition was improved by gifts of the gods. Yet after having turned from a traditional speculation about man's origin, from "pre-history," to the description of actions which are remembered as having taken place in known localities of the inhabited earth (I. 8. 1 and 9. 1), Diodorus follows an Egyptian account according to which the arts are gifts of certain gods. Havelock is inclined to regard "this Egyptian fairy tale" as "a sort of parody" and he refers to "the whole question of why in antiquity it was so difficult for [the scientific] anthropologies to survive in their own stark scientific honesty" (84-85). We are not aware that he even tried to answer this question, although Diodorus is not silent about the usefulness of myths or untrue stories of a certain kind. If Havelock had not so airily dismissed Diodorus's "conflated and rather confused account of the mythical history of ancient Egypt" (83), he might have observed that Diodorus presents as part of the Egyptian lore the "Euhemeristic" explanation of the origin of the gods (cf. I. 13 with I. 17.1-2 and I. 20. 5). He certainly does not avail himself of this opportunity for reflecting on a possible fundamental difference between ancient and modern "naturalism," between an approach or doctrine for which it was "difficult to survive in its own stark scientific honesty" and one for which it is extremely easy because it is allied with popular enlightenment. Such reflection might have led him to wonder whether the ancient predecessors did not conceive of the relation between science and society, and hence of the character of both science and society, in entirely different terms from those of the liberals. On the other hand it is gratifying to see that "gradualism" does not necessarily exclude the crucial importance of "gifted individuals" (93) and hence that "gradualism" may make allowance for sudden changes.

Having arrived at this point we are in a position to pass final judgment on Havelock's procedure. When speaking of Plato, he says: "... we have spoken of his [scientific or naturalistic] source or sources. The case for their *existence* turns upon two factors:

there is first the cross-comparison that can be made between the items of his historical analysis and those present in the reports of the dramatists and of Diodorus; second, there are the inner contradictions discoverable in [Plato's] pages." (100, the italics are not in the original). In recovering the teaching of the Greek anthropologists from Plato's writings, Havelock can already use the results of his analysis of the tragedies. But with what right did he assume the existence of "scientific" sources of the tragedians when he analysed their plays? We assume that in his opinion some people have justified his assumption but we cannot be certain that this is his opinion. We feel entitled to speak of an involuntary satire on scientific method and on scientific progress.

Since Havelock believes that Plato made greater concessions to the Greek anthropologists when he was not yet old than when he was old, he tries to reconstruct the teaching of these men from what seem to be the most promising sections of Plato's relatively early writings, i.e., from the myth of the *Protagoras* and the second book of the *Republic*. The *Protagoras* is altogether the most important source for Havelock, as any degree of familiarity with the modern literature on the subject would have led one to expect. Read in his manner, the *Protagoras* supplies one with both the anthropology and the political theory of the Greek liberals. His whole thesis depends, as it depended in the writings of the scholars who maintained his thesis before him, on their interpretation of that dialogue. Havelock starts from the plausible assumption that Plato is not "a reporter" and therefore that the speech which Protagoras makes in the dialogue named after him is Plato's work. Yet if this speech is to supply us with information about the view of Protagoras himself, we must be in a position to distinguish its Protagorean elements from its Platonic elements. Since we know which teachings are peculiarly Platonic (or Socratic) and since the Platonic Protagoras makes use of peculiarly Platonic teachings, the only thing needed to discover Protagoras' teaching is a simple operation of subtraction. In his myth, the Platonic Protagoras asserts or suggests that there are essential or qualitative differences between various species of animals and especially between man and the brutes, as well as within man between his intellectual power and his social or moral sense. According to

Havelock, the emphasis on these differences is Platonic (or Socratic) and wholly incompatible with "previous Greek science" which asserted the primacy of "process" in general and of "the historical process" in particular as distinguished from the apparently essential distinctions between the products of the process (91). Yet we are dealing with a myth here, a popular statement, and Protagoras does not go beyond using the popular or common-sense distinctions of various kinds or races or tribes of living beings. If the incriminated remarks of the Platonic Protagoras prove Socratic influence, then the first chapter of *Genesis* was written under Socratic influence, to say nothing of Empedocles (B 71-76) and Democritus (B 164). When Havelock finds in the Platonic Protagoras' speech "the Platonic thesis . . . that men differ fundamentally from birth in mental capacity and aptitude," he himself admits that "this could be regarded as a truism of common sense" (97). Furthermore, the Platonic Protagoras uses against Socrates what one may call the essential differences between the species and between the different parts of living beings in order to show the relativity or the "multicolored" character of the good (333d 8-334c 6). In commenting upon this passage Havelock does not complain that Plato has adulterated the Protagorean teaching; he regards that passage as a reliable source, in fact as an "excerpt" from Protagoras and draws infinite conclusions from it. He contends however that that passage contains, not "a classification of things in themselves in their genera and species," but a "classification . . . of acts and performances of things done by men in given situations" (205). We shall not quarrel with Havelock as to whether a classification does not presuppose the existence of classes. It suffices to say that the Platonic Protagoras classifies the useful things on the basis of a classification of the beings or parts of beings to which the useful things are useful. Moreover, Protagoras' most famous saying ("Man is the measure of all things") implies that not every being is the measure of all things and hence that there is a qualitative difference between man and the brutes. Above all, what is the status of the "species" and their "essential properties" according to the Platonic Protagoras? "The mortal races" are primarily mixtures of earth and fire and all that is mingled with fire and earth; as such they do not

possess "natures," for the "natures" of the various races or kinds are the "powers" which they possess; primarily "the mortal races" are not even distinguished by size; the powers or natures or "essential properties are secondary or derivative (*Protagoras* 320d 5, e 2-4, 321c 1). In this crucial point the teaching of the Platonic Protagoras is then not at all marred by "Socraticism" but is properly "naturalistic." The second consideration by means of which Havelock tries to achieve the subtraction of the Platonic element from the Platonic Protagoras' speech starts from the fact that "in matters of religion [Protagoras] was a complete agnostic" and yet Plato's Protagoras ascribes to the gods the origin of all animals and especially of man and, above all, of the arts and of justice (92-94). Granted that Protagoras was "a complete agnostic," must he always have talked like a complete agnostic? Does he not sufficiently make clear where he stands by explicitly distinguishing his account of the origins as his myth from his *logos* (320c 6-7, 324d 6-7, 328c 3) and by treating the gods very differently in his myth on the one hand and in his *logos* on the other? It is in accordance with this, and it is not the consequence of Plato's defective "editorial skill" which does not succeed in reconciling a Platonic setting with a Protagorean content, that the Platonic Protagoras contradicts himself. He states to begin with that all animals including man were molded by the gods and later on that man in contradistinction to the brutes has "kinship with the gods" (92). He speaks of man's "kinship with the god" [not "with the gods"] after he had shown how man had come to partake of a divine share or lot: man's kinship with the god is his participation in a divine lot. Man came to partake of a divine lot, not through Zeus' gift of right, but through Prometheus' theft of fire and technical wisdom from Hephaestus and Athena (321d 1-322a 4). Man owes his salvation or his being in the first place not to a gift of the gods but to a theft from the gods, to a kind of rebellion against the gods. This should be acceptable as a mythical expression of the "naturalistic" creed. But why does the Platonic Protagoras tell a myth at all? In order to answer this question, one must consider the context. The city of Athens was rather liberal but not so liberal as to tolerate every pursuit and every teaching. It seems that that city was so much opposed to Prota-

goras' activity that it had his writings burned and himself expelled. Plato's Protagoras was aware of the fact that he was in some danger in Athens since he was a stranger who engaged in an unpopular activity, in the activity of a "sophist". Havelock cannot consider this, although he cannot help noting the existence of a "prejudice" against the sophists (158) because he is compelled by his prejudice to imagine that the "model of Periclean Athens is there as the sophistic prototype of what a complete society really is" (187) or that there was perfect harmony between the sophists and the Athenian democracy. Granting for a moment that the sophists loved the Athenian democracy, it does not follow that the love was requited. The Platonic Protagoras at any rate had a strong sense of danger. In order to destroy the suspicion against the sophists, he decided to deviate from the practice of the earlier sophists who concealed their pursuit: he is the first man who professes to be a sophist, the first who speaks up, as his very name indicates. This does not mean that he says always and to everyone all that he thinks: apart from the precautionary measure of professing to be a sophist, he has provided himself with other precautionary measures. He does not tell what those other precautionary measures are. But the professed "agnostic" gives a sufficient indication of them by describing their intended result as follows: "under God, I shall not suffer anything terrible on account of my professing to be a sophist." The indication is indeed not sufficient for everyone, for, as he says, "the many do not, so to speak, notice anything" (316c 5-317c 1). The third and final clue supplied by the speech of the Platonic Protagoras is his assertion that there is a fundamental difference between the arts and reverence or right: the latter are "universals," i.e., all men must partake of them, while it is neither necessary nor desirable, that everyone should be a physician, a shoemaker and so on. Havelock finds this assertion incompatible with the assumed democratic creed of Protagoras (93). But does democracy, as distinguished from Marxism, require that every man be a jack of all trades? How does Havelock know that Protagoras' assumed theory of democracy demanded that everyone be a jack of all trades? The Platonic Protagoras' assertion that there is a fundamental difference between the arts and "man's moral sense" is

meant to be the basis of democracy: all men are equal as regards that knowledge by which civil society as such stands or falls. Yet Plato's Protagoras describes reverence and right as gifts of Zeus and how can "a complete agnostic" give a religious account of the origin and the validity of morality? (93-94). He explains his mythical account of the origin and validity of morality in what one may call the non-mythical part of his speech. The universal practice of mankind shows that everyone "in some way or another" partakes of justice, as distinguished from flute playing for instance, i.e., that everyone must claim to be just regardless of whether he is just or not (323a 5-c 2). Justice has in common with the arts that it is acquired by teaching and training; but the difference between the teaching and training by which the arts are acquired and the teaching and training by which justice is acquired appears from the fact that the latter consists chiefly in punishment: men become just "in some way or another" chiefly by punishment, or the threat of it, but also by praise, as distinguished from instruction proper (323d 6-324c 5, 324e 6-326a 4, 327d 1-2). What is mythically called a gift of Zeus, is non-mythically described as "social compulsion" which as such cannot produce, at any rate in the case of thinking men, more than conformism or lip-service. The assertion that morality rests on "social compulsion" or on "conditioning" (178) and not on natural inclination nor on calculation nor on intellectual perception should satisfy every behaviorist. It certainly satisfies Havelock after he has added a few touches of his own. When Plato's Protagoras says that the man who does not pretend to be just, whether he is just or not, is insane, Havelock adds "unless, *it is surely implied*, in temporary repentance" (171; the italics are not in the original). When the Platonic Protagoras is believed to have said that justice and virtue are useful, Havelock makes him say that morality is "pleasant" (185). Perhaps still more remarkable is his enthusiasm for what the Platonic Protagoras says regarding the purpose of punishment, namely, "that punishment only makes sense as a corrective or as a deterrent" (175). He takes it for granted that this teaching is genuinely Protagorean. But how does he know this? Because it is a liberal view? But the illiberal Plato held the same view. Besides, the same Platonic Protagoras teaches, just as Plato himself did, that

there are incurable criminals who must be driven out of the city or be killed. Why did Plato entrust the rational teaching regarding punishment to Protagoras in particular? The context requires a praise of punishment, and the highest praise of punishment is its rational justification: the Platonic Protagoras presents his doctrine of punishment before he has formally concluded his myth (324d 6-7).

One cannot make a distinction between the Platonic and the Protagorean elements in the myth of the Platonic Protagoras because the contradictions occurring in that myth are perfectly intelligible as deliberate contradictions of the speaker. The same is true, *mutatis mutandis*, of the statement on the genesis of the city in the second book of the *Republic*. According to Havelock, Plato there uses the "naturalist-materialist principles" of the Greek anthropologists and finds therefore "the driving force behind the formation of society" and even of morality itself in "material and economic need". Yet Plato drops this approach "with some haste". Why then did he mention it unless it occurred in his source and he has cited it almost by inadvertence? (97) This is obviously not a proof of the existence of a "naturalist" source. Understanding of the context would show that in a preliminary consideration one may limit oneself to the understanding of society and morality in terms of the bodily needs of man. After all, that section of the *Republic* which alone is discussed by Havelock deals with what is called there "a city of pigs." The city, as Aristotle says, "comes into being" for the sake of mere life but "is" for the sake of the good life. One may well begin the analysis of the city with its beginning, with its coming into being. Taking hypotheses for facts, Havelock has no difficulty whatever in accusing Plato of having "adulterated" his source (98-99). The only effort which he makes to prove his assertion starts from the "patent absurdity" which consists in Plato's attempt "to argue that a developed technical and commercial society is really a rustic Utopia committed to vegetarianism and the simple life": Plato follows the naturalists by tracing the development of society up to the development of technical and commercial society, but his obsession with primitive simplicity and innocence forces him to drop all luxuries in the same context. Similarly, Plato denies that in his original condition man

waged war, "once more revealing his deeply regressive conception of history" (99-100). We disregard the fact that a society in which there is exchange of goods in the market place and which imports say salt and exports say timber is not by virtue of this a commercial society. While Havelock here goes so far as to impute to Plato's "city of pigs" the existence of "bankers," he says later on with equal disregard of the truth that "Plato omitted currency" (95, 97, 338). It is more important to understand the meaning of the whole discussion of the city of pigs as "the true city" or even as "the city" (372e 6-7, 433a). That city is not early society, but is the society according to nature which is sufficient for satisfying men's bodily needs without poverty, without compulsion (government), and without bloodshed of any kind; it is not a commercial society because it is not a competitive society, a competitive society presupposing the existence of government. Plato makes this experiment in order to show the essential limitations of society thus conceived. A society of this character may possess justice of some sort since its members exchange goods and services; it cannot possess human excellence: it is a city of pigs. Whereas its members sing hymns to the gods they cannot sing the praises of excellent men because there cannot be excellent men in their midst (cf. 371e 9-372b 8 and 607a 3-4).

After he has completed his attempt to prove the existence of Greek progressivist philosophers from their alleged use or adulteration by the tragedians, Diodorus Siculus, and Plato, Havelock turns to the fragments of these alleged progressivists. Three very late reports on Anaximander and five fragments from Xenophanes are said to "hint at the presence in both [thinkers] of a scheme of cosmology which found perhaps its climax in the history of life and of man upon the earth . . . the tentative conclusion can be drawn that . . . if the record of Anaximander guarantees the biological naturalism of Greek anthropology, that of Xenophanes does the same for its empirical pragmatic conception of the sources of human knowledge" (106-107). The unusual restraint of Havelock perhaps reflects the fact that according to a report to which he does not refer [21 A 49] Xenophanes regarded only reason itself, in contradistinction to sense perception, as trustworthy. He admits that "against these tentative conclusions should be set

what we know of Xenophanes' 'theology'." By this he does not mean Xenophanes' verses on the one god, the greatest among gods and men who does not resemble the mortals at all; he does not say a word about Xenophanes' Eleaticism or his denial of any coming into being; he merely means his "critical attack on Greek polytheism." To say nothing of the facts that according to a fragment and a report quoted by Havelock, Xenophanes did not limit his attack to the Greek popular notions of the gods and that he did not attack polytheism, Havelock wishes to believe that that "critical attack" "was a part of [Xenophanes'] reconstruction of the history of human institutions." Sympathizing with the spirit of present day anthropology, Havelock "plays down" Xenophanes' concern with the question of the truth of what peoples believe. As regards Anaxagoras, Havelock carefully avoids any reference to his doctrine regarding the ordering Intelligence which rules all things, knows all things, exists always and is unmixed, and is the cause of all things; he does not even take the trouble to deny the relevance of that doctrine for Anaxagoras' anthropology (107-112). To assimilate the Greek anthropologists to the liberals, Havelock must impute to Archelaus the view that "the historical process is . . . a natural growing process" and therefore dilute Archelaus' fundamental distinction between nature and convention ("the right and the base are not by nature but by convention" [112-114]). Similarly, when Democritus distinguishes between the "nature" of all animate beings according to which they get themselves offspring "not for the sake of any utility" and endure hardship for it, and the assumption peculiar to men according to which the parents derive benefit from their offspring (just as the offspring derives benefit from the parents), Havelock asserts that the peculiarly human "which is superimposed on *physis*, is not discontinuous with it" (115, 411); he is unconcerned with the difference with which Democritus is concerned: the difference between man and the brutes and the difference derived therefrom between nature and law or convention. When he is no longer under a compulsion to confront the reader with Democritean fragments, he takes courage to assert that for Democritus "nature and law did in fact coincide" (181). The fragment in question (B 278) appears to belong to the context, not of anthropological "description," but

of "judgmental evaluation": Democritus questions the soundness of getting married and begetting children; the specifically human calculation which is meant to make the raising of children beneficial to the parents too, is not reliable (A 166, 169, 170; B275-278). There is a close connection between this question and the question discussed in Aristophanes' *Birds* as to the inference to be drawn from the fact that the brutes do not respect their aged parents. Since Democritus notes that man has learned certain skills by imitating certain kinds of brutes, Havelock feels entitled to infer that according to Democritus "the possibility of any hero or master inventor. . . as having historical importance is decisively removed," although he makes Democritus speak of the "few with power of expression" who originated Greek "religious myth" (119-120; B 154 and 21). By translating "they proceeded" as "they took successive steps," he enables himself to ascribe to Democritus the "doctrine of historical gradualism" (116, 119).

So much about Havelock's account of the "philosophy of history" of the Greek anthropologists. We can be briefer in our examination of his account of the Greek liberals' political doctrine. He deals first with Democritus, then with those who are not "documented by their own utterances" (255) and finally with Antiphon. For the sake of convenience, we shall accept his assumption according to which the Democritean fragments embodied as authentic in Diels' edition are in fact authentic. The fragments which he uses to establish "the political doctrine of Democritus" are all or almost all rules of conduct which derive from common experience. While admitting that "Democritus makes a value judgment" here and there, he believes that he can discern in the fragments in question Democritus' "historical method: 'the mind and method of Democritus [seek] to understand and to solve political problems simply by describing them' (131, 137, 138). He does not consider and does not even refer to Democritus' statement according to which "for all men good and true are the same, but pleasant differs from one man to another" (B 69; cf. A 166) "which no complete account of his philosophy can afford to ignore" (142); this statement would make clear that Democritus is not a historicist or a relativist, that for him the problem indicated by the distinction between

factual and value judgments does not arise, and that one cannot intelligently solve a political problem by describing it if one does not know what is good for all men. As for Democritus' or Havelock's "historical method," we give two examples. Democritus' saying "Faction within the tribe is bad for both sides" proves to Havelock that whereas Plato and Aristotle uncritically accepted "the virtual identification of *nomos* and *polis*," "Democritus true to his genetic method sees law generated as a solution to the problem which was already crystallizing . . . in the clan of blood kindred." Yet "depending on the context," "tribe" [*phyle*] "might refer [also] to all members of a *polis*" (135-136). Since we do not know the context in which the saying occurred, some modesty of assertion would be particularly proper, to say nothing of the fact that Plato and Aristotle only "virtually" "identified *nomos* and *polis*" (cf. *Laws* 681a-c and *Republic* 565e 4-7). In another saying Democritus shows what good—compassion, fraternity, concord and so on—follows or rather is already present when the powerful take heart to help the poor and to be kind to them. According to Havelock, this saying "constitutes the most remarkable single utterance of a political theorist of Hellas. Considering its epoch, it is as remarkable as anything in the history of political theory. Neither in content nor in temper has it a parallel in the better-known classical thinkers" (143). Apparently Havelock did not remember Plato's *Laws* 736d 4-e 2 and 936b 3-8 or Aristotle's *Politics* 1320a 35-b 11 [cf. *Rhetoric* II, 7-8]. But forgetfulness does not explain the extraordinary assertion and the complete absence of a sense of proportion which it exhibits. He is driven to assertions of this kind by an inordinately strong prejudice and the ferocity which goes with such prejudices. When Democritus says that "poverty under democracy is as much to be preferred to the so-called prosperity which resides with lords or princes as freedom is to slavery," Havelock makes him say "poverty under democracy is better than any prosperity under oligarchy," takes him to prefer democracy to all other regimes, and finds it "hard to avoid the conclusion that when Thucydides penned the Funeral Speech of Pericles he was expressing an intellectual debt to Democritus" (146-147). He has strange notions of what is required for making a conclusion sound. Besides, the Funeral

Speech does not strike one as a praise of "poverty under democracy." Havelock finds it unnecessary to comment on Democritus' relative praise of poverty nor does he even allude to other fragments of Democritus which depreciate wealth (B 283-286). Those sayings would not confirm his contention that the position taken by the Greek liberals, among whom he counts Democritus, is characterized by "a recurrent terminology of equality and good will . . . of security, and leisure and wealth" (377). He does quote Democritus' statement according to which "ruling belongs by nature to the superior" and he rightly contends that Democritus understood by superiority the superiority in understanding and in striving for the noble, although he fails to refer to the Democritean sayings which confirm this contention (B 75, 56). He supplies from his own means without any effort a reconciliation of Democritus' recognition of "the aristocratic principle" with his presumed belief in democracy (148-149). He does not give any thought to the possibility that the notion of natural rulers might have led Democritus, as it led others, to the view according to which laws are "a bad afterthought" and that "the wise man ought not to obey the laws as his rulers but ought to live freely" (A 166) —to a view which is easily compatible with the admission that law has "a virtue of its own" (B 248). Havelock's horizon is blocked in every respect by his "a priori" certainty that Democritus was a liberal. As a matter of course he does not say a word about Democritus' remarks asserting the inferiority of women (B 110-111, 273-274), for otherwise he could not so easily stigmatize the corresponding remarks of Aristotle as shockingly illiberal (326, 382).

In discussing the political theory of those Greek liberals of whom we know chiefly if not exclusively through Plato, Havelock is confronted with the fact that the thinkers in question are described by Plato as sophists. He rightly states that the ambiguity of the word "sophist" has some analogy to that of the present day term "intellectuals," but since he has not reflected on the problem of the intellectuals, he has no clue to what he calls Plato's "denigration" of the sophists (157-158). He rightly suggests that for most of their contemporaries Socrates was as much a sophist as Protagoras, but he is too certain that those contemporaries were

"the dispassionate"; it still has to be proved that they were not the undiscerning (160). He rightly wonders whether Plato was fair in censuring the sophists for taking pay for their teaching. In this he can probably count on the applause of all professors since, as he hard-headedly notes, a professor "has got to live by his trade like anybody else" (162) and would be in an awkward situation if Plato's censure of the practice were sound. But the two cases are not altogether the same. If Havelock had not been so certain that there were Greek liberals or, in other words, if he had given some thought to the peculiarities of the modern or liberal state, he would have become aware of the significance of academic freedom which may be said to constitute the specific difference between the sophist and the professor: the professor receives pay for teaching, not what his contemporaries wish to hear but what they ought to hear. To use the words of Havelock, it was Plato and Aristotle, and not the Greek liberals, who "had the compelling genius to invent the idea of an institution of higher learning" (20). Havelock is right in saying, and in fact agrees therein with Plato, that the theories of the sophists had "their own specific integrity" but he does not seem to make much sense when he says that "the theories they taught and believed may or may not be possible of reconstruction, but they were at least serious theories, intellectually respectable" (160): how can one judge of the dignity of doctrines which become accessible only through reconstruction if their reconstruction is not possible? Given Plato's "fundamental hostility" (162) to the political theories of the liberals, Havelock would be unable to reconstruct them if he could not rely in his interpretation of the Platonic passages on that "portrait" of liberalism which he has painted with the assistance of a few fragments. But before connecting the Platonic evidence with the non-Platonic vision, true or feigned, of Greek liberalism, one must understand the Platonic evidence by itself. The *Protagoras* being the most important source for Havelock, he is under an obligation to interpret that dialogue. *Hic Rhodus hic salta*. Here is the occasion for displaying that "philological discipline", that "good deal of finesse," that "critical intuition," to say nothing of "the over-all judgment" to which he lays claim in this very context (157, 171).

Plato presents Protagoras as presenting his particular claim

in a particular setting: in the house of a very wealthy Athenian, in the presence of his most formidable competitors, with a view to inducing a youth to become his pupil. A "pragmatist" (166) like Protagoras cannot but be influenced by this situation: we can only guess as to how he would have stated his claim if he had been closeted with Socrates or, for that matter, with the mathematician Theodorus. An author as much concerned with "logographic necessity" as Plato would not have prefaced the conversation between Socrates and Protagoras with the fairly extensive conversation between Socrates and young Hippocrates—to say nothing at all here of the conversation between Socrates and an anonymous "comrade" with which the dialogue opens—without a good reason. The conversation between Socrates and Hippocrates shows in the first place how much Protagoras appealed to a certain kind of young men and conversely how little Socrates appealed to those people or how little they appealed to Socrates; it permits us to size up Hippocrates. Protagoras is characterized by the fact that he is willing to accept as his pupil a youth of whom he knows nothing except what Socrates tells him in the youth's presence, namely, that he *comes* from a wealthy Athenian house, that as regards his nature he is *thought to be* a match for those of his age, that he *seems to Socrates* to desire to become famous in the city, and that he believes that he will most likely get what he wants if he joins Protagoras. "We know from Middle Comedy that Plato's Academy charged fees and high ones at that." Hence "by Platonic standards the sophists committed no offence" (162). The basis on which Havelock establishes the Platonic standard is somewhat narrow and hence he misses the decisive point. For Protagoras it is sufficient to know that his potential customer can pay for his services; Socrates is concerned above everything else with whether his potential young friends have the right kind of "nature." In other words, Protagoras is at liberty to accept every wealthy young man as a pupil whereas Socrates is not (cf. the *Theages* and *Memorabilia* I 6. 13). The place occupied in Socrates' thought by "nature" is taken in Protagoras' thought by "wealth." Havelock is unaware of this difference. According to Plato's presentation, Protagoras was insufficiently aware of it.

In his way Havelock admits then that Plato's presentation of

Protagoras is fair. While he believes that Plato gives a reasonably fair account of Protagoras' claim, he contends that Plato "transfers [that claim] into a non-political context" (165, 168). Let us then consider the context. In his eagerness to acquire a new pupil of means, Protagoras was entirely unconcerned with inspecting the nature of Hippocrates; in spite of the caution of which he boasts, he did not stop to consider whether there was not a serpent lurking behind Hippocrates' alluring promise. Still less did he consider whether his claim did not bring him into conflict with the Athenian democracy. Socrates tactfully draws his attention to the fact that in Athens "rich and poor" are equally supposed to possess that political skill which Protagoras claims to teach (319c 8-e 1): Protagoras' claim is incompatible with democracy. Havelock sees here only "irony . . . at the expense of Athenian democratic practice" (168), although he observes when speaking of a term similar in meaning to "irony," namely, "playfulness," that it is "a term convenient to critics who have not understood Plato's mind" (100). It would be unbecoming to comment on his claim to have "understood Plato's mind." But we may say that strictly speaking every utterance of the Platonic Socrates is ironical since Socrates is always mindful of the qualities of his interlocutors and that for this reason Havelock is right when he intimates that one does not explain any particular utterance of the Platonic Socrates by describing it as ironical. At any rate, Socrates forces Protagoras for the benefit of Protagoras (cf. 316c 5) to show that his claim is compatible with Athenian democracy. In the mythical part of his speech he defends or justifies democracy with that complete lack of qualification which is fitting in a mythical utterance; in the non-mythical part he defends or justifies democracy in a more qualified manner: he knows that some qualification of democracy is required if his claim is to be respectable or reasonable. If Protagoras had not given the unqualified justification of democracy, Socrates could not know, and the readers of the *Protagoras* could not know, whether Protagoras had understood the difficulty to which Socrates had alluded. According to Havelock, "the continuity [of the *logos*] with the myth is tenuous, simply because the myth is a myth" (168). He thus unwittingly suggests that Plato presented Protagoras as a very great blunderer; this suggestion is

wrong. As for the qualification of democracy which is required for reconciling Protagoras' claim with democracy, Protagoras supplies it in a properly subdued manner by referring to the fact that in a democracy there are, after all, wealthy people who can afford to give their sons a rather expensive education and therefore, we must add, the education in that political art which he claims to supply. Havelock applauds the "pragmatic" wisdom "which any member of a liberal democracy is forced to accept: that educational opportunity tends to be available in proportion to family means" or that "leadership tends to fall into the hands of the privileged"; he applauds the sophists' "acceptance of a measure of plutocracy." But a democrat might well wonder whether Havelock is right in suggesting that a practice which is bound to increase the gulf between the rich and the poor "does not violate the ethos of democracy" (182-183, 248): "if there is inequality [of legal or social status], the function of amity is thereby inhibited" (397). All that one can say of Havelock's political theory is that if he is right, it is not for a liberal to be right in this point. As for his thesis that Protagoras was a defender of democracy, and even of "a craftsman democracy" (187), it must be restated so as to read that the Platonic Protagoras defended a mixture of democracy and oligarchy or that he deviated from democracy pure and simple in the direction of oligarchy. He might have defended oligarchy pure and simple if he had not been compelled to adapt his doubtless "negotiable" political convictions to a democracy. His criticism of democracy differs from Socrates' criticism because he takes the side of the wealthy whereas Socrates takes the side of the gentlemen. We trust that Havelock is aware of this difference when he does not happen to write on "the Elder Sophists."

One would be unfair to the Platonic Protagoras if one did not stress more strongly than Havelock does that, according to him, the laws are, or should be, "the inventions of good and ancient lawgivers" (326d 5-6) as distinguished from the enactments of a chance multitude. However "radical" he may have been regarding the gods, he knew too well that reverence for antiquity and especially for the great "inventors" of antiquity is indispensable for society. But, as he says, "the many do not, so to speak, notice anything." It is due to the merit of those inventors that present-

day man is separated by a gulf from the original savages. Protagoras must have noticed somehow that Socrates looked down on that political art which Protagoras claims to teach and of which he claims that every man possesses it. At any rate, he accuses Socrates of not properly appreciating that art or what one may call the progress of civilization: Socrates seems not to know that in the beginning human beings were worse than the worst criminals living in civilized society. "The reflection almost reads like a piece of Plato's own self-criticism . . . here he lets the liberals have their say undiluted" (188). There is undoubtedly some kinship between the modern liberal and the ancient sophist. Both are unaware of the existence of a problem of civilization, although to different degrees. For Protagoras supplies his assertions with important qualifications which do not come out in Havelock's paraphrases. It would be painful and in no way helpful if we were to follow Havelock's analysis of the conversation between Socrates and Protagoras. As one would expect from his claim to have understood Plato's thought, he interprets Socrates' questions as dictated by Plato's "system" without listening patiently to what Socrates actually says in the context. Similarly, he interprets Protagoras' answers as dictated by a pragmatist or behaviorist epistemology or sociology. The utmost one can say about his whole discussion is that it may shed some light on present day liberalism. Two examples must suffice. The question discussed by Socrates and Protagoras is whether virtue is one or many. Common speech assumes that virtue is one: we speak of good men. At the same time common speech assumes that there are many virtues and that a man may possess one virtue while lacking all others. For instance, as Protagoras says, a man may be courageous and yet unjust or he may be just and not be wise. When Protagoras' attention is first drawn to the difficulty, he suggests immediately that the one virtue has many qualitatively different parts. Socrates seems to be surprised that Protagoras regards courage and wisdom too as parts of the one virtue. Protagoras replies emphatically in the affirmative and adds that wisdom is the greatest of all parts of virtue (329e 6-330a 2). Socrates' difficulty is not hard to understand: in his long speech Protagoras had been rather reticent regarding wisdom and especially reticent regarding courage; his

emphasis had been on justice, moderation and piety; for his chief subject had been "political virtue" (322e 2-323a 1, 323a 6-7) which is a special kind of virtue (323c 3-4). If one wishes to understand Protagoras, one must therefore make explicit what he implied by putting different emphases on justice, moderation, and piety on the one hand, and wisdom and courage on the other. We suspect that one cannot achieve this if one does not reflect on the Platonic distinction between political virtue and genuine virtue. Who knows prior to investigation whether Protagoras did not admit the soundness of this distinction? Prior to further investigation it is clear that according to him only political virtue is a gift of Zeus and yet there is also a virtue which is a gift of Prometheus (321d). Havelock carefully avoids this kind of reflection which would certainly complicate matters and might shake his confidence that Protagoras' thoughts about truth were thoughts about "the parliamentary process" or "the crystallization of public opinion."

At a certain point in the discussion Protagoras elaborates the obvious but not unimportant truth that different things are good for different beings or for different parts of those beings. Havelock finds therein a "pragmatic epistemology," a "pragmatic classification," a "sophistic economics," and a "pragmatic programme." He is therefore shocked by "the Socratic context." Socrates "virtually concludes 'Here is mere relativism . . .'" and "Plato next resorts to an artifice as unfair as anything anywhere in his dialogues. Socrates figuratively throws up his hands exclaiming: 'I cannot deal with long speeches' . . . One would think that here, if anywhere, Plato's readers would get a little out of hand, and protest the propriety of his hero's attitude. But Plato is skillful—he must be, to judge by the procession of professors who have obediently followed the lead of this preposterous propaganda" (204-206). As Havelock virtually admits, the reason that Socrates almost breaks up the conversation is not that he is shocked by Protagoras' "relativism." Socrates and Protagoras had been discussing the admittedly delicate question of whether sobriety or prudence is compatible with acting unjustly. Protagoras did not like this discussion; he said that he would be ashamed to answer the question in the affirmative and yet Socrates tries to compel him

to defend the affirmative reply (333b 8-d 3). Was this wicked of Socrates? It would have been wicked if Protagoras had believed, as Havelock thinks he did, that justice and utility must coincide (203). But Protagoras had asserted that a man may have one virtue while lacking the others and that a man may be sober or sane without being just (323b). Not Protagoras simply but an already somewhat chastened Protagoras is ashamed to say in the present context that sobriety or prudence is compatible with acting unjustly. In his eagerness to defend Protagoras' pragmatic doctrine against Plato's static doctrine, Havelock overlooks the obvious fact that he is confronted with a Platonic dialogue and hence with a moving, not static, context. Socrates' apparently wicked action is in fact an act of reasonable punishment as Protagoras's liberal doctrine had defined it. For it is not sufficient that one is ashamed to pronounce a wicked proposition; one must learn to reject it in one's thought too; in order to learn this, one must make oneself, or one must be made by others, the defender of that proposition and take one's punishment for it. But Protagoras does not like to be punished: he mistakes punishment, i.e., improvement, for humiliation, i.e., defeat. Therefore he tries to evade the issue which is too hard for him to handle and to escape into an entirely different issue which is easy for him to handle. We do not deny that it might have helped both Havelock and simply inattentive readers if Socrates had protested, not against long speeches in general, but against long speeches which are irrelevant. But Plato had to think of all kinds of readers. Perhaps his Socrates felt that he should put a stop to a conversation which had already fulfilled its purpose, namely, to demonstrate to Hippocrates *ad oculos* that Protagoras was not such an excellent teacher of good counsel as he claimed to be and that a continuation which would stick to the issue so hard to handle would only embarrass Protagoras and needlessly mortify him. We cannot possibly do in a short review what Havelock has failed to do in a long book, namely, to give an interpretation of the *Protagoras* and, as a preparation for that, to explain what a Platonic dialogue is and how it is to be read. Havelock regards the Platonic dialogue as a vehicle for propaganda or even "preposterous propaganda."

After all, his book is a liberal's book not on Plato but on liberalism.

After the conversation between Protagoras and Socrates had led to a conflict and to the threat of a break-up of the conversation and therewith of the society constituted by the conversation, the conflict becomes the concern of the whole society. Its outstanding members intervene either as partisans or as would-be arbiters. Immediately before the conflict Socrates and Protagoras had been speaking about justice. Now justice is presented in deed. In the words of Havelock, "the impasse which the dialogue has reached is treated as a parody of a situation in the *ecclesia*" (218). We pass over his vague speculations about the sophistic contribution to "parliamentary" techniques and the sophists' anticipation of "the necessity of the party system" (243). Instead we concentrate on his remarks about the speech of one of the would-be arbiters, Hippias. Hippias is frequently said to have stated in this context "the doctrine of man's common nature and brotherhood and world citizenship." Accepting this interpretation, Havelock finds that Plato's treatment of this doctrine "is not quite forgivable." If this interpretation were correct, Havelock would have presented to us the first example of a conflict between Plato and a Greek liberal. But alas, Havelock also says that Hippias teaches the common nature and brotherhood and common citizenship, not of all men, but of all Greeks. Yet can we be certain that Hippias taught even this much? He says that "all present" are "by nature, not by law" kindred and fellow citizens because like is by nature akin to like. "All present" are like to one another because they "know the nature of the things" or because they are exceptionally wise (337c 7-d 6; cf. 318e). Roughly speaking Hippias teaches then that by nature all wise men are kinsmen and fellow citizens, whereas all other kinship and fellow citizenship rests on law or convention. Plato ridiculed not this teaching but Hippias' childish belief that "all present know the nature of the things." Havelock however finds in Hippias' words the suggestion of an "epistemology of group communication" (225-229, 352).

Havelock's book culminates in, although it does not end with, his account of Antiphon. The account is based on "the mutilated record" supplied by two Papyrus fragments which are now held to stem from the sophist Antiphon (256, 289, 416-418). Antiphon

asserts that by nature all men, regardless of whether they are Greeks or barbarians, are alike in all respects and that the denial of this likeness is barbaric; he proves this likeness by the fact that as regards the things which are by nature necessary to all men, such as breathing through mouth and nose, there is no difference among men. Havelock admires Antiphon's "breathless logic" in which the distinction between "natural barbarians" and "the natural free man", (that is, Greeks)" "dissolves like smoke" (257-258). He thus implies that Antiphon's liberal assertion is opposed to the view of the classics. His implicit criticism proceeds from a superficial understanding of certain passages in the first book of the *Politics* (351-352) and from a complete disregard, for instance, of the treatment of Carthage in the second book, to say nothing of Plato's description of the division of the human race into Greeks and barbarians as absurd, and of many other things. Antiphon's assertion, as distinguished from his proof, is not specifically liberal but is implied in the understanding of philosophy as leaving the Cave. The difference between Antiphon and the classics appears from Havelock's overstatement: "In estimating man and his behaviour, you begin not with the mind but the lungs" (257). As for Antiphon, we have not given up hope that he did not stop at the lungs but proceeded to the mind. Those Greek thinkers who seemed to share the prejudice of their fellow Greeks against the barbarians meant by it that there were among the Greeks more men willing to learn from other nations and to understand the thought of other nations than there were among the other nations; barbarians are simply self-sufficient or self-contained in the decisive respect. Antiphon bears witness to this superiority of the Greeks: he calls it barbaric, i.e., un-Greek, to deny the fundamental unity of the human race. Antiphon also questioned civil society itself. He seems to have argued as follows. Given that it is just not to wrong anyone if one has not been wronged by him first, it is unjust to bear witness against a criminal or to act as a judge in a law court against a criminal who has not wronged the potential witness or judge; besides, by testifying against a criminal or by condemning him, one makes him his lifelong enemy and thus does damage to oneself. The first argument would justify meeting hurt with hurt; the second argument seems to suggest that it is shrewd

not to meet hurt with hurt. But the passage is so corrupt and Havelock's claim on behalf of his interpretation of it is so modest (262) that we may drop the matter with this observation: we fail to see that Antiphon is "tender-minded," a "utopist," and an anarchist (260, 263, 265, 290). Antiphon says that one should observe the laws of the city in the presence of witnesses and the laws of nature when one is alone. Havelock approaches this saying in the certainty not supported by any evidence that Antiphon is not "an immoralist." But he does not deny that in this saying Antiphon advocates "a flexible behaviour pattern which involves a double standard" or that "he has a large measure of sympathy [for] hypocrisy" or that according to him "one must give lip service" to the laws of the city or that those laws may be "flattered and evaded when they cannot be fought." As if Plato had never recommended "the noble lie," he proclaims that "idealists of all schools would violently object" to a "flexible behaviour pattern which involves a double standard". He then goes on to commit a *non sequitur* which in a sense does honor to him: "ripe civilizations . . . tend to nourish a split between private judgment and public observance. He is the first Greek candid enough to see this. In a sense, then, he is not a political theorist at all" (267-271; compare also this passage and the Preface with 376). The Antiphonic antithesis of law and nature gives him an occasion to express his dissatisfaction with Plato's suggestions regarding the use of that antithesis by certain individuals. He abstains from discussing the pertinent Platonic passages and he does not even begin to consider whether Plato's own questioning of law—especially in the *Statesman*—as well as his simile of the Cave do not imply the same antithesis although differently understood. He who had praised the sophists as "communication men" and blamed Plato for despising "discourse [as] a vehicle of group or collective opinion and decision" has the hardihood, and in a sense the consistency, to lump him together with the "group thinkers" for whom the polis is "the mistress adored" (194, 270). *Fiat liberalismus pereat Plato*. All these lapses however fade into insignificance when compared with the great merit of an observation which, to the best of our knowledge, Havelock is the first classical scholar to make. "Any subject of a totalitarian state—and the city-state had its totalitarian aspects

—and indeed the citizens of a democracy, in this present age of war and anxiety, know what Antiphon meant" (271). We dismiss the reference to "democracy in this age of war and anxiety" as out of place and even misleading. But in the main point Havelock is right. The polis, and even the celebrated Athens of Pericles, was not liberal or limited by a First Amendment, and Antiphon explicitly says that the law determines "for the eyes what they ought to see and what they may not see, and for the ears what they ought to hear and what they may not hear, and for the tongue what it ought to say and what it may not say." It is perhaps a pity that Havelock did not go on to wonder in the first place whether Antiphon's "candor," however praiseworthy on other grounds, does not have the disadvantage of being inconsistent with his insight because remarks like those quoted "fight" the law of the city in the presence of witnesses; and to wonder in the second place whether Antiphon's manner of writing was not perhaps affected by his insight or whether the obscurity of his style was not perhaps intentional—whether he appears to us as extraordinarily candid because a lucky or unlucky accident has saved for us a most shocking saying of his in isolation, while in the complete work it was perhaps hidden away in the middle of an innocent exposition or not presented by the author in his own name but entrusted to other people—whether therefore one should not read his fragments with a corresponding lack of innocence; and to wonder finally whether other Greek writers did not have the same insight (which after all is not of transcendent profundity) and hence composed their writings accordingly and hence must be read with much greater care and much less innocence than that with which they are usually read. A scholar who would have given these questions ever so little serious and unbiased consideration would have written an entirely different book—not a liberal book in the present-day sense but a liberal book in the original sense.

To return to Havelock, he takes Antiphon's antithesis of law and nature to imply that law is not "framed by the virtue of inspired lawgivers" but "results from a social compact reached by society's members" (272). Antiphon says that the law or the usages of the city stem from agreement as distinguished from nature. This does not necessarily mean that the laws or usages

are simply the product of "group opinion"; it does not exclude the possibility that the laws or usages are primarily the work of an outstanding man regarded as endowed with superhuman virtue whose proposals were accepted by human beings and these human beings constituted themselves, by virtue of this acceptance, as members of one society. Havelock unintentionally reveals the fundamental difference between the modern liberal and the so-called Greek liberal by this question: "If law is a compact reached historically by human beings, why is it not natural and organic as are other items in man's progress?" (273). For the liberal, "natural" is not a term of distinction: everything that is is "natural"; for his Greek predecessors not everything that is is "natural." Zeus "is", for otherwise one could not speak about him, distinguish him from Kronos, Hera, and so on; but in what sense "is" he? He is by virtue of opinion or establishment or agreement or law (cf. *Laws* 904a 9-b 1 with Antiphon B 44 A 2 line 27-28), whereas man for instance is not by virtue of law or opinion but by nature or in truth. If the liberal rejoins "but at any rate the law or opinion by virtue of which Zeus is, is not merely by law or opinion but is necessary for the people who adopted it or cling to it," his Greek predecessors would ask him how he knows this: is there no arbitrariness and hence in particular no arbitrary freezing, wise or unwise, of errors salutary or otherwise? While the ground of arbitrariness (the natural constitution of man as the rational animal) is natural, or, as was formerly said, while the conventional finds some place within the natural, certainly the product of the arbitrary act which establishes this or that convention is not natural. In other words, man fashions "a state within a state": the man-made "worlds" have a fundamentally different status from "the world" and its parts. The liberal view originally emerged through the combination of determinism with the assumption that the laws always correspond to genuine, not merely imagined, needs or that in principle all laws are sensible. The term "historical" as used by Havelock, which is almost the modern equivalent for "conventional," serves no other function than to obscure a very obscure event in the development of modern thought. As for the specific meaning which Antiphon attaches to the antithesis of law and nature, Havelock is hampered in his

understanding of it by his belief that Antiphon advocated justice in the sense of non-aggression or that he had "a deep feeling for the inviolability of the human organism." He infers the existence of this feeling from a saying of Antiphon which he renders "To be alive is a natural condition," while Antiphon says "To live and to die is from nature" (275): "the human organism" is by nature most violable. Similarly, Antiphon's saying that life comes from the useful or suitable and dying from the damaging or unsuitable, is taken by Havelock to bespeak "reverence for life" (280). In fact Antiphon explains what the good by nature is as distinguished from the good by convention: the good by nature is that which is conducive to life, and therefore the good by nature is ultimately the pleasant. "The human organism" is violable in particular by other "human organisms"; the laws claim to protect the innocent; Antiphon questions the truth of this claim. Havelock admits that Antiphon's statement on this subject could "easily" be understood to mean that it is according to nature "to adopt the initiative in aggression" in order not to become the helpless victim of aggression. He rejects this possibility on the ground that according to Antiphon "nature does not seek to create enemies" (284) although he also says that Antiphon questioned the benign character of "nature's rule" (294). Antiphon merely says that what is just must be universally beneficent; he does not say that justice thus understood is possible, and he certainly does not say that justice thus understood is implied in "the laws of nature." He also appears to have pointed out the essential inconveniences of marriage and he may very well have questioned the natural character of marriage. Havelock interprets the passage in question after having excised portions of it "which better reflect the tradition" than they reflect Antiphon (293), in the same spirit in which he interprets his questioning the laws of the city. "The twentieth-century note in his teaching is there. It sounds almost uncanny. Was he an apostle of the new education? Would he have approved a progressive school? Is it possible that in his Greek we catch, across the centuries, the accents of Sigmund Freud?" (294). The "almost" is inspired not by reasonable restraint but by the liberal temper: Sigmund Freud can be relied upon *a priori* to show in each case that what appears to be uncanny is not truly uncanny.

Some readers may blame us for having devoted so much time and space to the examination of an unusually poor book. We do not believe that their judgment of the book is fair. Books like Havelock's are becoming ever more typical. Scholarship, which is meant to be a bulwark of civilization against barbarism, is ever more frequently turned into an instrument of rebarbarization. As history suggests, scholarship is, as such, exposed to that degradation. But this time the danger is greater than ever before. For this time the danger stems from the inspiration of scholarship by what is called a philosophy. Through that philosophy the humane desire for tolerance is pushed to the extreme where tolerance becomes perverted into the abandonment of all standards and hence of all discipline, including philological discipline. But absolute tolerance is altogether impossible; the allegedly absolute tolerance turns into ferocious hatred of those who have stated most clearly and most forcefully that there are unchangeable standards founded in the nature of man and the nature of things. In other words, the humane desire for making education accessible to everyone leads to an ever-increasing neglect of the quality of education. No great harm is done, or at least there is no new reason for alarm, if this happens in disciplines of recent origin; but the situation is altogether different if the very discipline which is responsible for the transmission of the classical heritage is affected. True liberals today have no more pressing duty than to counteract the perverted liberalism which contends "that just to live, securely and happily, and protected but otherwise unregulated, is man's simple but supreme goal" (374), and which forgets quality, excellence, or virtue.

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THREE COMMENTARIES OF AVERROES

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HISTORIANS of philosophy have been unanimous in agreeing that the work of the Arabic philosophers (not "Arab philosophers" since most were non-Arabs: their uniting links were the Arabic language, the Muslim religion, and the Greek philosophical tradition) is of crucial importance in the history of Western philosophy due to the fact that, prior to the "Renaissance," Greek learning was known to the Latins mainly through the medium of translations of the Arabic texts and commentaries. Nevertheless, knowledge about Arabic philosophy in the English-speaking world has to date been almost wholly confined to a narrow circle of specialists who are virtually without exception, not primarily philosophers, but Orientalists. Because of the imposing philological prerequisites, English-speaking philosophers have continued largely oblivious to Arabic philosophy.

The greatest of the Arabic philosophers was the Spanish Muslim Abu-I-Walid Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Rushd = Averroes (b. Cordova 1126, d. 1198). In the midst of a busy public career, as court scholar and personal physician to an Almohad caliph, and as chief magistrate of Cordova, Ibn Rushd found time to compose a monumental series of philosophical commentaries, as well as several important legal, astronomical, and medical works. His extensive commentaries on Aristotle earned him St. Thomas's accolade of "*The Commentator*."

Only in the last four years have some of Averroes' philosophical commentaries become available in English—three to be exact. These three works will be the subject of consideration here.

I. Averroes' Commentaries on Aristotle's "*De Generatione et Corruptione*."

The Aristotelian treatises upon which Averroes comments are generally taken up by him not once, but three times, making for a *Long* or *Great Commentary*, a *Middle Commentary*, and an

Epitome. Each of these has a distinctive format. A Great Commentary first cites verbatim—in the faithful Arabic translation made for the Caliphs of Baghdad in the 9th and 10th Centuries, for Averroes knew no Greek—a section of the Aristotelian text a few sentences in length, and then gives a detailed discussion of this quotation, generally two or three times its length, in which Averroes frequently takes critical issue with the Greek commentators (Alexander of Aphrodisias especially), or with the views of earlier Arabic Aristotelians. A Middle Commentary paraphrases Aristotle and offers supplemental explanatory discussions. It is usually somewhat longer than its original. An *Epitome* is a detailed statement of the gist of an Aristotelian work and also offers introductory remarks about the subject-matter and about the place of the work in the Aristotelian corpus. It is generally about half the length of its subject work.

The need for such commentaries arose largely because the original Arabic translations from Greek and Syriac were in themselves difficult and obscure (due in part to their painstaking literalism), and caused increasing difficulty to succeeding generations of students in a time when knowledge of Greek became extinct among Arabic scholars. The threefold arrangement of Averroes' commentaries corresponds to the program of instruction in the medieval Muslim universities: the *Epitome* for the first year of study, the Middle Commentary for the second, the Great Commentary for the third. Muslim education did not proceed by continuous acquisition of new materials, but by iterative deepening of material already familiar.

In his translation of *Averroes on Aristotle's "De Generatione et Corruptione"* published by the Medieval Academy of America in its *Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), Samuel Kurland has provided a smooth English version of the original Arabic of Averroes Middle Commentary and *Epitome* (taking into account also the medieval Hebrew and Latin versions). The translation is enriched by a short, but informative introduction, and around ninety pages of notes. This puts the English reader into complete possession of Averroes on the *De Generatione et Corruptione*, for we have no evidence to think that he wrote a Great Commentary on this work.

Averroes' aim in the study of Aristotle is not criticism or evaluation; he regards him the Master "who so helpfully endowed us with all that has been correctly stated concerning these matters and that may be stated concerning them for all time to come" (*Kurland*, p. 35). Averroes' purpose is the restoration of the Stagirite's work to its pristine force and purity, by removing misunderstanding and corruptions that had been intruded into the interpretation of his teachings by his Greek and Arabic commentators and expositors. It goes without saying that his effort falls far short of what the powerful tools of modern classical scholarship has made possible. Wherein, then, is there a basis for present-day philosophical interest in Averroes' Aristotelian commentaries?

For one thing, Averroes' commentaries on Aristotle afford a graphic illustration of the process of assimilation of the conceptual structure of one philosophical tradition (the Platonic-Aristotelian) into an alien cultural setting (the Muslim world). This itself affords a most interesting and useful object of contemplation for thinking men living in our times, when Eastern societies are struggling to assimilate Western science and technology, and when Western philosophers are trying to learn from Eastern thought.

More particularly, however, Averroes' Aristotelian commentaries afford frequent instances of interesting philosophical examples and arguments which are not found in Aristotle himself. For example, in commenting on Aristotle's discussion in *De Generatione et Corruptione* (338a 4 *et seq.*) of the cyclic character of natural processes, Averroes suggests (*Kurland*, 137-138) that the period of a moon-rotation may be incommensurable with that of a sun-rotation, so that a strict repetition of celestial phenomena—on the order of the ancient concept of a "Great Year"—may therefore be strictly impossible. Or again, in explaining Aristotle's observation (*De Generatione et Corruptione* 319b 31-320a 4) that "matter" is the substratum of growth and diminution—as well as of coming-to-be and passing-away—Averroes observes:

The three dimensions which are believed to constitute the nature of body are the first state in matter and matter cannot be devoid of them in any instance of generation, not that they exist in matter in actuality, but rather in some kind of potentiality . . . Matter is that which receives these three dimensions . . . (*Kurland*, p. 26.)

This conception of dimensionality as the primary characteristic ("the first state") of matter, which alone necessarily characterizes the material things throughout the changes undergone by them is an interesting anticipation of Descartes and the wax-example of the *Second Meditation*.

That such discussions as I have just cited may—for aught I know—occur obscurely in some Greek commentator, does not militate against the primary point I am trying to make. For it is my aim here to emphasize not the originality of Averroes' theories, but the interest of his books.

II. Averroes' Commentary on Plato's "Republic."

The Arabic *falasifa* (Hellenizing philosophers) did not have access to Aristotle's *Politica*; its surrogate in their Aristotelian canon was Plato's *Republic* or the *Laws*—in both cases in the Arabic translation (by Hunain ibn Ishaq, d. 876) of Galen's Summaries of these works. On this basis, Averroes wrote what is, in effect, a Middle Commentary on the *Republic*. The Arabic original of this work must be presumed lost, but it has survived in a Hebrew translation by Samuel ben Yehuda of Marseilles (fl. 1320). In *Averroes' Commentary on Plato's "Republic"*, published in the University of Cambridge Oriental Publications Series (Cambridge, 1956), E. I. J. Rosenthal has edited Samuel's Hebrew text, and has translated it into English, with almost fifty pages of explanatory and supplementary notes.

From one standpoint, Averroes' commentary on Plato's *Republic* is far and away more interesting than any comparable commentary on Aristotle would be. While he regards Aristotle as the infallible Master, Averroes attitude towards Plato is highly independent. He has no hesitancy about taking critical issue with Plato's ideas, or even about offering his own views as complementary and supplementary to Plato's discussions. Thus Averroes injects into his commentary analyses of contemporary thought on matters of social philosophy, and discussion of political development in the Muslim world in the light of the *Republic* (and also to a much lesser extent the *Laws* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*). For instance, Averroes construes Plato's concept of the Ideal State

based on the rule of just laws in the light of the Muslim ideal of a state founded on the religious law of Islam (*shari'a*). And Plato's account of the decay of the state in Book VIII of the *Republic* is presented in the light of political developments in Muslim Spain. Such liberties in departure from the text are characteristic of this work as contradistinguished from Averroes' Aristotelian commentaries.

Following Aristotle (and the Stoics), Averroes draws a sharp distinction between arguments which are *demonstrative*, and those which are merely "rhetorical" or "dialectical" or "persuasive", and terminate, not in proof, but in probability. Demonstrative argument, he insists, is the only valid philosophical method. This concept provides the basic tool of Averroes' critique and exposition of Plato.

Thus Plato's contrast between "knowledge" and "opinion" is interpreted as the difference between knowledge attained through "demonstrative arguments" as contrasted with information acquired *via* rhetorical or poetical methods; and the philosopher becomes the man who knows the "theoretical sciences" through the "demonstrative arguments" by which they are built up (*Rosenthal*, pp. 176-177), Plato thought that the training of Guardians should begin with "music", but,

He held this opinion only because the art of logic did not exist in his time. But since this art now exists, it is only proper that we should begin their course of study with the art of logic; after that they should proceed to arithmetic, then to geometry, astronomy, music, optics, mechanics, physics, and finally metaphysics. (*Rosenthal*, pp. 201-202.)

Averroes dismisses the first book-and-one-half of the *Republic* out of hand, as well as Book X, on the grounds that the discussion "consists only of dialectical arguments, and there is no proof in them except by accident." (*Rosenthal*, p. 251.) The Arabic *falasifa* generally, and especially Averroes, pattern their appreciation of all Greek philosophy—even Aristotle's *Poetics*!—closely along the lines of the logical *Organon*.¹ It is painful, but fascinating to see how Averroes' uncompromisingly "scientific" approach strips Plato's great dialogue of its texture of artistic

¹ See C. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik*, vol. II, pp. 311-312.

beauty, poetry, parable, and myth, and exposes its rather bare bones of logical argumentation. This effort to "purify" Plato from the standpoint of a doctrinaire construction of Aristotelian epistemology is perhaps the most philosophically intriguing aspect of this work.

IV. Averroes' Commentary on al-Ghazali's *"Tahafut al-Falasifa."*

Abu Hamid Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Ahmed al-Ghazali (1058-1111), the Algazel of the Schoolmen, was the greatest scholastic theologian of Islam. A highly original thinker, it was he who first gave an unambiguous formulation of the problem of "Buridan's Ass"², and it was he who first advanced the theory of causality which earned Nicholas of Autrecourt the title "the medieval Hume."³ Ghazali's masterpiece, *Tahafut al-Falasifa* "The Incoherence of the Philosophers," is a massive and detailed critique of various fundamental tenets—twenty in all—shared in common by the Arabic Aristotelians. In this work, Ghazali endeavors to establish the theological pillars of Islamic orthodoxy over the dead body of the doctrines of the philosophers; especially their (Aristotelian) view that the world is eternal and uncreated, a question to which Ghazali devotes over a quarter of his book.

Averroes' most interesting and important work is his attack upon this book, *Tahafut al-Tahafut*, "The Incoherence of the Incoherence," known to the medieval Latins as *Destructio Destructionis*. This, in effect, is a Great Commentary on Ghazali's book. However—uniquely among Averroes' philosophical commentaries—its aim is not to bring forth and to clarify what is (to his mind) the truth embodied in the work under study, but the exposure of its errors. Passage by passage, Averroes examines and rebuts Ghazali's critique of the *falasifa*. His long and emphatic

² See Léon Gauthier, "L'Argument de l'Ane de Buridan et les Philosophes Arabes," *Mélanges René Basset*, Publications de l'Institut des Hautes-Études Marocaines, vol. X (Paris, 1923), pp. 209-233.

³ That Nicholas knew of Ghazali's writings is clear from the fact that he gives at least one quotation from Ghazali's *Metaphysics*. (See J. R. O'Donnell in *Medieval Studies* [Toronto, 1931], I, p. 208.)

emphasis on the uncreatedness of the world was a major factor in the promulgation of the "Averroist" heresy of the Christian Aristotelians who followed him in this faithful interpretation of the Master's views.

In Averroes' *"Tahafut al-Tahafut"* (2 vols., London, 1954) Simon van den Bergh has provided a smoothly readable translation of this work, and an excellent Introduction to it (in Volume I), as well as a monumental set of philological, literary, and philosophical annotations (in Volume II) whose scope and perceptiveness represent a high degree of philosophical competence. This masterly work, published under the joint auspices of the E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Trust and the UNESCO International Commission for the Translation of Great Works, provides the English-speaking philosopher with an opportunity to become acquainted with Averroes at his best.

In his critique of Ghazali, Averroes is again concerned primarily with an assessment of the validity of his arguments: "The aim of this book," he writes, "is to show the different degrees of assent and conviction attained by the assertions in *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*" (van den Bergh, p. 1). His touchstone of philosophical truth is not *prima-facie* plausibility, but demonstrative adequacy, a conception which it is of interest to ponder in a time when "common usage" is frequently taken as the supreme arbiter of philosophical truth:

One who wants to enter deeply into these speculations must know that much of what is firmly established in the speculative sciences seems at first sight, and compared to the opinions the common man holds about them, like the visions of a dreamer . . . If, for example, the common man, and even he who has attained a somewhat higher degree of culture, is told that the sun, which appears to the eye as being the size of a foot, is about a hundred and seventy times bigger than the earth (*sic*), he will say that it is absurd, and will regard him who believes it as a dreamer . . . If this is the case even with geometrical questions and mathematical problems in general, that, when a solution is explained to the common man, it will appear to him fallacious and open to criticism at first sight and to have the character of a dream, how much more will this be the case in the metaphysical sciences, since for this kind of knowledge there are no plausible premisses which satisfy the superficial understanding . . . Therefore if a lover of truth finds a theory reprehensible and does not find plausible premisses which remove its reprehensible character, he must not at once believe that the theory is false, but must inquire how

he who has put it forward has arrived at it, must employ much time in learning this, and follow the systematic order corresponding to the nature of the topic. And if this is necessary in other sciences than metaphysics, how much more will this hold for metaphysics, since that science is so remote from the sciences built on common sense. Thus it should be learned that in metaphysics rhetorical reasoning cannot be applied, as it may be applied in other questions; for dialectics is useful and permissible in the other sciences but forbidden in this (van den Bergh, pp. 124-125).

The main occasion for present-day interest in Averroes' book is that it constitutes a work which grapples seriously and intensively with the question of the validity of reasonings in philosophical matters, and which addresses itself to this task, not in the abstract, but in an innumerable variety of particular concrete instances. Many of the problems and puzzles disputed between Ghazali and Averroes are still of real philosophical interest in the present day. Let me enumerate just a few samples:

1. "Mere" will and the possibility of choice without preference (i.e., the Buridan's Ass paradox).
2. What is an "agent"? The nature of "voluntary" actions and the concept of responsibility.
3. Can "choice" exist in the face of predictive foreknowledge?
4. The meaning of "possibility," "necessity," and "impossibility." Potentiality. The concept of "nonexistent possibles."
5. The nature of causality. "Causal chains."
6. Infinite regresses, infinite processes, and the conception of an "infinite" past.
7. The meaningfulness of the ideas of "creation" and "annihilation."
8. The identity of indiscernibles.
9. The logical status of "universals."
10. Can God's existence be demonstrated by arguments?
11. The relationship of philosophy to religion and to natural science.

Such questions are still discussed and disputed in the current issues of philosophical journals. But it is not unlikely that the English-speaking reader will find in the pages of Averroes' *Tahafut al-Tahafut* positions and arguments bearing upon them which will strike him as not inferior in novelty to far more "modern" treatments.

V. Conclusion.

The initiation of the availability in English of major works by an important figure in the history of philosophy is an event which is in any case to be greeted with approbation. And in the instance of Averroes this general maxim applies with especial force because of his important and extensive influence upon a major portion of our Western philosophical tradition. However, my main purpose in the present review has been to suggest that a more active philosophical cognizance of Averroes—now at last *feasible*—is in fact *warranted* on the grounds that throughout his writings discussion can be found which hold far more than merely antiquarian interest.

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THOUGHT AND ACTION

ERROL HARRIS

THE FORM OF THE PERSONAL is the title of the Gifford Lectures delivered at Glasgow by Professor John Macmurray, who alleges that to determine this form is the emergent problem of contemporary philosophy. The first series of these lectures entitled *The Self as Agent* is now in the hands of the public;¹ the second, *Persons in Relation*, is still to come. The first series is itself a major contribution to philosophy and provides ample material for discussion, but as the answers to many questions which arise in the reader's mind may well be given in the yet unpublished sequel, a reviewer of this first volume is at some slight disadvantage. Nevertheless, it would be a pity to postpone discussion of the stimulating fare already put before us, as it may well whet our appetite for the course to come. Macmurray's contention is that our failure hitherto to recognize the primacy of the practical in determining the form of the personal and our neglect to develop our philosophy in terms of this form has not only led speculation into a cul de sac but has also brought us into the social and intellectual crisis in which we find ourselves today. Its dissipation requires a new outlook and a new departure in philosophical thought.

We are nowadays so often reminded that we live in times of crisis that no controversy is likely to arise on that score, but the knowledge of its source and nature is not so easy to come by as the awareness of the fact. Macmurray is not the first to suggest that the crisis springs from the oversight or suppression of personality. Max Horkheimer, for instance, some years back deplored the submergence of the individual in a totalitarian mass civilization;² but whereas Horkheimer traces back the salient characteristics of the crisis situation to the subversion of reason

¹ New York: Harper Brothers, 1957.

² In *The Eclipse of Reason* (New York, 1947). Cf. also Leslie Paul, *The Annihilation of Man* (London, 1944) and *The Meaning of Human Existence* (New York, 1950).

as an objective standard, Macmurray's diagnosis seems, at least *prima facie*, just the opposite—the substitution of thought for practice as our philosophical presupposition and of the subject for the agent in our idea of the person. This opposition of the two analyses is, however, only apparent as I shall try to show anon.

Macmurray's primary concern, at least in this volume, is not directly with social practice and tradition but with philosophical, which reflects, as well as reflects upon, the social, being both its product and its generator. He points to the signs of breakdown in modern philosophy, evidence of which is provided by both of the main contemporary schools, alike only in their extreme opposition to tradition. The Existentialists, finding traditional methods incapable of solving traditional problems, have abandoned the former and stagger clinched in hopeless grapple with the latter. Logical Empiricism, on the other hand, for the same reason abandons the problems and continues to juggle fruitlessly with a refined and sharpened but unproductive logical technique. Neither of these expedients liberates us from the impasse into which, Macmurray holds, we have been led by the initial error of our Cartesian starting-point.

His complaint is not merely that of Gilbert Ryle, that Descartes invented and propagated the myth of the ghost in the machine; but the defect he points to accounts for that misconception of the self along with other and more prolific errors. The mistake was to have made *cogito* the starting-point and fundamental presupposition of all theorizing instead of *ago*. This committed all consequent philosophy to a purely theoretical view-point and an excessively egocentric outlook. Contrary to this, he maintains, all theoretical activity has its origin in practice and finds its significance and its verification in its practical reference.³

This is not simply a return to the Pragmatism of James and Dewey, which Macmurray repudiates.⁴ He offers what the pragmatists neglected to provide, a precise theory of the relation between theory and practice. Pragmatism is essentially an epistemology, whereas Macmurray's doctrine is metaphysical. It is a metaphysical theory of the self, asserting agency to be its defining

³ *The Self as Agent*, pp. 21-2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-3.

essence and distinguishing knowledge as one inseparable aspect or moment of action. "The essential reference of theoretical to practical activities does not involve the control of theory by practice. It consists even more significantly in control of practice by theory" (p. 23).

Here we have the keynote of the doctrine. Action is what *persons* do, and what makes them persons is their capacity to know what they are about. Their activity accordingly is characterized and determined by their knowledge. Activity independent of knowledge is not action; it is either mere physical occurrence or organic process. Action therefore is possible only for persons, and persons are primarily and essentially agents. Consequently any theory of knowledge must proceed from the standpoint of action and the agent, not from that of reflection and the subject, which is not to deny, so Macmurray assures us, that the enterprise of philosophizing is itself theoretical and reflective.

He does not, however, set out to develop a system. He considers that he is offering us a new point of departure for philosophy which will revolutionize its whole approach, and he intends no more than to explicate the new form which he thinks philosophy should exhibit and to illustrate its applicability in the major fields.

In a penetrating and original comment on the philosophy of Kant, he illustrates the persistence of the Cartesian features which the new form would eliminate, as well as Kant's prophetic insight that foresaw the limitations of the old and pointed the way to their transcendence. Later developments in the history of western philosophy, such as Hegel's objective idealism and the philosophies of evolution and organism prove inadequate, according to Macmurray, because the dialectical form which they substitute for the mathematical is adapted to an organic or aesthetic conception of reality and is still inappropriate to personality. Abandonment of the "I think" as starting point and the adoption of the new approach, on the other hand, abolishes dualism between subject and object and provides means of escape from the egocentricity which inevitably leads to solipsism. Doubts about the existence of the external world are ruled out, for the awareness of it as the Other of the Self is integral to action, which is not possible

without it. In practice we do and must believe that it exists and to profess doubt for purely theoretical reasons is to entertain a doubt which is bogus and unreal. How much more incisive and effective in this analysis than Wisdom's beating of the air in *Other Minds*. Scepticism, from the practical point of view, is likewise excluded. Action, by nature and definition, is the practical expression of knowledge. Agency is always aware of itself as such. To deny the possibility of action is therefore self-refuting, for not only is the denial itself an act, but also the knowledge which could issue in and support any such denial is derivative from action. It follows that freedom of action is guaranteed, for unfree activity is not action but mere occurrence, so that the denial of freedom is likewise the denial of the possibility of action and is self-refuting. If all activity were either physical or merely organic and as such determined, the pronouncement that this was so would itself be a mere event subject to the same determination. It could therefore be no judgement capable of truth or falsehood.

Under the new dispensation the problem of perception, as we might expect, assumes a different aspect. Perception is an element in action—the immediate awareness of that Other with respect to which action is taken. The primary form of such awareness is tactual and the correlative of touch is resistance to movement. This is at once the negative and the necessary support of action, one of its indispensable conditions. But the awareness of resistance to action is direct and infallible awareness of that with respect to which we are acting. Thus no problem arises concerning the relation of a mental representation and an external object. Only in the case of indirect perception such as vision, which is the awareness of things at a distance or the means of anticipating contact, can such a question be raised. Vision is essentially symbolic and representative and the knowledge it gives is mediated by imagery. Consequently it is liable to misinterpretation and illusion. The traditional problem of perception, Macmurray alleges, is the result of too exclusive attention to vision and is obviated when we consider vision as mediated anticipation of contact, in the occurrence of which the interpretation of the visual image is verified.

Some further clarification seems to be needed here before the

doctrine becomes acceptable. Macmurray's account of vision is in the main sound. But surely some doubts arise about the infallibility of touch and the immediacy of verification which it provides. Macmurray says that there are no illusions of touch and that what are sometimes described as such are illusions of feeling, which is what is left when we abstract from action—"an element in the general coenasthesia"⁵—and he gives the pain of a prick as an example. Tactual perception, he maintains, is always perception in action. But without denying this we may still assert the possibility of illusion, as for instance when one rolls a marble with fingers crossed and perceives two solids where there is only one, or retains the sensation of a hat on one's head after it has been removed—not to mention Descartes's examples of touch sensations in limbs which have been amputated, in relation to which the uninitiated might well be tempted to act. But even if the last are to be ruled out of court as mere feelings, the first two examples are surely illusory perceptions where there is the same necessity to distinguish between appearance and reality as in the case of vision. Nor is the method of discrimination different in principle. It consists in the correlation of evidence from different sources, and judgement (possibly reached with great rapidity) in accordance with the largest and most coherent body of corroborative evidence. This moreover is also the essential character of perception in action. The action itself is a decision as to the nature of the Other, and when the necessary evidence is present and the agent has sufficient knowledge, discrimination between real and illusory is just the appropriate action. Here relations between right and wrong in action and true and false in judgment coalesce and our account of perception fits in with Macmurray's view of these two antitheses, which may be summarized as follows.

Action is directed by choice among alternative courses. This determines right and wrong, the right course being the one chosen and the others being wrong. Macmurray admits that this is an abstract statement of the matter which gives the impression that action can never be wrong. The impression, however, is the result of the limitation which he imposes upon himself in this volume to consideration of the self in isolation. He shows that such

⁵ P. 113.

isolation is in reality and strictly speaking impossible as it destroys the possibility of action. Only in relation to the Other can the self act, and as activity in relation to inorganic matter is itself inorganic and in relation to living matter is merely organic, action proper is possible only in relation to other persons—then only is it personal. Consequently the distinction between right and wrong in action can be explained properly only when we come to consider persons in relation in the second volume. And as knowledge is derivative from action, right and wrong are prior to true and false.

Before one can justly criticize one should know what the second volume is to contain, but this is a crucial point and the position as it is stated here is not obviously defensible. Choice between alternatives, as Macmurray allows,^{*} implies discrimination and that again reasons and grounds for preference. All this presupposes judgment and the distinction between true and false. We need not quarrel with the allegation that judgment is an abstraction from action, or that only in action and in reference to it has judgment any ultimate significance, in order to insist on this. But if we do, must we not equally insist that true and false are prior to right and wrong? Perhaps the best view of the matter, and one more congenial to Macmurray, is that it is not sensible to speak of either distinction as prior. They are both aspects of one and the same act which is at once both theoretical and practical. The danger to be avoided here is that of exalting into a factual separation what is only a conceptual distinction between theory and practice. Right and wrong is ultimately and in practice *the same* distinction as true and false.

This way of presenting the case would tie in with Macmurray's theory of valuation. The act is unified and defined as one act by feeling. It begins with a feeling of dissatisfaction and ends with one of satisfaction. But mere feeling unrelated to a situation to which action is relevant, though it may be motive to organic (or instinctive) behaviour, cannot be effective as a reason for action. For that it must be referred to the Other. For example, fear referred to the situation is the apprehension of the situation as dangerous. This initiates the appropriate defensive action. Such reference of feeling to an actual situation is valuation and without

^{*} P. 168.

it there can be no choice. Our primary knowledge of the world is therefore apprehension and valuation in one, and strictly neither is possible without the other. It is only by abstraction and withdrawal from action that the world can be represented as a process of events without value and there is good reason to call such a representation more subjective, and not less, than one which includes value. Here, then, we have at least a basis for resolving the problem of finding an "objective" standard of value, though Macmurray takes us no further at this point. The importance of his teaching here lies in the convergence which it requires of the standards of truth and of value, apart from which both become arbitrary, truth being exhibited as a mere convention and value as purely subjective and all but pathological affection.

It follows that the typical scientific picture of the world as a process of events devoid of emotional significance cannot be accepted as final. Macmurray opposes event to act as an antithesis which takes the place, in any philosophy proceeding from the practical standpoint, of that which from the old theoretical standpoint appeared as mental and material. The idea of an event is what is left when we strip an act of its element of knowledge. An act is done for a reason, but an occurrence which has no reason must be otherwise accounted for, and as reason and knowledge stand to act so we supply the notion of cause to explain an event. Illuminating and suggestive though it is, I shall give no further outline here of Macmurray's account of causation and natural law,⁷ for neither does space permit nor my immediate purpose require it. It will be sufficient to note that the world, conceived as a series of events in causal relation and determined by laws of nature, in short, the physical world as a whole, turns out to be a theoretical construction based on an abstraction from the practical experience of human agents. Theory for Macmurray is always an element in action and he calls it its negative aspect—thinking or reflection is *in se* a withdrawal from or negation of action, while at the same time it is essential to and constitutive of it. The physical world, therefore, is a product of abstraction, and Macmurray calls it imaginary.⁸ The laws of physics do not apply to the real world

⁷ See Ch. VII.

⁸ P. 164.

without qualification. The same is true *mutatis mutandis* of the biological world, and in fact of the natural world in general as it is represented by the natural sciences.

We have already noted that action properly so called is not possible in a purely physical world or even in a purely biological environment, for the first presupposes complete causal determination and the second no more than behavioral response to stimulus, both of which preclude action. The conception of the world as a whole in these physical and biological terms is therefore incoherent, because we are aware of ourselves as agents and as acting within and upon the world, not simply as subjects set over against it and contemplating it from the outside. To think of it as being such, in its essential nature, as to exclude our own agency would be to think of it inadequately, abstractly, or not as a whole. Consequently the only *possible* coherent conception of the world as a whole is as one action—as an intentional whole.

The paradigm of such a conception is given by History. History is a systematic discipline which aims at producing a knowledge of past human experience as a whole continuous with the present. Its proper object of study is human action, and events (in the strict sense of the word, opposed to acts) interest the historian only so far as they affect and provide a field for human action. History is interested primarily in persons and only derivatively in things and events. But, of course, the knowledge of things and events enters into history as it enters into human experience and determines human action. Thus the subject matter of the sciences as of the arts becomes part of history as their history is part of human experience. Even our speculations about the unknown influence our action, and our very ignorance negatively determines our conduct. History is therefore in its own way, like philosophy (and for analogous reasons), all-inclusive. Its ideal is to present the past as if it were the complete and adequate memory of a single experient. As memory is by its very nature integral to present experience, the continuity of the past with the present is essential for history. And it seeks not only to chronicle but also to understand this past, which it can do only by comprehending the continuity of human intention exhibited in a multitude of past acts both with one another and with the

present. This continuity is real so far as many persons form a single community and have a common intention, their acts constituting a single act of that community (as when a tribe deliberately migrates or a nation declares and fights a war). Similarly, the continuity of intention is maintained from one generation to the next, so that ultimately and ideally the whole of humanity's past takes on the character of a single, continuous intentional action.

This gives us the model for a metaphysical conception of the world as one action. Action, Macmurray points out, is the integration of the movements of the agent with those of the Other, so that they form a unity which is intended. We could not act in a world which was totally chaotic so that the effects of movement were altogether unpredictable. Hence, though we may not think of the world as a process of completely determined events, we must think of the future as systematically related to the present and the past.* Thus we must conceive the world as one world, and it can only be coherently thought as a unity of intention—as one action. This clearly points to the existence of God as the ultimate agent.

Now this is a metaphysical theory and if it cannot be proved by the evidence of observed fact, it can equally not be disproved in that way. If it could not be verified at all, Macmurray concedes that he would, with the positivists, regard it as meaningless. But, he asserts it can, like all metaphysical statements, be verified, not indeed by sense-perception, for that, as such, (so he declares) can verify nothing, and seems to do so only on the unwarranted dogma "that what is given in sense perception exists independently in its own right" (p. 215). The verification of metaphysical statements, he maintains, (and here he is in agreement with James and Dewey) depends on the difference the belief in them makes to our practical way of life. A metaphysic determines a manner of living and its verification depends on the satisfactoriness, and falsification on the unsatisfactoriness, of that way of life.

Both in contrast with and in explanation of much current

* The future, Macmurray maintains, is indeterminate for action and is determined by it. The scientific conception of a determinate future is the conception of the future as past, for the past is determined having been so determined by action. See *op. cit.*, pp. 137-9

philosophy Macmurray's argument is refreshing and enlightening. But his final doctrine is not without difficulty and must give us pause. For, if we assert that no action is possible except in an environment of persons, are we not committed to some sort of hylozoism? If not, how are we to conceive, for instance, the activity of Robinson Crusoe on his island before the advent of Friday? Granted that action is determined by thought and knowledge and that this is what distinguishes it from physical activity or organic behaviour, does it follow that it is impossible in a physical or an organic setting? For Macmurray it must be so because he holds that the physical and organic world is imaginary, a mere abstraction from the human experience of acting. What then is the world of human action? Are we not involved in some new kind of idealism which substitutes practice for thought?

Action is admitted to be impossible *in vacuo*. Equally it is admitted to be impossible in a totally indeterminate world where nothing follows systematically on anything else. Yet we are told that the future must be indeterminate in some way for free action to be possible—and all action is by its very nature free. How are we to conceive this determinate indetermination? Macmurray says that action determines the future by choosing between possibilities. But it cannot do so absolutely, for unless the future were also in some way and to some extent determined causally, the agent would not know how to act. He could not tell what means would conduce to what ends. The causal conception of things, Macmurray agrees, is the conception of things as means to ends; but if this is not their real nature, that conception, however requisite for action, must be an illusion. And philosophers since Hume (Macmurray no exception) have recognized that the notion of causality is incoherent. The determination of the future by action, therefore, must depend on some other principle. We might say that causal laws define only what is possible in terms of what has already occurred, but that action decides what shall be actual. But even this is a difficult position to maintain if causality is held to be an illusion. The essential question to be faced is, what determines action? That it is free cannot mean that it is altogether undetermined, for that would make it the self-contradictory extreme of caprice. Is it sufficient to say that action is determined

by knowledge? Certainly not if the knowledge is "a false imaginary glare" and its object an unreal abstraction. Would it not be better to concede some degree of reality to the physical world, as well as to the organic, and to relate them to the personal as phases in a dialectical process? Much of what Macmurray writes suggests something like this, but to admit it openly would involve a revision of his estimate of Hegel and his successors and the acknowledgement of important debts to others in the old tradition whose theories he rejects.

Could we not approach Macmurray's goal in a slightly different manner? We already find at the biological level that causality, while persisting as a factor in organic activity, gives place to teleology, understood not as the consciousness of the end, but as the determination of the part by the whole and of the phase in an organic process by the developing form. Organic process is teleological because what occurs in any part or phase of the developing organism is regulated and governed by the outcome of the process and not simply by the preceding phase. At the level of action, therefore, we should expect to find a form of determination which went beyond organism while it included organic process as an element in itself—a form of determination more coherent and integral, yet more adaptable and resourceful than the organic. Determination by conscious thought would be such a form, but we must not imagine that it would be purely cognitive and intellectual. It would at the same time have to be emotionally charged or evaluative, which implies a conative aspect as well—in other words, it would exhibit all the characteristics of action. This raises the further question, what determines the quality of the emotional charge—what is the principle of evaluation? The answer is provided, if only by implication, by Macmurray: that value depends ultimately on contribution to a way of life which is satisfactory on the whole. Such a life clearly must be guided by knowledge which is true in the fullest sense, so that the content of the thought which is the determinant of action would, in the last resort, have to be the total reflective awareness of the actual world, unifying and reconciling the deliverances of science, religion, and philosophy, as well as that of the artistic vision.

In other words, the determinant of action is no mere

subjective intellect nor yet any mere subjective feeling, but a Reason which defines an objective standard of truth and value in one, through which the total system of the real expresses itself in and as action.

But this is just what Horkheimer invokes as objective Reason and the loss of which he deplores in his analysis of modern social and intellectual trends. This is the final "form of the personal," which points, no doubt, to a supra-personal form. Perhaps the development of some such view is what we are to look for in the second series of Macmurray's Gifford Lectures, but whether or not this is what he will offer, it seems odd that he should from the outset have recognized no kinship to his own philosophy in some of the works of the older philosophers. Surely the protest against intellectualism, the rejection of dualism, and the repudiation of "pure thought" are already familiar to us in the work of Hegel and his followers, in Dewey and in Whitehead. Surely the reduction of the scientific view of the world to an abstraction from a more concrete experience has already been made, if only (and conspicuously) by F.H. Bradley. The revolt against subjectivism and solipsism is no new thing, even if it has taken different forms in different schools; and the coalescence of theory with practice and of value with truth is an important tenet of the much maligned objective idealists. To accuse them along with Hegel of solipsism and to allege that they were slaves to the conception of organism, if some colour may be given the charge on a superficial reading of their philosophy, would be impossible after as careful and perspicacious an assessment of it as Macmurray accords to Kant. Here too we should descry an insight which broke the bounds of the contemporary forms and traditions of Romanticism and at least foreshadowed the kind of approach that Macmurray desires.

The truth of the matter is that the Cartesian subjectivism and egocentricity have been outdated since before the middle of the nineteenth century; but many contemporary philosophers are too short-sighted to notice it. They hold up further advance by reverting to obsolete metaphysical dogmas which lead to a dead end, and then declare that further progress is irremediably blocked. Others, feeling the discomfort of this situation, fall upon the

obsolete doctrines with a welter of destructive criticism, ignorant or neglectful of advances already made beyond them. This rejuvenating and refreshingly instructive volume of Professor Macmurray's lectures should remind us that the way *is* open and the direction of progress already indicated, if not to some extent already mapped in outline. All we need in order to go forward is clear sight, sanity, and the courage of our convictions.

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RECENT SPECULATIONS IN THE POSITIVISTIC MOVEMENT

DAVID L. MILLER

THE three works under consideration¹ have two main points in common: each author holds that (1) every meaningful scientific statement must refer directly or indirectly to the "differentiated aesthetic continuum" and, (2) the subject matter of the philosophy of science is confined to meaning, explanation, and understanding. The meaning of a scientific statement are referents in the aesthetic continuum; a scientific explanation of these referents (observable phenomena) consists in statements (laws, theories) from which these referents can be predicted or postdicted, or from which they can be "logically derived." Understanding has a slightly different meaning for different authors. However, with the exception of Alexandre Koyré, E. G. Boring, Robert Cohen, and possibly Jerome Richfield, (see *Validations*), each author rejects any form of old fashioned metaphysical understanding, but whereas most of them seem to assimilate understanding to explanation, Frank strongly emphasizes the pragmatic operational concept of it. I.e., according to Frank we understand the meaning of terms (or their referents) when we are able to produce their referents.

"If we say that a straight line means a light ray in a vacuum, or means the edge of a sharpened knife, then the statement obtains an exact meaning only if we present the operations by which we produce a ray of light or the edge of a knife."²

¹ Philipp Frank, *Philosophy of Science, The Link between Science and Philosophy* (Englewood Cliffs, 1957). Hereafter called *The Link*. *The Validation of Scientific Theories*, ed. Philipp Frank (Boston, 1956). Hereafter called *Validation*. (All articles in *Validation* are also found in the September, October, and November 1954 and the January and February 1955 issues of *The Scientific Monthly*. B. F. Skinner's article, "Critique of Psychoanalytic Concepts and Theories," is also printed in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science* [Minneapolis, 1956].) Gustav Bergmann, *Philosophy of Science* (Madison, Wis., 1957). Hereafter called *Bergmann*.

² Frank, *The Link*, pp. 331-32.

Here we see that Frank has extended operationalism beyond its application to concepts of measurement and is applying it to the meaning or referents of all scientific terms. I venture to suggest that Frank is, in his rather cryptic way, indicating a significant and a relatively new thesis in the philosophy of science; scientific explanation and understanding are for the sake of controlling the order of events. This, of course, is a pragmatic thesis to which Frank and other anti-metaphysicists have been driven by a tedious, circuitous route. But Frank has gone too far in insisting that all referents of scientific concepts must be producible, for finally this would require that we be able to produce the universal forms (class concepts) of knowledge, and that the prototype of every observable is itself observable. We cannot in fact produce a perfect cube, and we know it. Nor can we produce a one hundred per cent efficient engine. Yet this does not detract from the fact that science is for the sake of practice. But it does bring to focus important questions: Through the application of science, can we produce the objects of cognition? Can science furnish the ideals or the goals for which it is applied?

Of the three works considered, Frank's book is the most interesting and the most valuable. I disagree with Hilary Putnam's suggestion³ that *The Link Between Science and Philosophy* is thirty years out of date. In fact it is one of the few works coming out of the positivist movement that tries to face squarely up to the problem of the relationship between philosophy (conceived of by Frank, Reichenbach, Carnap, *et al.* as metaphysics of the idealistic strain) and science—especially its application. As Rudner points out, "How sure we must be before we accept a hypothesis depends on how serious a mistake would be."⁴ Inasmuch as a "mistake" can be made only in the application of science, for example the application of Salk vaccine, nuclear energy, etc., the truth, the acceptability, the trustworthiness, of factual statements are conditioned by extrascientific factors, especially values. This is a point which Frank is beginning to see, and which Rudner sees clearly. Science has not and cannot thrive in a vacuum. Pure

³ See Putnam's review of Frank's book in *Science*, IV (April, 1958), pp. 750-51.

⁴ *Validation*, p. 26.

research is not for its own sake. Rather, as is eminently clear since World War II, "pure science" is an abstraction, and pure research is for the sake of practice. This being the case, there still is a necessary link between science and values, science and philosophy, science and "intelligible principles," Frank to the contrary.

Intelligible Principles

According to Frank there are two reasons for accepting factual statements, and these reasons are antithetical. First, scientists accept a statement because they can derive observables from it. Second, many statements are accepted as true by the common man, philosophers, and theologians, because they are derivable from "intelligible principles." In one sense, according to Frank, intelligible principles are outmoded scientific beliefs and attitudes which have been taken over by the nonscientific people, probably unconsciously, and are applied to new scientific discoveries and theories to see whether or not they are acceptable. E.g., the theologians and philosophers of Kepler's day seemed to know on "a priori" grounds (from intelligible principles) that celestial bodies had circular orbits, and today many reject the principle of indeterminacy for the same reason. In another sense, Frank seems to interpret intelligible principles, not as outmoded scientific theories, but rather as final causes or the basic value system of a society with reference to which that society determines whether a scientific theory or law is good and, consequently, true. Thus by intelligible principles the unscientific-minded people try to account for events by the "organismic" theory; they are interested in why things happen, in the beginning and end of change, but not in how they happen.⁹

Frank holds that the union between science and philosophy was possible only when there was a separation between science and technology, but now that science and technology are united (since pure and applied science are integral parts of scientific method) there is no room for philosophy nor for "intelligible principles" in science.

⁹ Frank, *The Link*, p. 100.

I confess I think Frank is confused. First, he does not stick to a consistent interpretation of intelligible principles, but accepts the two interpretations stated above. Second, despite his belief that science is for the sake of practice and despite his knowledge of the fact that scientists do not stipulate the ends for which science is applied, he cannot bring himself to admit openly that there may be a necessary relation between values stipulated on non-scientific grounds and applied science, technology.

Obviously Frank missed the cue. Yet, short of a denial of his positivistic position, it would be unreasonable to expect him to argue that the very function of philosophy in the modern world is to furnish a rational justification, through ethics, for "extra-scientific" factors which are necessary to bridge the gap between pure science and technology. It becomes convincingly clear that he could have developed a systematic theory of the place of science and technology in the modern world had he done so. Instead, the "extrascientific" factors remain a "thorn in the flesh" throughout the book.

Yet, as I have suggested, this does not detract from the fact that Frank and other positivistic-minded philosophers of science have stumbled onto the conclusion that science is incomplete apart from technology, and that, therefore, pure science is for the sake of practice. Consequently, inasmuch as basic knowledge resulting from pure research will lend itself indifferently to the accomplishment of alternative goals or ends, the goals actually selected are selected on non-scientific grounds and the evaluation of these alternative possible ends properly belongs to ethics.

Once it is clear that pure science is for the sake of practice, it follows that many extrascientific factors furnish the matrix within which science can be applied. Moore shows that political situations condition the acceptance of scientific theories and he believes the totalitarian case, including the USSR, is simply an extreme and obvious example. Since there will always be conflicts between science and religion and politics, "methods of *control* and *compromise* will then have to be made."^{*}

When we ask: Who will set up *controls* and by whom and at

* Barrington Moore, Jr., *Validation*, p. 35.

what level will *compromises* be made, we realize that they can result only from the cooperation of interested parties in society, and that neither the politician nor the pure scientist can force a settlement of issues that give rise to "conflicts." For the sake of intellectual honesty we should abandon the isolationist's thesis that science, whether pure or applied, can prosper apart from these extrascientific, alogical factors.

Operationalism

In *The Validation of Scientific Theories*, seven authors labor over the meaning and present state of operationalism, but no new developments are in sight.⁷ From 1927 to the present Bridgman's thesis has been spread thinner and thinner, so that today all we can say definitely is that operationalism holds that all scientific statements must involve the aesthetic continuum directly or indirectly, and that testing a factual statement requires some sort of manipulation by the testor. Bergmann settles for the following:

This is the whole of "operationism." To ascertain the truth or falsehood of a statement in which a defined term of this kind occurs (i.e., x is a magnet if certain consequences follow) one must perform certain manipulations and observe what happens.⁸

Discussions by the authors indicate that operationalism, positivism, and pragmatism supplement each other, and that there is a strong philosophic movement in America based on the assumption that science should set the boundaries for philosophic "speculation". Indeed exponents of this movement are contending that philosophy should be the handmaid to science and that all objects of cognition can be dealt with scientifically.

Bridgman bemoans the fact that philosophers have used his book, *The Logic of Modern Physics*, to justify certain philosophic systems.

... so much of the concern of others has been with abstract methodo-

⁷ The best work on operationalism to date is, I think, *Operationism*, by A. Cornelius Benjamin (Springfield, Ill., 1955).

⁸ Bergmann, p. 56.

logical questions suggested by the endeavor to erect some sort of philosophic system rather than with attempts to follow the more concrete and obvious leads.*

Bridgman also reminds his "followers" that "the operational point of view suggested itself from observation of physicists in action,"¹⁰ and by innuendo he suggests that philosophic speculation or, in general, a philosophy of science set up by present day non-scientists (the philosophers) should command no more respect than the speculation carried on by philosophers of the prescientific era.

None of the authors seems to want to challenge Bridgman in anything he says. ("An operational analysis can be given of the most obscurely metaphysical definition, such as Newton's definition of absolute time...")¹¹ Rather each author seems to be willing to concede that Bridgman knows what is meant by "operationalism," and that the doctrine is sound in principle. As can be seen from the immediately preceding quotation, Bridgman spreads his doctrine so thin that it means anything that is in accordance with "good scientific procedure."

Bergmann says:

Applied to psychological concepts, operationalism becomes methodological behaviorism, that is, a behaviorism sobered and shorn of its metaphysics. Operationalism can thus take credit for having facilitated the transition from Watsonianism to contemporary behavior theory.¹²

No doubt Bergmann approves of a psychological system devoid of metaphysics which, in the last analysis, means a psychology devoid of subject matter other than what is found in physics and chemistry. If MacCorquodale and Meehl¹³ are correct in their interpretation of the works of Hull and Tolman (whose ideas were prevalent much earlier than Bridgman's statement of his operational thesis), methodological behaviorism needed no boost

* *Validation*, p. 20.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 48.

¹³ See their "Hypothetical Constructs and Intervening Variables," *Psychological Review*, LV (1948), 95-107.

from Bridgman in making the transition from Watsonianism to present behavior theory. Yet it is doubtful that even the contemporary extreme behaviorists, such as Skinner, have been successful in their attempt to define the subject matter of psychology in operational or behavioristic terms. Skinner believes he leaves out all reference to metaphysical entities such as "intervening variables" when he defines "reflex reserve" as the total available responses without further conditioning. But when we ask whether these responses are available and have a thereness about them even before they are expressed in observed behavior, we realize that to be available is to have some sort of ontological status independently of their overt expression.

On the one hand Frank leaves the impression that operationalism is a recent discovery (by Bridgman). On the other hand he speaks as if it is very old. He suggests that whenever a scientist formulates a law or a theory that is successfully applied, he *ipso facto* has used the operational method. "Newton and all those who applied Newton's laws have actually used an operational definition of 'mass'." ¹⁴

Direction of Processes in Living Systems

Wolfgang Köhler ¹⁵ clarifies the main issue between mechanists on the one hand and organicists (neo-vitalists, finalists, etc.) on the other by saying:

For if the behavior of sodium ions in the active nerve fiber were perfectly known, if we had discovered the last vitamin, and so forth, we would still have to ask why, taken together and interrelated, the various operations of the organism tend to preserve its existence as well as they do. ¹⁶

He holds that a living organism involves continual replacement of its parts and is a process, whereas a machine maintains the stability of its parts and the recurrence of their original positions. However, McCulloch believes every living organism can be

¹⁴ *The Link*, p. 112.

¹⁵ *Validation*, pp. 143-7.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

duplicated (in principle at least) in man-made machines. "Everything we learn of organisms leads us to conclude not merely that they are analogous to machines but that they are machines."¹⁷

To the theoretical question, Can you design a machine to do whatever a brain can do?, the answer is this: If you will specify in a finite and unambiguous way what you think a brain does do with information, then we can design a machine to do it. Pitts and I have proved this constructively. But can you say what you think brains do?¹⁸

McCulloch writes like a dare-devil and clearly works up far more passion over the mechanistic position than a machine can do. Yet, if one can explain to McCulloch *in mechanistic terms* what is meant by "passion," he promises to construct a machine with passions, and without human ancestors. But here is the catch—McCulloch *means* by "finite and unambiguous" statements of the nature of brains and organisms nothing other than statements framed in terms of his preconceived, mechanistic philosophy; i.e., a statement of what is meant by "living organism" must be framed in mechanistic terms (terms indicating how it can be reproduced) before it makes sense to him. Hence in this dogmatic way McCulloch refuses to acknowledge the possibility of a distinction between machines and organisms as conceived by Köhler.

McCulloch sees only two alternatives: thorough-going mechanism and chance, or divine intervention and superstition. For him any suggestion that mechanism is inadequate or as yet incomplete means narrow-mindedness and a reversion to pre-scientific attitudes.¹⁹ He goes on to argue that he can manufacture (not create) chessplaying machines "whose desire to play exceeds their desire to win." Just what "desire" and "win" mean in mechanistic terms I do not know, but one thing is certain; McCulloch has developed an intense distaste for, if not a fear of, all non-mechanistic interpretations, and runs from them as the noble savage runs from ghosts. Yet, if his claim holds, the only reason he cannot construct a machine that suffers pain is that no one can state *in mechanistic terms* what pain is.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 167.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 165.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 162.

Finalists, organicists, and vitalists are claiming that it is impossible to equate or reduce factors that emerge only at the organic level, such as goal-seeking, desiring, thinking, pain, pleasure, etc., to the properties of inorganic, inanimate objects. Mechanists, on the other hand, conclude that since the means of controlling the life process is the same as the means of controlling machines, therefore living organisms are machines. This conclusion follows only if we assume that effects are like their causes.

Life processes are known in two different senses. First, we know their nature through direct inspection or through recognition. This is the sense in which men, prior to the innovation of science, knew the difference between the living and the dead and between green and red. The second kind of knowledge and understanding may properly be called scientific understanding, and in this case it is confined to the means of predicting, controlling, and producing living organisms.

The extreme position, thorough-going mechanism, held by McCulloh, is accounted for when we realize that he confuses these two kinds of understanding and includes the first in the second. The basic argument between organicists and mechanists can be epitomized in the following questions. (1) Are extra-physico-chemical-electric principles or forces involved in life-processes? (2) Can a belief in such principles or even a knowledge of their existence be of any scientific value? I.e., can these principles be used in any way either to predict, control, or produce living phenomena?²⁰

Psychoanalytic Concepts and Theories

In contrast with many other experimental psychologists,²¹ Skinner recognizes that Freud made a great contribution to psychology and to Western thought by his application of the principle of cause and effect to human behavior. Accordingly

²⁰ See my article, "Sinnott's Philosophy of Purpose," in this *Review*, XI (June, 1958).

²¹ See especially Karl M. Dallenbach, "Phrenology versus Psychoanalysis," *The American Journal of Psychology*, LXVIII (Dec., 1955), pp. 511-25.

Skinner believes Freud took the first step toward behaviorism, and had he been a little freer from traditional theology and introspective psychology, he would have become a full-fledged scientist in the orthodox sense.²²

Since Freud made no appeal to the psyche to explain spontaneity and caprice (*contra* theology and earlier psychologies), Skinner believes he could have left it out of his system altogether and could have substituted the physiological man for it.

This indicates the chief conflict between thorough-going behaviorism and psychoanalysis. The behaviorist goes to orthodox physics and chemistry for his method of dealing with "mind," and after accepting the method of the physical scientists as complete and sufficient, he next, though probably unwittingly, accepts their subject matter as all inclusive. Richfield puts his finger squarely on the issue.

When psychoanalysis is discussed. . . , the questions asked are aimed at determining whether psychoanalysis is fundamentally scientific, but when physics is discussed the questions are aimed at discovering the nature of science itself.²³

Richfield points out that most critics of psychoanalysis have a preconceived, dogmatic notion of the meaning of science and scientific method and that they try, in procrustean fashion, to fit every new discipline, including psychoanalysis, into a fixed mold. I believe Skinner does just this at the expense of the subject matter of psychology. To use the physiological man as the physical means by which past events (experiences of them?) are connected with present overt behavior, and to claim that this means is altogether sufficient is to leave the symbolic process and all of its accompaniments out of psychology. Skinner seems to think "force" has some meaning in physics, but when applied to psychology it becomes mystical. He speaks as a thorough-going actualist, denying that "potentiality" has any meaning (or any referent) apart from the directly observable. Yet even the staunch anti-metaphysicians of our day, such as Carnap and Reichenbach, recognize that even physical objects have "dispositions" prior to a

²² *Validation*, p. 120.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

later manifestation of these dispositions, and that there are "surplus meanings" such that none of the means by which we can verify the existence of an object exhausts its meaning; i.e., nothing that can be predicated of a subject exhausts its meaning. This, in fact, is very close, if not identical with the belief that finally predicates can be known only through the subject, not vice versa, and that "symptoms," the data of psychoanalysis, must be understood through their causes.

Freud assumed that the "symptoms," overt behavior, must be understood by means of the psyche, not the converse. To be sure, the symptoms are evidence for the nature of the psyche, but they are also what are to be accounted for and explained. Skinner's difficulty is accounted for when we see that he identifies the evidence with that for which it is evidence. He tries to equate the subject with everything that can be predicated of it; i.e., for him "psyche" means nothing other than the symptoms. Yet it is just the symptoms that call for explanation.

The nature of science and the scientific method cannot be settled on a priori grounds independently of the success with which it may be applied to the subject-matter at hand. If a preconceived method does not aid in understanding the difficulties of a mentally disturbed person, so much the worse for the method. If a new approach fulfills the purposes at hand and leads to general understanding, it should be considered a part of the scientific method. We are not justified in criticizing psychoanalysis because its method differs from that of physics. The justification of any method lies, finally, in its value in attaining desired results. As Richfield says:

Questions about the nature of science are not scientific questions; they are not like those concerned with the nature of zebras. . . . They are questions that involve a technical philosophical analysis in terms of some combination of sociological, semantic, ethical, logical, epistemological, and historical facts and values.²⁴

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 130-1.

Science as a Social and Historical Phenomenon

Recent positivists have been rather vigorous in their efforts to show that traditional philosophic systems have been a hindrance rather than a help to scientific progress. Reichenbach says:

Philosophic systems, at best, have reflected the stage of scientific knowledge of their own day; but they have not contributed to the development of science.²⁵

Contrary to Reichenbach's attitude, Alexandre Koyré shows that philosophy is the life of science, that many basic ideas in modern science were proposed by philosophers who were far more daring in their speculation than hard-headed experimentalists. A recent tendency to confine philosophy of science to analysis and to deny any scientific value to speculation (metaphysics) does not find ultimate support in the history of science.

Of course it is easy enough to find "evidence" in the history of science for the positivist's anti-metaphysical view that a generalization of the facts is a very important part of science. Yet Positivism, according to Koyré, is always a temporary retreat. I suspect that the value of Positivism lies chiefly in the fact that it continually reminds us that hypotheses and theories are never to be divorced from the facts—from observables. But the temporary retreats of the positivist cannot outlast the underlying persistency of the human mind to understand the phenomenal world through unobservables, such as atoms, genes, etc., and latent potentialities.

Boring and Cohen acknowledge that new theories, inventions, and novel ideas are expressed through individual members of society. Their articles consider the effect of society on both the creative imagination of individuals and the acceptance by society of new ideas. This amounts to a discussion of the relationship between the individual and society—the extent to which the individual depends on society as a necessary condition for the creation of new ideas in science and the extent to which the

²⁵ Hans Reichenbach, *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy*, p. 13.

scientific progress of a society depends on the creative imagination of its individual members.

Boring calls the social forces acting on the individual the *Zeitgeist*. He is not willing to defend the position that society has a mentality of its own, independently of individuals (*a la* Durkheim), nor does he believe in a super-organic oversoul. Yet he believes *Zeitgeist* is the final authority in determining both the nature of new ideas that come to expression in individuals and the acceptance of these ideas. Boring cites several inventions, such as the telescope, as due to the *Zeitgeist*, since they were invented by several individuals at the same time, acting independently. He says the same is true of theories and the discovery of laws.

The *Zeitgeist*, according to Boring, is in many instances a help to scientific progress, whereas in other instances it is a hindrance. Cohen, on the contrary, believes that "men always go with the *Zeitgeist*: when they seem to oppose it, they do so within it, not against it, thereby revealing contradictory tendencies within it."²⁶

This indicates the confusion of the authors over the issues at hand. Neither Boring nor Cohen explains the relationship between society and the creative intelligence of individual scientists. Nor do they explain that all progress must be built on an old order only parts of which are undesirable, and that many of the things called obstacles to progress by scientists are things to which society has become adjusted and in which in many instances they have found cultural value. E. g., many of the Asiatics will not accept what they know to be "the scientific way of life" unless they can preserve certain parts of their tradition. If there is a conflict, often we do the unscientific thing at an expense simply because it would force us to give up certain values. Few have given up cigarettes because of good scientific advice.

For the most part Boring's and Cohen's statements consist of a confession of faith that *Zeitgeist* explains what cannot be explained otherwise. *Zeitgeist* covers up our ignorance with a term.

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²⁶ *Validation*, p. 222.

PAINTING AND REALITY

DOROTHY WALSH

In the preface to *Painting and Reality** Etienne Gilson says that what he intends is not a philosophical approach to painting, but, rather, a pictorial approach to philosophy. "My own problem exactly is: what has a philosopher to learn from painting?"

This question does not mean: what has a philosopher to learn from paintings? Rather it is: what metaphysical implications can be derived from the consideration of the art of painting? Since, however, this consideration is not a contemplation but a theorizing, we must understand Gilson's question to be: what metaphysical implications can be suggested by a theory about the creative activity of painters and about the kind of entity a painting is?

Gilson, indeed, has such a theory. Briefly, it is to the effect that painters are creators and makers and that a painting is, or aspires to be, an entity in its own right and an independent individual. A painting is not an imitation of nature, and it is not a vehicle for the interpretation of the world. The painter (presumably when successful) embellishes the world by the creation of beautiful structures that otherwise would not exist.

What is distinctive in Gilson's advocacy of this doctrine is that he regards it as providing a common basis of understanding and communication between painters and metaphysicians. There is evident in this book what I think can only be called an attitude of animosity towards art historians, art critics, and, indeed, all whose theorizing has not been either on the most abstract level of metaphysics or on the most concrete level of art practice. There may be something to be said for this point of view, but what Gilson says, in addition to remarks that border on abuse, is hardly tenable. The fact that paintings are not themselves linguistic is supposed to cast doubt on all detailed analysis description or elucidation of particular paintings. We are informed that talk

* Etienne Gilson, *Painting and Reality*, The A. W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts 1955 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1957).

about the painting is not the painting. But of course it is not. Any utility such talk might have depends entirely on this circumstance. There may be critics who confuse their discourse with the object of their discourse, and there may be critics who forget that critical analysis is not aesthetic experience, but wholesale condemnation on the ground that critics talk and write is unwarranted. Gilson tells us that in engaging in pleasurable contemplation we are practising "the only kind of art criticism that is not wholly foreign to the nature of its object." Let us pass over this matter. The position presented is that on the theme of painting and reality painters and metaphysicians have something to say. Painters will tell us about painting and metaphysicians (or, at any rate, St. Thomas Aquinas) will tell us about reality and a meeting of minds on this issue will be highly significant.

In the preface, Gilson states that "the only persons who know anything about painting as a creative art are the painters themselves." This is obviously true if the knowledge is a knowing how to make, but is this so if the knowledge is in the form of a theory about the object made? Thought it is both natural and appropriate for anyone interested in art to be interested in what artists have to say, the question of the authority of the speculative theorizing of artists on art—or of painters on painting—is more complicated than Gilson seems willing to recognize.

Reasons might be cited for caution on this matter. In the first place, creative talent and speculative talent are different and may vary independently. Secondly, there is no guarantee that the speculative theorizing of an artist derives directly from his experience of making works of art. Regardless of practice, theory may be taken over from some prevailing philosophy or some constituted authority. Finally, there is the historical fact that the theorizing of artists exhibits lack of agreement so that there is no single testimony that might be said to represent the "opinion of artists." Thus, however much a philosopher, speculating on the nature of painting, might desire to have the support of painters, the most he can hope for is some agreement in some quarter. Accordingly, the philosopher cannot evade the obligation for decision.

Gilson himself believes that there are certain wrong views about the kind of thing a painting is, and he is not ignorant of the

fact that these views have been endorsed by painters. Thus what it comes to is that Gilson believes that certain modern painters are now saying the right thing—or the right sort of thing. But how does he know that these tentative theorizings are now moving in the right direction? The answer seems to be that *these* theorizings can be clarified and systematized by being brought into relationship with "the classical metaphysics of being as interpreted by St. Thomas Aquinas." This is chiefly because the notion of a painting as non-referential conforms to the Thomistic distinction between making, knowing, and doing, according to which the artist is a maker and the final end of his art beauty not knowledge.

Whatever we may think of the methodology involved, Gilson is surely correct in claiming that the practice and theorizing of some modern painters involves a break with what might be considered the Renaissance tradition. It seems also just to describe that tradition as being, in intent at least, intellectualistic, since, according to the theory prevailing at that time, painting was regarded as a kind of discourse. In some sense or other it was assumed that the purpose of painting was to record, or interpret, or clarify some aspect or part of the world. Painting was about something not simply incidentally but essentially. The status and dignity of painting as a "liberal" art was considered to depend on the claim that the painter was, in his fashion, a kind of poet though his form of expression was not the same. The notion of the painter as essentially a creator and of the painting as a self-sufficient entity—a new thing in the world—is different.

Whether or not we accept this latter view we can entertain it as a view. So entertaining it we can proceed to the consideration of what Gilson has to say. Briefly stated it is that modern revolutionary painters, intent on establishing the autonomy of their art, can now find aid and comfort and possibly clarification from metaphysical quarters. On the other hand, philosophers have something to learn from a meditation on this new conception of painting. These matters must be dealt with separately.

Gilson states that he is concerned with painting in particular, not with art in general. However it may be with other arts, there is something about the art of painting that lends plausibility to the view that a painting is a self-sufficient entity. To be sure,

Gilson is not entirely clear on whether he means painting considered simply as a case of visual art, or whether he means painting considered specifically as pictorial art, or whether it is painting as one particular form of pictorial art—painting as distinguished from graphic art. Ambiguity on this issue makes many passages of the text puzzling. However, if we look beyond these puzzlements, we can discern the outline of a general claim that can be summarized as follows.

Paintings have a continuous mode of physical existence; they are in places during times; they are "substantially" present in the world. Poems and musical compositions are somewhat ghostly by comparison; they come and go and their mode of existence is intermittent. Gilson is impressed by the fact that the painter "makes" in a more down-to-earth literal sense than the poet or composer. The painter uses his hands; he engages with matter. Unlike a musical composition, a painting does not need to be executed by a performing artist; the painter is his own executant. He makes from beginning to end and he finishes what he makes. "Himself an existent, the painter is an efficient cause of actual existence of other existents" (p. 120).

Such remarks may suggest that Gilson is inadvertently confusing the aesthetic vehicle—or physical basis—with the aesthetic object. But, in fact, he is intent on challenging that distinction which he regards, not as a metaphysically innocent useful distinction that enables us to know more clearly what we are talking about when we ascribe characteristics to "a work of art," but, rather, as a symptom of departure from metaphysical realism and the substitution of phenomenology for ontology. Gilson is prepared to recognize a distinction between aesthetic existence (existence of what is actually experienced as a work of art) and artistic existence (existence of that which has been produced by art), but it is this latter, he insists, that is properly "the work of art." "The work of an artist's art is, by definition, a work of art" (p. 13). The importance, for Gilson, of the identification of the artist's artifact with the work of art in the complete and total sense is that it is natural to say that it is works of art that are beautiful. Accordingly, if a beautiful painting has

been created, it is beautiful regardless of whether or not anyone experiences it.

This is a central point. The aid and support that metaphysics (the proper metaphysics) can render modern artists is the assurance that their naive realism is essentially sound. The painter can believe that what he has made he has completely made. The painting, once created, exists with all its artistic qualities. The artist's involvement with matter, his manual activity, his very dirty hands, should confirm him in the belief that he is really a maker, a creator, not of images, but of substantial things. Matter is the principle of individuation. The activity of the painter consists in the development of artistic form in matter. Prime matter, to be sure, does not exist independently, so every material used by the artist has its own potentialities and its "natural vocation." The talented artist has an intuitive understanding of this and his creativity—though genuine creativity—is in a sense also a kind of cooperation with what God or nature has already created.

This is perhaps enough to indicate the emphasis placed by Gilson on "the materiality of painting." The complete identification of the work of art with the artist's artifact is, of course, the central assumption. Anyone who supposes that the artistic significance of a painting—even a non-representational or non-objective painting—depends on meaningful relationship of part to part and who finds it difficult to understand how there can be meaning independent of mind, will not be likely to be persuaded that "the materiality of painting" carries some deep and special message. But, according to Gilson, it does. This brings us to the suggestions presented in the final chapter. What has a philosopher to learn from a reflection on the art of painting?

"The natural tendency of science and speculative philosophy is to consider their intellectual formulations of reality equivalent to reality itself. True enough, philosophers and scientists are well aware that they do not know everything; on the contrary, they often declare that what they know is little in comparison with what still remains to be known; but they also believe that what remains to be known will be found to be homogeneous in nature with what they already know . . . When apprehended

from the point of view of art, reality becomes very different from what it seems to be when seen from the point of view of speculation. It is being only to the extent that becoming is being" (p. 290). Briefly put, the recognition that a painting is not a kind of discourse about what already exists, but is, instead, a new existent, can lead philosophers to take account of novelty and creativity in the world. Moreover, "what happens in painters suggests the presence, at the origin of universal becoming, of an imminent force of invention and creativity that, everywhere at work in the world of nature, achieves self-awareness in the mind of artists" (p. 289). According to Christian theology, creative power belongs to God alone. Yet painters are makers of new visual forms that add to the beauty of the world. This is the most solid ground there is for speaking of religious art. Art is religious in its very essence because to be creative is to imitate, in a fainter and analogous way, the divine prerogative. "There is, in a Christian universe made up of created beings, a direct invitation to artists to join in the praise of God by cooperating with his creative power and by increasing, to the extent that man can do so, the sum total of being and beauty in the world" (p. 295).

It is surprising to be told that philosophy has failed to take account of novelty and the process of becoming. But Gilson's dismissal of Aristotle's notion of the novel as the contingent and accidental, indicates that Gilson distinguishes novelty as mere newness from novelty as creativity. It is novelty as creativity that might be said to be weighted with intimations of theology. Perhaps it is, but what are we to think when we are told that "creativity" is a term borrowed from Christian theology and intelligible only by reference to that context? If creativity can be understood only by reference to a theological context, it will perhaps not be surprising that the discovery of creativity in painting will have theological import. I think we must conclude that the heavens—or the art of painting—may declare the glory of God, but only to those who are already believers.

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DISCUSSION

COMMENT ON: "PRICE'S THEORY OF THE CONCEPT"

H. H. PRICE

WHEN I wrote *Thinking and Experience* I was hoping that someone would be stimulated to restate the "classical" view of thinking. Mr. Burgener has done this in the latter sections of his article.* It was high time that someone should restate it, because (on this side of the Atlantic at least) it is in danger of being forgotten altogether.

The first half of Mr. Burgener's article is a very clear and very just exposition of my views. There is, however, one point which he may not have appreciated fully, and that is the "climate of opinion" in which I was writing, and against which I was reacting. One of my main aims was to protest against the transformation of the empiricist epistemology into a *linguistic* epistemology, a transformation initiated by the Logical Positivists of the 1930's, and completed by Wittgenstein and his disciples. Hence the amount of space devoted to sign-cognition, to the intelligence of animals, and to image-thinking, all of which are non-verbal or pre-verbal. But, as he has surmised, I am really just an old-fashioned British empiricist. I am fighting on two fronts, as it were, throughout the book: against a purely linguistic conception of thinking on one side, and against the "classical" inspective conception of it on the other. And in this two-fold battle, I am taking just the line which Locke, Berkeley, and Hume would have taken if they had been alive today: one which they do in fact suggest in their writings, though of course they could not anticipate the lengths to which the purely linguistic or verbalistic conception of thinking would go, or how it would ally itself with a behavioristic conception of human personality. One of the things I most object to in current British philosophy is the attack which is made on all sides of the "inner life," the attempt to

* See this *Review*, XI (Sept., 1957), 143-159.

show that there is no such thing, or that it is a mere muddle to suppose there is, or that to the extent that it does exist it is of no importance. (This I take to be one of the main themes of that remarkable book, Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*.) Perhaps there is some connection between this attack on the inner life and the attack on *private* life which is made by the politicians, social reformers, and economic planners. Perhaps they are only two aspects of the same thing. Anyway, between them they have gone a long way towards a kind of "dehumanisation" of man; and this seems to me one of the darkest features of the very dark age in which we live. I feel concerned about it not only as an epistemologist, but also as a religious person, or at least as a person who is interested in religion in a very undenominational way. Religion, as I view it, is very closely connected with the "inner life"; and if one is forbidden to take an interest in the "inner life," religion will wither away from sheer inanition. At any rate, the most mystical types of religion will, and these are the ones which seem to me the most important.

If I am anything like right in these rather extravagant remarks, the purely epistemological issue about the linguistic or verbalistic conception of thinking is connected quite closely with others which are of importance to the ordinary man and not merely to professional philosophers. But of course I am not discussing these other issues in my book. What did concern me was only to correct the extravagances of a purely linguistic conception of thinking, by showing, if I could, that intelligence manifests itself also in non-verbal or pre-verbal ways, some of which are "private," i.e., inaccessible to outside observers.

Professor Burgener's remarks about dispositions are much to the point, and I have certainly felt uneasy myself on that subject. One of the questions here is whether dispositional statements (which are equivalent, I think, to sets of *conditional* statements) must have a "categorical basis." I have said something about this on pp. 321 *fin* - 322; and have suggested that though dispositional statements about material objects, e.g., "wood is combustible" have turned out to be deducible from categorical statements about the molecular or atomic or sub-atomic structure of the objects, this may not be true of dispositional statements

about minds. I am not quite clear what he thinks about this. The question turns upon his notion of "power." Just what does "a power" amount to? I think that when Hume made his remark about images being "present in power" (as opposed to present in fact) he only meant that they *would* be present in fact, *if* they were needed. In that case, his notion of "power" (equivalent to "potentiality") is something which can be elucidated entirely in terms of conditional statements, statements about what *would* actually happen, *if* such and such conditions were fulfilled. But plainly this is not Burgener's notion of power. I believe he ought to say that "power" is something which can be defined only ostensively, by means of examples (perceptible or introspectible or "detectable by self-consciousness," as the case may be), and this, I think, is the point of his reference to willing. If so, he would be maintaining—as I believe Maine de Biran did—that the empiricists have been mistaken about the empirical facts. (And indeed Locke himself perhaps takes a view about "power" which is very like Burgener's; for Locke seems to think that power is something *observable* both by sense and by reflection.) But in such a case even Burgener would be a kind of empiricist. An empiricist is a man who says "it all comes down to *ostensive* definition in the end."

This has something to do with his distinction between inspection and introspection. I think he is saying in effect that there are two different forms of self-consciousness, that introspection is not the only one. This is like Kant's distinction between Pure Self-consciousness and Inner Sense. My point at present is that Pure Self-consciousness (despite the honorific adjective "pure") is either something mythical, or else, if it is not, it is a form of *experience*, something that we do actually live through or "enjoy," something that we just *find ourselves* to be possessed of.

Mr. Burgener asks me on p. 157 what I think mental dispositions (recognitionnal capacities) are dispositions of. It would be sufficient for my purposes to answer "a conscious creature," human or animal. I didn't want to entangle myself more than I could help in the problem of "mind and body." But if he asks me what I conceive the structure of a conscious creature to be, then (as far

as human ones are concerned) I confess that I hesitate between two equally unfashionable views: a bipartite division of human personality into two constituents, mind and body, and a tripartite one into three (1) spirit or ego (2) mind or $\psi\omega\chi\eta$ (3) body. And if the second were accepted, I should have to say that concepts were in the end dispositions of the mind, rather than of the ego or spirit. I seem to see hints of this tripartite view in his paper, but perhaps I am mistaken.

I turn now to a quite different point. Concepts, according to Burgener's view, are modifications of the subject, and this is why they are "inspectable" as the subject itself is, (but not introspectible). And then he says they are unifying activities. Unifying is what they *do*. But it is not very clear to me *what* they unify. Do they, for instance, unify particulars into classes? And is recognising something as a Dog just unifying it with Fido, Tray, etc., which I have encountered in the past? Well and good, but I suspect he means something more by the rather awe-inspiring word "unify" and I suspect that in the background somewhere there is a whole epistemology of a more or less Kantian kind, or perhaps of a Cudworthian kind. If so, I think it ought to be brought out into the open.

In this connection, there is an intriguing passage about Platonic forms on p. 158 which seems to me to need amplification. I do not find it easy to see how concepts could be *both* modifications of the subject *and* independent of it, a possibility which Burgener says he is leaving open; nor how, if they were thus independent, they would still be entities "of the subject realm" (because they would be ideas in the mind of God, as the Christian Platonists supposed?). Or would they only be "of the subject realm" because we *become aware* of them in the same way as we become aware of the subject itself—viz., by inspection? But in such a case I think "of the subject *realm*" is perhaps too strong a phrase.

It is admittedly true that the knowing subject is "anathematic" today. First we had psychology without a subject, and now we have philosophy without one. There is however an intermediate position between admitting a full-blooded subject (a "spiritual substance," *res cogitans*) and not having any subject at all. This consists in saying that there are *acts* of awareness, as well as objects

of awareness. Even acts of awareness have nowadays been abandoned by most philosophers. If one were planning to reinstate the subject, I think one's first task would be to reinstate the acts. It seems to me that one of the weaknesses of Hume's theory of Personal Identity (as of Russell's) is that he omits them. His predecessors the Buddhists, who invented the Serial Analysis of Personal Identity long before he re-invented it, did not—I think—make this mistake.

One final point about the last few lines of the paper—the suggestion that the subject is “verifiable” by being the subject, not the object, of a true statement. I should rather have expected Burgener to say (as Descartes in effect does) that it is equally “verifiable” by being the subject, not the object, of *false* ones. If I state, quite falsely, that there is a lion in the room it is verifiably I, the subject, who state this (or anyhow, who entertain this false proposition). But perhaps Mr. Burgener is thinking here only of a special class of statements, namely “inspective” ones.

Oxford.

BOOKS RECEIVED

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS

ROBERT F. TREDWELL AND STAFF

ADLER, A. *The Education of the Individual*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. xiii, 143 pp. \$3.50—A confused and superficial treatment of the thesis that every individual is an end in himself. For Adler, the education of the individual consists in his realizing not only his relation to and equality with other individuals, but also the timeless meaning his actions can assume.—R. D. G.

D'ALBE, E. M. F., ALONZO, P. G. and BRODY, T. A. *Coloquio sobre el Problema Etico del Cientifico*. Mexico: Universidad Nacional de Mexico, 1958. 22 pp. N.P.—In a refreshingly direct paper and two critical replies, these writers try to work out a practicable criterion for the ethical judgments pressed upon scientists by the far-reaching effects of their work.—L. K. B.

ARENDT, H. *Elemente und Ursprünge Totaler Herrschaft*. Frankfurt/Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1958. xvi, 784 pp. DM 19.50—The German version of *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, 1951 and 1958) is less concise than the original, but compensates for this by a greater wealth of examples and a beautiful, almost poetic language rarely found in works of this nature. It includes a new chapter, "Ideologie und Terror, Eine neue Staatsform," replacing the "Concluding Remarks."—K. H.

BAHM, A. J. *What Makes Acts Right?* Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1958. 207 pp. \$4.00—A popular introduction to ethics, intended to "stimulate thinking" rather than offer a final solution, which discusses thirteen theories in terms of a number of tests of a good theory of right action.—F. E. B.

BASSON, A. H. *David Hume*. Baltimore: Pelican Books, Inc., 1958. 183 pp. \$.85—Basson's introduction to Hume follows the pattern which has led to successful treatments of Aquinas and Kant in this series: he limits himself almost exclusively to exposition and minimal criticism, apparently assuming that the reader will not be able to obtain or to follow the original text.—R. F. T.

* Books received will be acknowledged in this section by a brief résumé, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgement does not preclude more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. The Summaries and Comments will be written by the Managing Editor and his staff of assistants, with the occasional help of others. Reports have been contributed to this issue by Gary Brodsky, Brice Noel Fleming, Hector G. Kinloch, Donald W. Sherburne, Erling Skorpen and John T. Wilcox.

- BECK, L. *Judaism and Christianity*. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1958. 292 pp. \$4.00—In this well-bred polemic against Christianity, the "romantic religion," the author speaks from the standpoint of a devout Jew. He is most challenging in his reading of the Gospels as the history of a Jew among Jews, "manifesting . . . what is pure and good in Judaism," except so far as it has been unfortunately obscured by a later and less-admirable Pauline theology.—R. P.
- BELL, H. F. *Talks on Religion*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. 73 pp. \$3.00—That religion is essentially a human achievement is the central thesis of these short popular essays. The author is an enthusiastic admirer of the late Professor Garman of Amherst.—L. S. F.
- van den BERG, J. H. *Metableica*. Nijkerk: G. F. Callenbach, 1958. 255 pp. N. P.—A tentative but suggestive attempt to state "the principles of an historical psychology," this book protests against a static view of man and proposes a dynamic theory of human transformation.—F. E. B.
- BRÉHIER, E. *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, trans. Joseph Thomas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. viii, 205 pp. \$4.50—Bréhier's series of lectures introducing Plotinus is surely among the clearest works of its kind. It was originally published in 1928, but appears here with new footnotes, a revised bibliography, and a supplementary chapter on "The Sensible World and Matter" written in 1952.—R. F. T.
- BROMILEY, G. W. *The Unity and Disunity of the Church*. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1958. 104 pp. \$1.50—While questioning the basis of the current ecumenical movement, this conservative author suggests that the Christian churches should seek unity on the basis of a single correct theology.—F. E. B.
- BRUEHL, L. *The Death Blow to Communism*. New York: Vantage Press, 1958. 426 pp. \$5.00—Starting with the claim that thus far philosophy has been a total failure, the author remedies the situation by giving us his new principle of trinism ("A thing is a position-operation-duration structure"), which, if properly applied, will annihilate Communism and establish on earth "something resembling a paradise."—R. D. G.
- BURKE, E. *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful*, ed. J. T. Boulton. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. cxxx, 197 pp. \$5.00—Burke and his predecessors seem to be most before the mind of the editor in his long introduction to this standard eighteenth-century work: he traces the growth of Burke's ideas on art and compares them with contemporary investigations. The sections examining the doctrines themselves are somewhat vague, and those tracing the philosophical reaction to Burke rather

too short; however the study of Burke's influence on artists is fascinating reading. The text is done with care, and the footnotes include excerpts from the reviews of the *Enquiry's* first edition where these seem to have guided Burke's revisions.—R. F. T.

- CANTOR, N. F. *Church, Kingship, and Lay Investiture in England, 1089-1135*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958. xiv, 349 pp. \$6.00—The central issues of *regnum* versus *sacerdotium* have been obscured by a concentration on personalities and a murder in a cathedral. Cantor is also concerned with personalities, but in this thorough study of church-state relations in Anglo-Norman England, he goes behind the legend and ably demonstrates that the controversies which were dramatized in blood in 1170 had already been settled by politico-ecclesiastical negotiations more than half-a-century earlier. The main interest of the study is in Cantor's discussion of St. Anselm as an aging ecclesiastical statesman trying to avoid the extremes of that "fanatical high Gregorian" Paschal II, while insisting on the ending of lay investiture despite Henry I's opposition.—H. G. K.

- DONDEYNE, A. *Contemporary European Thought and Christian Faith*, trans. Ernan McMullin and John Burnheim. Pittsburgh: Dusquesne University, 1958. xi, 211 pp. Paper: \$5.00; Cloth: \$5.75—A very readable translation of a highly interesting book which marks an important step in the dialogue between existential phenomenology and the philosophia perennis. The author's claim is that each can profit from the other. After representing first the main currents of existentialist thought, with emphasis on the importance of intentionality and historicity, and then the relevance of Thomism, he shows the part the former could play in the developing Christian tradition.—R. D. G.

- DRAKE, H. L. *The People's Plato*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. xxiii, 633 pp. \$7.50—For an additional \$2.50 the people may purchase Jowett, which is no more unwieldy and a great deal more complete than this topical selection.—R. P.

- DUNCAN, A. R. C. *Practical Reason and Morality*. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd., 1957. xviii, 182 pp. N. P.—In examining Kant's *Foundations for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Duncan contrasts his own, Critical interpretation with the Ethical interpretation which is far more common. His principal contention is that the *Foundations* is not an exposition of Kant's ethical views but a "partial critique of practical reason"; Kant's object "is to understand the nature of morality and to state its principle, that is, the principle which describes what morality is." The net effect of this approach is to take the emphasis away from the categorical imperative as a criterion of morality and to place it on parts of the *Foundations* which are inherently stronger, particularly on Sections I and III. At the same time it brings the *Foundations* closer to the first and second *Critiques* and makes it a sounder and more thoroughly Kantian (if somewhat less exciting) work.—R. F. T.

- FEIBLEMAN, J. K. *Inside the Great Mirror*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1958. 228 pp. 19 Guilders—The 'Great Mirror' is the logic of Russell and Wittgenstein. Feibleman accuses positivists and analysts of looking at the mirror but not at the world of things and ideas which Russell and Wittgenstein saw in it; they therefore ignore the presuppositions of logical inquiry while inconsistently using this inquiry to scourge metaphysics. This thesis is made unconvincing by the fact that Feibleman does not try to restore transcendental metaphysics (he is glad the positivists have buried it!) but looks to those analysts who have shown increasing interest in metaphysical discourse as the hope of metaphysics.—E. S.
- FEIBLEMAN, J. K., ed. *Tulane Studies in Philosophy*, VII. New Orleans: Tulane Department of Philosophy, 1958. 151 pp. \$2.00—The contributors to this collection on the method, scope, and evidence of philosophical systems agree that only the most modest claims can be made for philosophy. And they agree that there is an "irreducible plurality of philosophical systems;" all of which leaves one with the question whether there can be reasons other than personal taste for choosing one system over another—a question which none of the writers faces.—R. E.
- FINK, E. *Sein, Wahrheit, Welt. Vor-Fragen zum Problem des Phänomen-Begriffes*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958. viii, 156 pp. 12,50 Guilders—Fink attempts to give an introduction to the problem of Being and appearance in the light of the philosophy of Husserl and Heidegger. There is very little in this volume which is new; Fink's work is hampered by prolixity and by a difficult language which is opaque in spite of attempts to be poetic.—K. H.
- FUERSTENAU, P. *Heidegger, das Gefüge seines Denkens*. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1958. 185 pp. N. P.—Fürstenau systematically analyzes Heidegger's understanding of being, stressing the continuity between *Sein und Zeit* and his later writings. He also presents a survey of the history of philosophy as interpreted by Heidegger, summing up this discussion with an account of Heidegger's conception of *Ursprünglichkeit* and *Verfall* in philosophy. A work of explication and interpretation rather than criticism.—L. S. F.
- GENTILE, G. *Opere Complete: Le Origini della Filosofia Contemporanea in Italia*. Firenze: Sansoni, 1957. 4 vols, each L. 2500—Volumes XXXI-XXXIV of the new critical edition present Gentile's erudite work on the writings of Italian philosophers—mostly minor figures—of the second half of the nineteenth century. He classifies them as Platonists, Positivists, Neo-Kantians, or Hegelians.—R. D. G.
- GENTILE, G. *Opere Complete: Discorsi di Religione*. Firenze: Sansoni, 1957. Vol XXXVII: xii. 172 pp. L. 1800—This fourth edition of Gentile's well-known work has been augmented by a second part and an appendix, consisting of four late articles which give his last formulation of the problem of religion.—R. D. G.

- HANSON, N. R. *Patterns of Discovery*. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1958. ix, 241 pp. \$5.50—Hanson is primarily concerned with the discovery of new scientific theories. Following Wittgenstein, he points out how our appraisal of the facts is influenced by the language and concepts we bring to our inquiry. The problem of discovery is, he believes, the overcoming of these preconceptions, and is neither inductive nor deductive but, as Peirce called it, abductive. The passing treatments of Kepler, and of other topics in the history of science, are very good.—R. P.
- HARRIS, E. E. *Revelation Through Reason*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958. xii, 160 pp. \$4.00—Arguing that religion and science can not be in essential conflict, Harris sets himself the task of resolving their apparent disagreements by considering such problems as the language of theology, the relation of nature and God, and the nature of evil. — L. S. F.
- HART, C. A. *Thomistic Metaphysics: An Inquiry into the Act of Existing*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959. xviii, 413 pp. \$5.50—Each chapter of this beginning textbook is followed by an extensive list of questions, but bibliography and guides for supplementary source readings are absent. Positions other than St. Thomas's—such as those of Suarez, Scotus, and Kant—are briefly considered on specific issues.—R. D. G.
- HUTIN, S. *La Philosophie anglaise et américaine*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958. 128 pp. N. P.—A slim volume in which almost every English and American philosopher from the Middle Ages through the present day comes up for mention, but scarcely more.—R. D. G.
- JACOBS, N. J. *Naming-Day in Eden*. New York: The MacMillan Co., 1958. xi, 159 pp. \$3.95—A sometimes delightful, but often strained, spoof of the vagaries of names, and of theories about names, from their creation by Adam to the present.—R. P.
- JOLIVET, R. *Aux sources de l'existentialisme chrétien: Kierkegaard*. Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1958. 287 pp. 900 francs—An ever-so-slightly changed version of the author's *Introduction à Kierkegaard* which appeared in 1946.—R. D. G.
- JONAS, H. *The Gnostic Religion*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. xviii, 302 pp. \$6.00—This informative and well-written account of gnosticism provides the English reader with his first access to much of this material, which was formerly restricted to specialized publications in French and German. Jonas describes the basic tenets and symbols of gnosticism, and then presents six specific systems for consideration, including Marcian, Valentinius, and Mani. The third section is perhaps the most interesting: in it Jonas demonstrates that gnosticism is more objectionable to the classic Greek than to the Christian.—L. S. F.

- KANTBACK, K. *Vom Sinn der Selbsterkenntnis*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1958. 211 pp. DM 18—The central theme of this volume is love, which conquers the rift between man and that which surrounds him. The meaning of human existence is sought in the awareness of the same, incomprehensible divine presence in man and in the other. Although this work owes too much to Heidegger to stand as an original contribution, it is nevertheless well written and sincere.—K. H.
- KAUFMANN, W. *Critique of Religion and Philosophy*. New York: Harper and Bros., 1958. xvii, 325 pp. \$5.00—While this work evidences considerable learning and contains many important insights, it seems to fall between the professional philosopher and the general reader: it is too dogmatic, terse, and occasionally superficial for the one, and too diffuse and erudite for the other. The critique of philosophy centers around a discussion of existentialism and analysis, neither of which, it is claimed, is adequate as a philosophy of man. Analysis cannot account for the emotive, religious and "profound" aspects of life, while existentialism cannot account for the commonplace. The critique of religion moves largely at the level of theology, with Bultmann, Tillich and Niebuhr coming in for brief and unsympathetic discussion.—G. B.
- KNELLER, GEORGE F. *Existentialism and Education*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. xi, 170 pp. \$3.75—Kneller holds that existentialism, as a humanism concerned with authentic human existence, may well throw light on many educational problems. Though open to challenge on many points of interpretation, the book remains interesting for its approach and for the novel viewpoint from which it appraises existentialist thinkers and themes.—R. D. G.
- LAUER, J. Q. *The Triumph of Subjectivity: An Introduction to Transcendental Phenomenology*. New York: Fordham University Press, 1958. ix, 185 pp. \$4.00—Husserl's basic phenomenological method and techniques, his notion of the intentionality of consciousness, and his reformulation of the meaning of "Subject" and "Object" are elucidated in this admirably clear, well-documented study. The contributions of Scheler, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre to the development of phenomenology are also indicated.—R. D. G.
- MALCOLM, N. *Ludwig Wittgenstein*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958. 100 pp. \$2.00—This limpidly composed memoir should fascinate anyone interested in Wittgenstein (and might make interested many who are not). It consists of personal reminiscences, letters from Wittgenstein, and some straight philosophical material in the form of notes, taken by Malcolm at the time, on lectures and conversations. A revised version of the already-published biographical sketch of Wittgenstein by von Wright is included.—B. N. F.

- MANLEY, G. T. *The Book of the Law, Studies in the Date of Deuteronomy*. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1958.—On the basis of detailed arguments drawn from historical and philological analyses of Deuteronomy, the author argues that the laws proclaimed in it were declared by Moses and subsequently placed in the hands of the priests.—G. B.
- MANNHEIM, K. *Systematic Sociology*, ed. J. S. Erös and W. A. C. Stewart. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. xxx, 169 pp. \$6.00—While perhaps somewhat dated (the lectures from which it is drawn were delivered in 1934), this work is a thoroughly readable and perspicuous introduction to sociology. Its four parts discuss the human "psychic equipment"; social forms; the problem of human integration; and the forces and institutions which create social stability.—G. B.
- MAYO, B. *Ethics and the Moral Life*. London: Macmillan, 1958. 232 pp. \$5.00—Mayo argues that ethical principles are not actually universal but can be universalized in three senses; they are, in fact, essentially controversial and can best be understood in terms of an analysis of the notion of authority. He concludes with a critique of (Kantian) duty, as opposed to (Greek) virtue, as a key to morality.—J. T. W.
- MARITAIN, J. *St. Thomas Aquinas*. New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1958. 281 pp. \$1.35—Newly translated and revised, this book is as pertinent today as when it first appeared in 1930. In it Maritain presents some striking aspects of the personality and work of Aquinas and shows the continued relevance of Thomism. A generous appendix includes bibliographies and reprints of four pertinent papal documents.—R. D. G.
- MEHLBERG, H. *The Reach of Science*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958. xii, 356 pp. \$5.50—Mehlberg's technically competent work will make an excellent text for introductory courses in the philosophy of science. It moves from a discussion of scientific method to a theory of truth; then, without an appeal to a doctrine of meaning, it argues that every theoretical and practical problem which can be solved at all has a verifiable solution and can be solved by the scientific method.—G. B.
- MELDEN, A. I., ed. *Essays in Moral Philosophy*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958. xii, 216 pp. \$4.50—Two essays in this collection appear to be of special interest. W. K. Frankena presents an acute analysis of the question whether a person can have an obligation without any corresponding motivation, and concludes that the discussion should move to a new level because the arguments on both sides are inconclusive. Gilbert Ryle suggests that it is absurd to talk about forgetting the difference between right and wrong because such "knowledge" is not mere information or technique, but involves appreciation and taking things seriously.—F. E. B.

- MOSHINSKY, M. *Espacio, Tiempo y Paridad*. Mexico, D.F.: Universidad Nacional de Mexico, 1958. 25 pp. N. P.—A technical but lucid and relatively elementary discussion of the development of the physical concepts of space and time and the bearing of the parity hypothesis of Lee and Yang on the future course of this development.—L. K. B.
- MURDY, J. *Philosophy of Atomic Physics*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1958. 136 pp. \$3.75—"It remains unforeseeable why any recalcitrance should prevail where an attempt is being made towards the inclusion of concepts stressing finitude," Murdy writes. "After all, why such a view should be wrathed by subordination in preference to aspects of ad infinitum, is difficult to ascertain, especially so, if postulates conveying the impression of infinity are besieged by so many unknown factors" (52).—R. P.
- NAGEL, E. and NEWMAN, J. R. *Gödel's Proof*. New York: New York University Press, 1958. ix, 118 pp. \$1.75—A non-technical exposition of the proof and related questions in the foundations of mathematics is presented here. The work is built around the authors' study which appeared in *Scientific American*.—R. F. T.
- O'CONNOR, D. J. *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1957. vii, 148 pp. \$3.75—Written from the viewpoint of contemporary philosophical analysis, this book provides a simple—and biased—introduction "to philosophical thinking for those students of education in universities and training colleges who would otherwise have no formal contact with philosophy."—R. D. G.
- PICHT, G. *Die Erfahrung der Geschichte*. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1958. 54 pp. N. P.—From within the modern tradition of Heidegger, Picht appraises Aristotle's conception of the experience of history.—L. S. F.
- RANDALL, J. H. JR. *The Role of Knowledge in Western Religion*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. x, 147 p. \$3.50—Noting the shift from the old science-vs.-religion conflicts to the cooler query, "In what sense and to what extent, if any, does religion involve knowledge?" Randall surveys the history of the question on the way to developing his thesis. Religion is socially indispensable, he holds; in it beliefs function not primarily as expressions of truth but as non-cognitive symbols directing the group's "organized expression of the feelings, actions, and beliefs . . . centering around the emotionally significant and valuable elements of their social experience." Still, religion involves a kind of insight inasmuch as the use of its symbolism transforms experience and the way we view it; and there remains within it an important role for intelligence—"to clarify . . . the values to which we are actually consecrated."—L. K. B.
- REISER, O. *The Integration of Human Knowledge*. Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1958. xii, 478 pp. \$8.00—Any hopes roused by an informed philosopher's undertaking a task of such importance as this

title indicates are quickly reduced to perplexity. Professor Reiser's "Scientific Humanism" turns out to be a sort of "philosophy-fiction" picture of the universe, woven out of concepts from an astounding variety of fields—semantics, logic, philosophy of mathematics, topology, cybernetics, relativity theory, social engineering, quantum mechanics, parapsychology, etc.—L. K. B.

REITH, H. C.S.C. *The Metaphysics of Saint Thomas Aquinas*. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1958. xvii, 403 pp. \$5.50—Some of the most important texts of St. Thomas—drawn from eight of his works, and paralleling the exposition in the first part—are helpfully reproduced in this elementary text.—R. D. G.

ROSSI, M. M. *A Plea for Man*. Edinburgh: The University Press, 1956. viii, 167 pp. 9/6—We have here a skeletal but suggestive sketch of the author's rejection of historicism and of history as progress; the history of philosophy serves as paradigm.—R. P.

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